David Watt

The appellant father appealed a Superior Court order dismissing his appeal from an Ontario Court order making his child a Crown ward.

The child had been apprehended after the father allowed the mother, who posed a serious risk, to have contact with the child, breaching a supervision order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to balance the risk of harm to the child from exposure to the mother against the risk of disruption to the child's positive relationship with his father if a Crown wardship order were made.

The appellant appealed his sentence of nine years' imprisonment and his designation as a long-term offender following guilty pleas to aggravated assault and other offences arising from a domestic stabbing.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in designating the appellant a long-term offender because she failed to find that his pattern of aggressive behaviour was 'persistent' under the dangerous offender criteria, and failed to separately analyze whether there was a substantial risk to reoffend.

The long-term offender designation was set aside, but the nine-year sentence for the predicate offences was affirmed as fit.

Two sets of plaintiffs commenced competing class proceedings against the defendants.

The motion judge granted carriage to the respondents and stayed the appellant's action.

The appellant appealed the carriage order to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because a carriage order is interlocutory, not final.

The stay of the unsuccessful plaintiff's action does not terminate their claim, as they may still opt out or participate in the certified class action.

Therefore, the appeal lies to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appellant sued her former employer for wrongful dismissal and its executive chairman for intentional and negligent infliction of nervous shock.

The motion judge struck the claim against the executive chairman, finding he was protected by a limitation of liability clause in the appellant's employment contract.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, applying the London Drugs exception to privity of contract.

The Court found the parties intended the limitation clause to apply to the executive chairman, who was acting in the course of his employment when he terminated the appellant.

The appellant appealed a three-year sentence for theft of a motor vehicle over $5,000.

The appellant had presented false identification, taken a test drive with a salesman, and forced the salesman out of the vehicle on a highway.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the premeditated nature of the offence, the terrifying impact on the victim, and the appellant's lengthy criminal record and breaches of court orders.

The respondents to the appeal brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal of a May 2, 2012 order for delay and lack of merit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, noting that the appeal was perfected prior to being dismissed for delay, and that motions to dismiss for lack of merit are generally dealt with at the hearing of the appeal.

The court also noted the appellant may have had an unconsidered motion to vary the order for appointment of a litigation guardian.

Costs of the motion were awarded to the appellant.

The infant plaintiff sued the defendant for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The defendant appealed an order striking out her third party claim against the infant plaintiff's mother.

The motion judge had struck the claim on the basis that the plaintiff's claim was limited to the defendant's proportionate degree of negligence.

The Court of Appeal amended the formal order on consent to explicitly state that the plaintiff's claim is limited to the damages apportioned to the defendant's relative degree of fault, and otherwise dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision finding implied consent for his son to drive his vehicle.

The motions judge had drawn an adverse inference against the appellant for failing to make efforts to provide his son's evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motions judge erred by drawing the adverse inference without first assessing the credibility of the appellant's own evidence, which strongly suggested a lack of consent.

The summary judgment motion was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal released a costs endorsement following an appeal and cross-appeal.

The respondent, RSM Richter Inc., was the successful party and was awarded costs.

The court fixed the costs of all proceedings, including the motion, stay, appeal, and cross-appeal, at $50,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes, payable by the appellant personally rather than by the estate.

The appellant pleaded guilty to simple robbery and was sentenced to 30 months in prison based on a joint submission.

He appealed his sentence, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer allegedly failed to follow instructions to immediately accept an earlier, more lenient plea offer from the Crown before seeking bail.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the lawyer's evidence more credible that the appellant had insisted on seeking bail first due to severe withdrawal symptoms.

The court also rejected arguments that counsel should have advocated for a return to the original offer or a reduced sentence based on inadequate medical treatment in custody.

The respondent law firm sued the appellant for unpaid legal bills arising from divorce proceedings.

The appellant counterclaimed for an order that the bills be referred for assessment, alleging his lawyer failed to address a material change in circumstance and a mathematical error in an arbitration award.

The motion judge granted summary judgment for the law firm, finding the request for assessment disingenuous because the appellant had promised to pay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the request was not tactical as the factual basis was known to the solicitor during the relationship, and referred the accounts for assessment.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm against his former partner, with whom he was engaged in a custody dispute.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding a note written by the complainant, the nature of her injuries, and her motive to fabricate the allegations to gain an advantage in family court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to accept the complainant's explanations and reject the defence's hypotheses.

A fresh evidence application regarding post-trial custody proceedings was also dismissed.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence of two years less a day imposed on the respondent for historical sexual assault against a teenaged relative.

The Crown argued the sentence was demonstrably unfit and sought a penitentiary term.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge made no error in principle in weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors and imposing a conditional sentence with strict house arrest.

The court granted the Crown's request to increase the SOIRA order to 20 years on consent.

The Crown appealed a net sentence of 10 months' imprisonment and 18 months' probation imposed on the respondent for possession of child pornography, making child pornography available, and breach of probation.

The Crown argued the sentencing judge minimized the gravity of the offences and imposed a demonstrably unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors, and noting the custodial portion of the sentence had already been served.

The Crown appealed the trial judge's decision to stay charges against two accused involved in a marijuana grow operation.

The trial judge stayed the charges against the first accused because a Mandarin interpreter was unavailable on the final day of trial, citing judicial independence and unreasonable delay.

The charges against the second accused were stayed based on a finding that police breached the knock-and-announce rule and section 7 of the Charter during the execution of a search warrant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle and in law on both stays.

The stays were set aside and a new trial was ordered for both accused.

The appellant appealed his convictions for uttering a threat to cause death, criminal harassment, and breach of probation.

He argued that the trial judge erred in the jury charge regarding the defence theory, the independence of confirmatory evidence, the examples of confirmatory evidence provided, and the instruction on post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions to the jury.

The appellant was convicted of firearms and drug trafficking offences after police found him in an apartment with drugs and a loaded handgun.

At trial, the judge refused to allow the defence to call a third-party witness who was expected to testify that the drugs and gun belonged to him, ruling there was an insufficient nexus between the witness and the offences.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge misapplied the test for alternate suspect evidence.

Where the defence proposes to call direct evidence from another person taking responsibility for the crimes charged, that proposed evidence itself constitutes a sufficient nexus.

The appellant appealed his conviction and eight-year sentence for cocaine importation.

He argued that his s. 11(b) Charter rights were violated, that the Crown's cross-examination and closing address were improper, and that the trial judge erred in discharging a juror.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge's interventions cured any potential prejudice from the Crown's conduct and that the s. 11(b) delay was not unreasonable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the eight-year sentence was within the appropriate range for a sophisticated courier.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching against a child.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by excluding evidence of the complainant's prior sexual abuse by another individual under s. 276 of the Criminal Code, failing to provide limiting instructions regarding prior consistent statements and extrinsic misconduct, improperly characterizing a defence witness's evidence as potentially 'scripted', and inadequately answering a jury question on the standard of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant appealed his conviction and six-month sentence for assault causing bodily harm following a bar fight where he sucker-punched the complainant.

He argued the trial judge misapplied the standard of proof and erred in assessing credibility regarding his self-defence claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's core findings were supported by a sober, independent witness.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the six-month term fell within the appropriate range given the circumstances.