David Watt

The appellant appealed a committal for extradition to the Republic of Korea for fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud, and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

The appellant argued the record of the case lacked sufficient basis for committal and contained inconsistencies and translation issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the will-say statements provided sufficient evidence of fraudulent transactions to support committal.

The application for judicial review was also dismissed, as the Minister was not required to seek assurances that the appellant would be tried only on particularized allegations.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for criminal harassment and failing to comply with a recognizance, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board continuing his conditional discharge.

He argued the Board erred in finding he posed a significant threat to public safety and in failing to order a Community Treatment Order (CTO) instead.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board reasonably relied on psychiatric evidence that the appellant would stop his medication and become a threat if absolutely discharged.

The Court also noted the Board lacked jurisdiction to order a CTO, as only a physician can issue one under the Mental Health Act.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving causing bodily harm, 'over 80' causing bodily harm, and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

He challenged the validity of the search warrant used to obtain his hospital blood test results and the admission of those results without specific evidence of the testing equipment's reliability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the search warrant valid and upholding the trial judge's reliance on the implicit accuracy and reliability of a large urban hospital's laboratory equipment.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings against the respondent for drug and proceeds of crime offences due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to properly analyze and allocate the periods of delay.

Upon conducting its own analysis, the Court of Appeal concluded that the total period of Crown and institutional delay was approximately 10 months, which only slightly exceeded the Morin guidelines.

Balancing this against the minimal prejudice suffered by the respondent and society's interest in a trial on the merits, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the stay, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of armed robbery and firearms offences.

At trial, the victim recanted his preliminary inquiry identification of the appellant.

The Crown introduced the preliminary inquiry evidence for its truth and a video of the victim's initial photo line-up identification.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the use of the video line-up, prior inconsistent statements of a witness, and the failure to give a Vetrovec warning for the recanting victim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate and the trial judge's cautions regarding the witness's evidence were sufficient.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and related offences arising from a stabbing incident.

At trial, the appellant relied on self-defence, calling a witness who testified the victim attacked the appellant with a baseball bat.

The trial judge rejected this evidence and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge applied unequal scrutiny to the witnesses and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or factual findings, concluding the evidence overwhelmingly weighed against self-defence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for child pornography and weapons offences.

He argued the trial judge erred by not severing the charges, admitting his statement, refusing mid-trial disclosure of his computer, and providing the jury with a written copy of the charge.

He also argued the verdict was unreasonable and the sentence for the firearms offence was excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's discretionary decisions or findings of fact, and held the verdict was reasonable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly imposed a consecutive sentence above the minimum for the loaded restricted firearm.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The respondent, Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No. 1352, was awarded costs of $30,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondent Tarion Warranty Corporation was also awarded costs of $11,000, as the appellant was unsuccessful in seeking relief against it.

Following an appeal where the appellant was partially successful in reversing a significant portion of the trial judge's award, both parties sought partial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal determined that because neither party was wholly successful at either the trial or appellate level, the appropriate disposition was no order as to costs for the appeal, the motion, or the trial.

The appellant franchisee appealed the dismissal of its action against the respondent franchisor for breach of the statutory duty of fair dealing under the Arthur Wishart Act.

The appellant argued that the franchisor failed to provide sufficient disclosure regarding a right of first refusal for a new restaurant location, specifically concerning the final lease terms and the size of the exclusive territory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the franchisor acted in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner, and that the appellant's decision to pass on the location was an informed one based on its own financial position and lack of confidence in the landlord.

The appellants and respondents are adjoining neighbours involved in a dispute over a parking easement on the respondents' property.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order that limited their parking to a single vehicle and required them to park so as not to restrict the respondents' backyard access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly interpreted the original grant of easement and the surrounding circumstances, which indicated an intention to create a right to park only one vehicle.

The respondents' cross-appeal on costs was also dismissed.

The father appealed from urgent temporary orders granting the mother temporary custody, support, and preservation of assets, arguing the Ontario court lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the real and substantial connection test for the Family Law Act claims and the statutory criteria under section 22 of the Children's Law Reform Act for the custody claims.

The court affirmed that jurisdiction can be assumed on a prima facie basis for urgent temporary orders while adjourning the final determination of forum conveniens.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and theft after hijacking a tractor-trailer of frozen chickens and shooting the driver.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting cell phone propagation maps and test calls, and in his jury instructions regarding the W. (D.) framework and the distinction between disbelief and fabrication of an exculpatory statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the evidentiary rulings or the jury instructions.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that largely denied his motion to change child and spousal support and ordered him to pay significant arrears.

He argued the trial judge erred by denying an adjournment to retain counsel, imputing income without sufficient evidence, and ordering him to pay 100 percent of horse-related section 7 expenses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in refusing the adjournment, had a sufficient basis to impute income due to the appellant's failure to provide financial information, and correctly treated the horse-related expenses as section 7 expenses.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of two counts relating to assaults committed on her child.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge made fatal errors during the jury selection process.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred by deciding to select alternate jurors after a jury of 12 had already been selected, and by erroneously concluding the appellant had exhausted her peremptory challenges, thereby denying her a challenge to which she was entitled.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the second error was fatal and could not be saved by the curative provisions of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The plaintiff's action was dismissed for delay by the Registrar.

The Master set aside the dismissal, finding the delay was inadvertent and there was no actual prejudice to the defendants.

On appeal, the Superior Court judge reinstated the dismissal, finding the Master misapprehended the evidence and failed to consider the public interest in finality.

The Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiff's appeal and reinstated the Master's order, holding that the Master's discretionary decision was entitled to significant deference and his findings were reasonable.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for firearms offences, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence and made unreasonable findings of guilt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no critical misapprehensions of evidence and that the findings were firmly rooted in circumstantial evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant was apprehended with a fully loaded semi-automatic handgun while bound by a recognizance and a firearms prohibition, making the sentence fit.

The appellant father appealed a trial judge's order awarding retroactive child support, retroactive section 7 extraordinary expenses, sole custody to the respondent mother, and the transfer of a life insurance policy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle by failing to apply the criteria under section 7 of the Child Support Guidelines and the D.B.S. factors for retroactive support.

The court also held it was an error to make unrequested substantive orders regarding custody and life insurance.

To save time and expense, the Court of Appeal substituted its own order fixing arrears and setting future section 7 expense obligations.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault, assault, and breach of recognizance arising from a stabbing outside a bar.

The trial judge relied on the testimony of a taxi driver who heard the appellant admit to stabbing someone.

The appellant argued that his trial counsel's failure to cross-examine the taxi driver on his preliminary inquiry testimony resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was aware of the discrepancies in the evidence and made reasonable credibility findings.

The young person appealed his robbery conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting his videotaped statement to police.

The first statement was inadmissible due to non-compliance with the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in applying the derived confessions rule, as the second statement was tainted by the first and the police failed to advise the young person that the first statement was inadmissible.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.