Charles William Hourigan

The Bank appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for knowing assistance in a breach of trust after it allowed a payroll processing company continued access to electronic banking facilities despite knowing of a deficit in a trust account.

The plaintiffs cross-appealed the dismissal of their claim for knowing receipt of trust funds regarding a transfer that reduced an overdraft.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the knowledge requirement for knowing assistance and made no palpable and overriding error in concluding the Bank had no obligation to inquire into the overdrafts.

The appellants purchased a home and acquired a title insurance policy from the respondent.

Years later, they discovered a previous owner had removed load-bearing walls without a building permit, resulting in a municipal order to remedy an unsafe building.

The respondent denied coverage under the title policy.

The motion judge dismissed the appellants' summary judgment motion, finding the title remained marketable and that municipal work orders must be registered on title to trigger coverage.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the standard of review for standard form insurance contracts is correctness.

The Court found the motion judge erred in his interpretation of the policy and the nature of off-title defects, concluding that the unpermitted construction rendered the title unmarketable and was covered under the policy.

The respondents, former employees, sued the appellant employer for unpaid wages and were granted summary judgment.

The appellant argued it was authorized under s. 13 of the Employment Standards Act to deduct amounts from the unpaid wages because the respondents failed to return a company computer containing intellectual property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the employment contracts did not contain written authorization permitting such deductions.

The Court also upheld the motion judge's discretionary refusal to stay the enforcement of the judgment pending the appellant's counterclaim for conversion.

The self-represented moving party brought a motion for an extension of time to serve and file a notice of appeal from an order dismissing her action for non-compliance with a discovery plan.

The respondents opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion for a stay or security for costs.

The Court of Appeal applied the five-factor test for extending time and found that the moving party had no intention to appeal within the time limit, offered no explanation for the delay, and the appeal lacked merit.

Given the moving party's history of non-compliance with court orders and abuse of process, the justice of the case did not favour an extension.

The motion was dismissed with costs.

The appellant purchased a property and subsequently discovered it was contaminated with petroleum hydrocarbons that had migrated from the respondents' neighbouring property.

The respondents had a long history of improper waste storage and non-compliance with Ministry of the Environment orders.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's claims under s. 99(2) of the Environmental Protection Act, nuisance, and negligence, finding that the appellant failed to prove damages and that an existing MOE remediation order precluded statutory recovery.

The Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that the MOE order did not bar civil recovery, that restoration costs were the appropriate measure of damages under the EPA, and that the individual respondent was personally liable.

The Court awarded $1,328,000 in remediation damages and $100,000 in punitive damages.

The parties, two dentists operating through professional corporations, entered into a joint venture agreement that provided for termination on 90 days' notice but was silent on the consequences of termination.

The respondent gave notice of termination and sought to exclude the appellant from the practice and buy out his interest.

The application judge declared the joint venture terminated, excluded the appellant from the practice, and directed that the appellant's interest be sold to the respondent, with financial issues to be resolved separately.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge had jurisdiction and that terminating the appellant's ownership interest was necessary to give business efficacy to the termination provision and the parties' common intention.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal from an order dismissing a motion for summary judgment.

The moving party conceded that the order did not preclude the responding party from advancing its arguments regarding s. 36(4) of the Competition Act or abuse of process as substantive defences at trial, and agreed not to advance an argument of res judicata.

Based on this concession that the order was interlocutory rather than final, the Court of Appeal quashed the appeal and awarded costs to the moving party.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime.

He was arrested during the execution of a search warrant in an apartment, holding cash and a knife, moments after being seen on a balcony where drugs were later found.

The Court of Appeal held that the drug convictions were unreasonable because the circumstantial evidence did not support guilt as the only reasonable inference.

However, the court upheld the proceeds of crime conviction, finding no other reasonable explanation for the cash.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery for his role in a home invasion and was sentenced to two years' imprisonment.

He appealed his sentence and introduced fresh evidence demonstrating significant rehabilitation during the five years he spent on bail pending appeal, including maintaining employment, marrying, and volunteering.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence and held that returning the appellant to custody would sacrifice his rehabilitation for general deterrence.

The custodial portion of the sentence was reduced to time served.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding child custody, child support, property equalization, and costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decisions granting sole custody to the respondent, calculating child support based on 2012 income, and excluding gifts and inheritances deposited into a joint account from the respondent's net family property.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding costs, finding the trial judge erred in awarding full recovery costs based on an offer to settle that expired before trial.

The trial costs award was varied to $76,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted to the respondent bank based on her default under a mortgage on a condominium property.

The appellant had stopped making principal, interest, and common element fee payments.

The appellant raised defences including that her name had been expropriated and that she was a tenant rather than an owner.

The Court of Appeal found no genuine issue requiring a trial and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application against the Law Society of Upper Canada and the Attorney General of Ontario as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by not reviewing the evidence filed in his supplementary application record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, endorsing the principle that Rule 2.1 is designed for summary dismissal based on the face of the pleadings and written submissions, and that resorting to evidence defeats the purpose of the rule.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to set aside a noting in default and default judgment.

The motion judge found that while the appellant had a triable defence, he failed to move expeditiously, waiting 28 months after the noting in default to proceed with the motion.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding ample evidence to support the conclusion on delay and confirming that the motion judge properly considered the prejudice to the parties and the appellant's litigation conduct.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving historic abuse of a child relative, and also appealed a six-year penitentiary sentence.

The court refused to admit fresh evidence consisting of a urologist's report because the proposed evidence merely bolstered unchallenged trial evidence and could not reasonably have affected the verdict.

Although the Crown's cross-examination about abortion risks was inflammatory and inappropriate, it did not render the trial unfair or cause a miscarriage of justice.

The court also held that the absence of a limiting instruction on one prior consistent statement was not fatal in light of the way prior statements were used at trial, and upheld the sentence as fit.

The appellants, charged with drug offences, sought disclosure of police policy directives regarding confidential informants during their preliminary inquiry.

After the Crown refused disclosure, the preliminary inquiry judge issued subpoenas duces tecum to the police chiefs.

A Superior Court judge quashed the subpoenas, finding the preliminary inquiry judge lacked jurisdiction to order what amounted to third-party disclosure.

The appellants appealed.

Although the appeal was moot because the appellants had since pleaded guilty, the Court of Appeal exercised its discretion to hear it.

The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a preliminary inquiry judge cannot use a subpoena duces tecum to circumvent the jurisdictional limits on ordering production of third-party records, which must be sought before a trial judge under the O'Connor regime.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of powder cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, seeking a reduction to six months less one day to avoid immigration consequences, arguing the trial judge failed to properly consider his post-traumatic stress disorder and misapprehended the sentencing range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge carefully considered all relevant factors and imposed a fit sentence within the applicable range.

The appellant insurer appealed a jury verdict awarding the respondent damages for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by refusing to grant a mistrial after the respondent's counsel made improper comments during his closing address, by giving an inadequate correcting instruction, by allowing an expert to testify beyond his report, and by refusing to order an assignment of statutory accident benefits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's correcting instruction adequately addressed the improper comments, the evidentiary ruling was fair, and the appellant failed to prove the jury's future care award mirrored the respondent's uncertain accident benefits entitlement.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's interpretation of a consent order incorporating terms of settlement regarding zoning restrictions on a proposed plan of subdivision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the language of the consent order clear and unambiguous in excluding the contested lots from the restrictions.

The Court further held that even if there were ambiguity, the parole evidence rule would not assist the appellants, and there was no basis to find unilateral or mutual mistake.

The appellants appealed a mid-trial Rule 21 motion decision interpreting their late father's will and codicil.

The trial judge found that the trusts created by the will, which granted a life interest to the testator's widow, did not preclude her from accumulating wealth from the trust funds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the interpretation, finding the testator intended to provide generously for his widow without requiring her to conserve the estate for the remainder beneficiaries.

The Court also rejected the appellants' argument that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to hear the mid-trial motion, noting they had consented to the procedure, though the Court cautioned against mid-trial Rule 21 motions.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court order quashing their discharge at a preliminary inquiry regarding a tractor trailer robbery.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence and testimony from former co-accused implicating the appellants in other robberies.

The appellants argued the motion judge improperly treated evidence from other counts as similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly identified a jurisdictional error by the preliminary inquiry judge in failing to consider the evidence as a whole, and that the similarities between the robberies supported an inference that the same group committed them.