Charles William Hourigan

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their third-party claim against their former lawyer for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.

The lawyer had acted for both the appellants and the vendors in a family share purchase transaction involving a promissory note and consulting agreements.

The lawyer failed to recognize the potential conflict of interest, did not advise the appellants to obtain independent legal advice, and failed to explain the full business risks and legal liabilities of the transaction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the lawyer breached his fiduciary duty and fell below the standard of care, and awarded the appellants damages for the amount they paid to settle the resulting action on the promissory note.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision allowing the respondent commercial tenant to exercise a lease renewal option despite being in arrears.

The tenant had purported to exercise the option, but the landlord argued the option was void for uncertainty and that the tenant was in default of rent-related covenants.

The Court of Appeal held that while the renewal option was not void for uncertainty, the tenant was in default of its obligation to pay additional rent when due.

As the tenant failed to meet the precondition of paying all rent when due, the purported exercise of the renewal option was invalid and unenforceable.

The appeal was allowed and the tenant was ordered to vacate the premises.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual offences against his step-daughter arising from long-term abuse allegations spanning childhood to late adolescence.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility findings, arguing improper speculation about the family’s prior housing arrangements and improper rejection of defence evidence from close family members.

The Court of Appeal held that any error concerning the housing-scam comment was peripheral, given the many unchallenged reasons for rejecting the appellant’s evidence.

It further held that the trial judge did not reject the younger siblings’ evidence solely because of relationship, but because the evidence supported a finding that they remained under parental influence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle and sought leave to appeal his sentence, arguing he was not accorded proper credit for pre-disposition custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the conviction was not unreasonable and the municipal address was not an essential element of the offence.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and the court applied a 1.5:1 credit ratio for pre-disposition custody, reducing the sentence by a further 300 days.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on how to assess the credibility of the complainant, who was 12 at the time of the events and 17 at trial.

The trial judge instructed the jury that they were considering 'the memory of a 12 year old'.

The majority of the Court of Appeal held this instruction was an error in law as it could have confused the jury into assessing the complainant's credibility on non-peripheral matters as if she were 12 years old.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and breach of probation, and sentenced to 18 months and 12 months consecutive, plus three years' probation.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the identification evidence was weak, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's analysis of the identification evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant had a lengthy history of similar offences on public transit, justifying the sentence and the probation condition prohibiting his use of public transit.

The appellant appealed a family law trial judgment regarding the funding of an equalization payment and the trial costs award.

The trial judge had ordered the respondent to pay the $183,911.76 equalization payment out of the $277,980.48 proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home held in trust.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that, because the parties had an equal entitlement to the sale proceeds, the trial judge erred by effectively using the appellant's own share of the funds to partially satisfy the equalization payment owed to him.

This portion of the order was set aside.

However, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the trial costs award, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the parties' relative success.

The appellant was awarded $7,500 in costs for the appeal.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal judge's decision upholding his conviction.

The conviction related to a car driven to the border that was found to be subject to duties under section 159 of the Customs Act.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the lower court's decision and denied leave to appeal.

The appellant appealed the probation conditions imposed following a conviction for breach of probation, arguing that the requirements to remain in Ontario and report weekly were improper.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge properly exercised their discretion.

The conditions were necessary to monitor the appellant, particularly because the underlying breach occurred while he was outside the province, and did not unduly restrict his mobility rights since he could seek permission to travel or vary the reporting frequency.

The appellant appealed an order declaring him a vexatious litigant.

He argued he was denied the right to be heard when the application judge denied him standing and ejected him from the courtroom, and that the judge failed to accommodate his medical illness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge was entitled to refuse standing due to the appellant's failure to comply with a prior peremptory order.

The Court also held that the appellant's disruptive behaviour justified his ejection and further demonstrated his vexatious manner of conducting proceedings.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action for damages arising from a jewelry theft after its alarm system allegedly failed.

The motion judge granted summary judgment based on an exculpatory clause in the commercial contract between the parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, as there was no misrepresentation inducing the contract and the parties were bound by the ordinary commercial contract.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its debt claim as statute-barred.

The appellant argued the limitation period should run from the date it received notice that the respondent's cheque was dishonoured, rather than the date the cheque was presented.

The Court of Appeal held that the limitation period began to run on the date the cheque was presented, as the appellant was suing on the loan agreement, not the cheque.

The court also rejected the argument that an admission during cross-examination reset the limitation clock, as it occurred after the limitation period expired.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Century Plumbing and Heating, appealed a summary judgment decision that removed the respondents, ADT Security Services Canada Inc. and Intercon Security Limited, from several actions relating to a flood in a Toronto tower.

The appellant argued the motions judge erred in finding the Building Automation System had frozen, in not considering video evidence, and in relying on inadmissible evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motions judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence, including an admission by the building owner that the system had frozen, and that the appellant failed to establish a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The appellant, a Québec corporation, appealed the dismissal of its motion to stay proceedings brought by the respondent, an Ontario corporation, on the basis of jurisdiction and forum non conveniens.

The dispute involved a contract for the importation and sale of chicken.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding errors in the motion judge's findings that the contract was made in Ontario, the appellant carried on business in Ontario, and there was a real and substantial connection to Ontario.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after beating his common-law spouse to death.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a W. (D.) instruction regarding his exculpatory statements to police and by refusing to leave the partial defence of provocation to the jury.

He also appealed his 15-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury was properly instructed on the burden of proof and intent, and that there was no air of reality to the provocation defence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the parole ineligibility period was reasonable given the aggravating factors.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to set aside the registrar's dismissal of their action for delay.

The action, related to a 2006 property purchase, was dismissed in 2011 after the appellants failed to meet a court-ordered timetable.

The motion judge found that a 14-month unexplained delay in bringing a second motion to set aside the dismissal was fatal, and that the defendants suffered actual prejudice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the Reid factors and balancing of competing principles.

The plaintiff was injured in a motorcycle accident caused in part by an unidentified driver.

He failed to report the accident to the police or his insurer within the time limits prescribed by the Uninsured Automobile Coverage regulation.

The trial judge granted the plaintiff relief from forfeiture under s. 129 of the Insurance Act and apportioned liability 60% to the plaintiff and 40% to the unidentified driver.

The insurer appealed the relief from forfeiture and the liability apportionment, while the plaintiff cross-appealed the liability apportionment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, holding that failure to give timely notice constitutes imperfect compliance for which relief from forfeiture is available, and that the trial judge's liability findings were supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed an order from a trial management conference judge who, on her own initiative, struck his pleadings on financial issues for failure to make disclosure.

The Court of Appeal allowed the unopposed appeal and set aside the order, finding procedural unfairness because there was no motion to strike before the judge and the parties were not given an opportunity to make submissions.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for violent offences in 2002, appealed the Ontario Review Board's refusal to grant her an absolute discharge.

The Board had ordered the continuation of her conditional discharge, finding she remained a significant threat to public safety due to her history of medication non-compliance, limited insight into her mental illness, and lack of a concrete follow-up plan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board did not misapply the test for significant threat to public safety and that its conclusion was reasonable and supported by psychiatric evidence.

The appellant appealed convictions and sentence arising from historical sexual assault allegations involving two complainants in a family context.

The court held that, although the reasons were capable of appellate review and the correct W.(D.) framework was identified, the trial judge committed reversible errors by misapprehending evidence of animus, misapprehending the appellant's evidence concerning an earlier allegation, and improperly treating a prior disclosure as negating the defence theory of collusion.

The prior disclosure was not sufficiently consistent with the later allegations to function as a prior consistent statement rebutting fabrication.

The curative proviso was unavailable because the convictions were supportable but not inevitable.

A new trial was ordered on all counts, including those previously stayed under the Kienapple principle.