Timothy R. Pedwell

The applicant sought a declaration and injunction to remove fences obstructing an express mutual right-of-way on adjacent properties.

The respondents claimed abandonment of the right-of-way and possessory rights for a board fence erected prior to Land Titles conversion, and conceded the removal of a chain link fence erected after conversion.

The court found no evidence of abandonment of the right-of-way prior to Land Titles conversion and ordered the removal of all obstructing fences, issuing a permanent injunction against interference.

Following a successful application regarding the interpretation of a cohabitation agreement, the applicant sought costs.

The applicant had made a time-limited settlement offer that was more advantageous than the final decision, though it did not attract automatic cost consequences under Rule 49.

Considering the factors in Rule 57.01 and the parties' bills of costs, the court awarded the applicant costs on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $21,000.

The applicant and respondent entered into a cohabitation agreement wherein the applicant invested $181,000 into the respondent's property.

Following the breakdown of their relationship, the property was sold at a shortfall.

The applicant sought her entitlement off the top of the proceeds, while the respondent claimed reimbursement for household expenses and funds taken from a joint account.

The court held that the applicant was entitled to her funds off the top as per the agreement.

The respondent's claims for older expenses and the joint account were largely barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, resulting in a minor set-off for recent household expenses.

The appellant appealed a family law trial judgment regarding the funding of an equalization payment and the trial costs award.

The trial judge had ordered the respondent to pay the $183,911.76 equalization payment out of the $277,980.48 proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home held in trust.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that, because the parties had an equal entitlement to the sale proceeds, the trial judge erred by effectively using the appellant's own share of the funds to partially satisfy the equalization payment owed to him.

This portion of the order was set aside.

However, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the trial costs award, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the parties' relative success.

The appellant was awarded $7,500 in costs for the appeal.

This was a costs endorsement following a lengthy trial in which the plaintiffs obtained judgment for damages, interest, and declaratory relief in a corporate and fiduciary dispute.

The court applied s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, together with the costs principles in Boucher, to determine a fair and reasonable costs award.

The plaintiffs' offers to settle were found to be more favourable than the result ultimately obtained, while the defendants' offers were not.

Given the length and complexity of the trial, the defendant's conduct, and the settlement history, substantial indemnity costs were awarded.

This was a family law costs endorsement following a trial involving custody, access, spousal support, child support, occupation rent, and property equalization.

The court applied s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rules 24 and 18(16) of the Family Law Rules, finding the applicant achieved substantial success on most contested issues and that her offer to settle was materially more reasonable.

The court also found the respondent's conduct, particularly on property division, increased trial time and costs unnecessarily.

After reducing disbursements for an unused expert report, the court fixed costs in the applicant's favour at $40,500 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The plaintiffs and defendants, who are family members, entered into a business venture to purchase and manage an apartment building through a corporation.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant managing the building breached his fiduciary duties by misappropriating corporate funds for personal use and to purchase other properties.

After a 40-day trial involving extensive forensic accounting evidence, the court found the defendant's evidence lacked credibility and determined he had misappropriated $592,671.43.

The court imposed a constructive trust on the properties purchased with the misappropriated funds and ordered the defendant removed as an officer, director, and shareholder of the corporation.

Following the breakdown of a marriage with two children, the court determined unresolved issues relating to equalization of net family property, child support, spousal support, and various financial claims.

The court addressed whether mortgage payments made directly by the payor spouse as spousal support should generate a credit upon sale of the matrimonial home and concluded no such credit was warranted under the Family Law Act.

The court also resolved disputes regarding ownership and debt related to a recreational trailer, deductions for property owned at the date of marriage, and arrears of support.

An equalization payment was ordered, arrears of spousal support were fixed, child support obligations were adjusted following a change in the children’s residence, and the respondent’s claim relating to an improperly collapsed RESP was granted.

The defendants appealed an interlocutory order requiring them to post $100,000 in security for costs or have their Statement of Defence and Counterclaim struck.

The primary issue was whether Rule 56.01(1)(c) conflicts with section 12 of the Libel and Slander Act.

The Divisional Court found no conflict, as the rule and the statute rely on different criteria.

However, the court varied the order, holding that a party should not be required to post security merely to defend itself.

The order was amended so that only the defendants' counterclaim would be struck if security was not posted.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of age and disability.

Prior to filing the application, she commenced a wrongful dismissal action in the Superior Court of Justice seeking damages based on the same alleged Code violations.

The Tribunal held that section 34(11) of the Human Rights Code barred the application because the applicant had an ongoing civil proceeding seeking remedies for the same alleged infringement.

The application was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellant insurance company appealed an order regarding the interpretation of an insurance policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that clause 14 of the policy was at best ambiguous.

Applying the contra proferentem rule, the court interpreted the clause in favour of the respondent insured and awarded costs of the appeal.

The appellant appealed a judgment finding her liable for the outstanding balance of her former law firm's accounts for services rendered in matrimonial litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the accounts.

The trial judge properly considered relevant factors, including the nature of the services, time expended, and the appellant's ability to pay, and correctly noted that the appellant had acquiesced to the fees by making partial payments without complaint for many months.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's finding that the respondent's carport overhung their property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was sufficient evidence on the record to support the trial judge's conclusion, which the appellants failed to answer with their own evidence.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding two mortgage actions.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended critical evidence from a handwriting expert, failed to adequately assist the unrepresented appellants to ensure trial fairness, and arbitrarily curtailed cross-examination.

Concluding that the appellants did not receive a fair trial, the Court of Appeal set aside the judgment in part and ordered a new trial for the mortgage actions.