Charles William Hourigan

The appellant, a project owner/developer, appealed a summary judgment dismissing its crossclaim against engineering consultants/subcontractors (respondents).

The crossclaim sought contribution and indemnity for damages paid to adjacent property owners, arguing the respondents were not covered under the appellant's wrap-up liability policy for professional services claims, despite a waiver of subrogation clause.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding the respondents were "additional insureds" and the waiver of subrogation applied.

The court affirmed that the policy, a standard form contract, was unambiguous and that the appellant's crossclaim was indeed a subrogated claim, regardless of the timing of payments.

The moving party sought to appeal an order dismissing her motion to add new causes of action and parties, which had been dismissed as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01.

After the Divisional Court dismissed her motion for leave to appeal, she applied to the Court of Appeal.

A single judge adjourned the matter to a full panel to determine whether the underlying order was final or interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal held that an order refusing leave to amend pleadings to plead a new cause of action, or to add a party, is a final order.

Consequently, leave to appeal was not required, and the appeal could proceed as of right to the Court of Appeal.

The moving party sought to set aside an order from a motion judge that dismissed his motion for an extension of time for leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's discretionary decision, which had concluded that the underlying appeal lacked merit.

The motion was dismissed, and costs were awarded against the moving party.

The Estate of Joseph Zabukovec appealed a trial judge's decision granting Judith Tomek and Joseph Zabukovec Jr. joint beneficial ownership of 75% of a property based on unjust enrichment and proprietary estoppel.

The Estate argued the trial judge erred in valuing the land and failed to consider Joseph Sr.'s contributions to the house construction.

The Court of Appeal found an error in the land valuation but declined to interfere with the remedy, citing the broad discretion in crafting equitable remedies for proprietary estoppel.

The court affirmed the trial judge's order as consistent with the parties' original intention for the house and house lot to be conveyed.

The appeal was dismissed, and the Litigation Administrator, Edward Waters, was personally ordered to pay costs due to acting in his own interest.

The appellant, RE/MAX Realtron Realty Inc., appealed the dismissal of its claim for commission on a property sale.

The trial judge, in a mini-trial ordered during a summary judgment motion, found that two numbered companies involved in the transaction were distinct corporate entities, and the corporate veil could not be pierced.

Consequently, the holdover clause in the initial purchase agreement did not apply to the subsequent sale.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings regarding corporate distinctness, the application of the corporate veil test, or the absence of wrongdoing.

The court also upheld the substantial costs award against the appellant, noting its rejection of settlement offers.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing a motion to validate late service of a statement of claim and extend the time for service in a motor vehicle accident action.

The appellant's former counsel failed to serve the defendants within the prescribed six-month period due to inadvertence.

The motion judge refused to admit a supplementary affidavit and dismissed the motion, finding insufficient explanation for delay and prejudice to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in finding insufficient explanation for delay, as it was due to counsel's inadvertence.

Furthermore, the motion judge erred in the prejudice analysis by failing to consider that the respondents' insurer had notice of the accident and the appellant's involvement, which shifted the onus to the respondents to prove prejudice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, validated the late service, and extended the time for service on unserved defendants, with a term regarding pre-judgment interest.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their breach of contract claim, which was dismissed under Rule 60.12(b) for their persistent failure to comply with interlocutory orders requiring them to permit the respondents to inspect disputed limestone.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the appellants' position, noting their history of non-compliance and attempts to avoid the inspection order.

The court upheld the motion judge's decision to dismiss the claim, finding it amply justified, and denied leave to introduce fresh evidence blaming former counsel, stating such complaints are for a negligence action.

The appellant, Jordan Brown, appealed his convictions for aggravated assault by wounding and discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life, as well as his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the conviction appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on "wounding" and intent to endanger life.

The court also granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, affirming the dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence despite a conceded error by the trial judge regarding the consideration of treatment prospects at the designation stage, finding no reasonable possibility that the outcome would have differed.

The appellant mother travelled to Ontario from Dubai with her two children for a visit, but subsequently informed the respondent father that she would not return.

The father commenced proceedings in Ontario seeking a return order under s. 40 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The trial judge declined jurisdiction under ss. 22 and 23 of the Act, ordered the children returned to Dubai, and dismissed the mother's constitutional challenges to s. 40(3).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the mother's appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the risk of serious harm under s. 23, and upholding the constitutionality of the return order provision under both division of powers and the Charter.

The appellant, R.C., appealed his conviction for two counts of sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The appeal raised six grounds of trial judge error and a seventh ground of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, supported by fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors by the trial judge in her credibility assessments or application of legal principles.

The fresh evidence did not establish that trial counsel's performance fell below a reasonable standard or occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

Leave to appeal the sentence was refused as it was not pressed and found not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant, M.R., appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing credibility and reliability, particularly concerning the DNA evidence, the complainant's level of intoxication, and the sufficiency of reasons.

He also alleged uneven scrutiny of the parties' evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility and reliability assessments were well-grounded in the evidence and did not rely on speculation.

The court affirmed that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and that the complainant's erratic post-assault behaviour was a reasonable inference of genuine traumatization, not cognitive impairment.

The appellant, Jeffrey Dodman, sought leave to appeal his 12-month custodial sentence for robbery and use of an imitation firearm.

The appeal focused on the calculation of "Downes credits" for pre-trial bail conditions, the appropriateness of a conditional sentence, the impact of post-sentencing events (including COVID-19 risks), and the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence for imitation firearm use.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge's calculation of Downes credits was a reasonable exercise of discretion, a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the seriousness of the crime, and post-sentencing events did not warrant interference.

The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum or delay the decision pending legislative changes, as the imposed sentence was deemed fit regardless.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for violent offences against intimate partners, appealed the Ontario Review Board's (ORB) disposition ordering his detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH).

He argued the ORB erred in finding him a significant threat and in failing to grant an absolute or conditional discharge, emphasizing a four-year period of stability while on bail.

The Court of Appeal upheld the ORB's decision, finding it reasonably concluded the appellant posed a significant threat due to his psychiatric history, ongoing symptoms, medication non-compliance, and impaired insight.

The court also found that a detention order was necessary given the inadequacy of the Mental Health Act to manage his risk, and that the ORB had implicitly considered and rejected a conditional discharge.

Helen Tolias, found not criminally responsible (NCR) due to mental disorder, appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition that ordered her detention.

The Board had conducted the disposition review hearing by videoconference without her consent and in her absence.

The Court of Appeal found this to be a jurisdictional error, rendering the Board's disposition null and void, and rejected the Crown's argument that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred.

The appeal was allowed, the Board's disposition was set aside, and a new hearing was ordered.

The court also varied a previous disposition to allow the appellant to remain at a facility closer to her family.

The appellant, convicted of firearms offences and breach of recognizance following a shooting incident, appealed his convictions and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the admission or assessment of witness evidence, that the verdict was reasonable given the strong circumstantial evidence, and that the trial judge properly rejected the self-defence argument.

The court granted leave to appeal the sentence but ultimately dismissed the sentence appeal, concluding that the eight-year custodial sentence was fit, balancing mitigating factors with the appellant's prior firearms offence and the dangerous nature of discharging a weapon in a populated area.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the trial judge erred in finding reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and search.

The appeal raised issues regarding the reliability of an officer's smell evidence, the interpretation of "neutral" observed behaviours, and the consideration of a neighbourhood's character in establishing grounds for arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge was entitled to accept the officer's evidence and that the cumulative behaviours, combined with the smell of marijuana, provided objectively reasonable grounds for arrest and search.

The court also clarified that while presence in a high-crime area alone is insufficient for grounds, it did not undermine the arrest in this case given other factors.

This is an application to re-open an appeal, brought by the applicant after her initial appeal of a habeas corpus dismissal was rejected.

The applicant sought to introduce what she characterized as "fresh evidence" to argue that the trial court lacked jurisdiction for her conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the proposed "fresh evidence" was merely further legal argument and did not satisfy the test for admission of fresh evidence as established in Palmer v. The Queen.

Furthermore, the court found the arguments irrelevant to the sufficiency of the application judge's original reasons.

The Crown appealed the 9-month sentence imposed on the respondent for sexual assault against a child, arguing it was demonstrably unfit and failed to properly apply sentencing principles from *R. v. Friesen*.

The Court of Appeal granted leave, found the trial judge erred in principle by overemphasizing mitigating factors and underestimating the gravity and harm of the offence, and imposed a demonstrably unfit sentence.

The Court increased the sentence to 24 months but, based on fresh evidence that the respondent had completed his original sentence and was on parole, stayed the execution of the additional incarceration.

The police followed the respondent off a public highway and onto his private driveway to conduct a random sobriety check, where they observed signs of impairment and arrested him for impaired driving.

The trial judge convicted the respondent, but the summary conviction appeal judge overturned the conviction, finding the stop violated s. 9 of the Charter and excluding the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that neither s. 48(1) of the Highway Traffic Act nor the common law ancillary powers doctrine authorized police to conduct a random, groundless sobriety stop on private property.

The Court upheld the exclusion of evidence, concluding that the serious Charter breach outweighed the public interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching.

He appealed his convictions based on an alleged error in the jury instruction and a request to admit fresh evidence for a partial alibi.

He also appealed his sentence, specifically lifetime prohibition orders under s. 161(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code, arguing their retroactive application violated s. 11(i) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and the fresh evidence application, finding no reversible error in the jury charge and that the fresh evidence lacked due diligence and cogency.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, holding that the retroactive application of s. 161(1)(a) and (b) to offences committed before their 1993 enactment was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter, as there was no compelling temporal justification for their retrospective application in 2005.