Paul S. Rouleau

The appellants, Rouzbeh Behrouz and Majestic Food Service Inc., appealed an order giving effect to a Letter Rogatory from a U.S. District Court, compelling testimony and document production for a U.S. proceeding alleging violations of Iran-trade embargo laws.

The appellants argued the application judge erred by admitting inadmissible hearsay and failing to properly apply the Friction factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error.

The court affirmed the application judge's reliance on evidence for determining relevance and necessity, and his proper application of the Friction factors and balancing of Canadian sovereignty with the enforcement request.

The court also agreed that the evidence sought was not otherwise obtainable, deferring to the U.S. court's conclusion and noting that Canadian residents are not compellable witnesses in U.S. proceedings for testimony or document production.

The appellant, Charles James Hevey, appealed a finding of contempt made against him in a family law proceeding for allegedly violating two preservation orders.

The Court of Appeal found that the first preservation order was not violated as the transactions did not diminish asset value and the appellant did not personally benefit.

Regarding the second order, the court determined that the order lacked clarity, particularly concerning the interplay between paragraphs permitting business operations and reporting requirements.

Applying the *Carey v. Laiken* test for civil contempt, the court concluded that the order did not clearly and unequivocally prohibit the impugned mortgage.

Consequently, the contempt findings and associated sanctions were set aside.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his challenge to his involuntary status and incapacity finding by the Consent and Capacity Board, arguing abuse of process due to alleged illegal detention and recertification after initial Board decisions in his favour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no abuse of process or res judicata, as new evidence of the appellant's deteriorating condition and previously unconsidered criteria justified the subsequent certification process.

The court emphasized the flexibility of the abuse of process concept in administrative proceedings and the importance of considering all circumstances, especially new and significant evidence, when determining capacity and involuntary status under the Mental Health Act.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's decision that struck out a default judgment and statement of claim as an abuse of process, found overpayment on a mortgage due to fraud, and awarded damages.

The trial judge's decision relied in part on prior Financial Services Tribunal findings of fraudulent conduct by the appellant mortgage broker.

The appellants challenged the striking out of the judgment/claim, the trial judge's credibility findings, and alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings, noting that the appellants' counsel had consented to the judge hearing the case despite prior dealings, and found no evidence of bias.

The appellant, Candy Locey, appealed her conviction for second-degree murder, seeking to set aside her guilty plea.

She argued that the Agreed Statement of Facts, which she had accepted, did not support the conviction, specifically regarding the mens rea for murder.

The appellant contended that a question posed by the trial judge after her plea, but before conviction, and her answer to it, cast doubt on whether the mens rea was established.

The Court of Appeal found that the Agreed Statement of Facts fully supported the plea, establishing both the actus reus and mens rea for aiding and abetting second-degree murder.

The court concluded that the subsequent question and answer did not undermine the facts supporting the mens rea.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for discharging a firearm and unauthorized possession of a loaded prohibited firearm in a motor vehicle, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding him a party to the shooting based on circumstantial evidence, including his presence in the vehicle and flight from police.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded from the totality of the evidence, including the appellant's DNA on the firearm and his coordinated actions with the co-accused, that he acted in concert to plan and carry out the shooting.

The sentence appeal was consequently dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of importing heroin after 1.8 kilograms of the drug were found hidden in his suitcase.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury instructions on circumstantial evidence by failing to explicitly state that exculpatory inferences need not arise from proven facts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury was adequately and sufficiently instructed in accordance with the principles in Villaroman, and that the charge as a whole did not shift the burden of proof to the accused.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm, having claimed self-defence at trial.

The trial judge rejected the self-defence claim, finding the appellant was the aggressor.

The appellant appealed the conviction, alleging legal errors in the application of self-defence provisions under s. 34 of the Criminal Code and a failure to give adequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's holistic examination of the self-defence claim, concluding that the appellant armed himself and initiated the confrontation with an aggressive intent, not for self-defence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence, which were based on communications intercepted under judicial authorization.

At trial, a Garofoli motion challenging the authorization's validity due to redacted affidavits and inadequate summaries was dismissed, leading to conviction.

Subsequently, in two other prosecutions arising from the same investigation, the Crown conceded that further disclosure was necessary for the accused to make full answer and defence, which they could not provide without compromising confidential informants, resulting in stays of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal admitted evidence from these subsequent proceedings, finding it in the interest of justice.

Given the Crown's concessions in related cases, the court determined that fairness required the appellant's prosecution also be stayed.

The appellant, designated a dangerous offender and given an indeterminate sentence, appealed his sentence.

He argued that the trial judge failed to consider his treatability at the designation phase, contrary to R. v. Boutilier.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge correctly applied Boutilier, considering treatability at both designation and penalty phases.

Even if there was an error, it caused no prejudice as the conclusion of untreatability would have been the same.

The court also rejected the argument that the trial judge confused "treatability with curability." The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder after a retrial.

He appealed his conviction on three grounds: the application judge erred by dismissing the application to admit hearsay for a third-party suspect, the trial judge failed to give a sufficient corrective instruction regarding the Crown’s prejudicial closing argument, and the trial judge erred by charging the jury on party liability without factual foundation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's hearsay ruling, the trial judge's handling of the Crown's closing, or the party liability instruction, which was found to have an evidentiary basis and was akin to co-principal liability.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal on the party liability issue, arguing insufficient evidentiary foundation and inadequate jury instructions.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of two respondents, Kalenda Kalonji and Sam Donaldson, on firearm and drug-related charges.

The trial judge had quashed a search warrant for a residence, finding no reasonable and probable grounds to believe firearms would be found there, and excluded the seized evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in her s. 8 Charter analysis by failing to consider reasonable common sense inferences that firearms would be kept at a person's residence, effectively elevating the standard of proof for issuing a warrant.

This error led to the improper exclusion of evidence.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittals, and ordered a new trial for both respondents.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms trafficking, arguing the trial judge erred by using the doctrine of abandonment to dismiss his s. 24(2) Charter application following a s. 10(b) breach.

The Court of Appeal agreed the trial judge erred in using abandonment as an absolute bar to s. 24(2) relief, but conducted its own analysis and found the evidence should not be excluded.

The court held that while there was a serious s. 10(b) breach due to a delay in facilitating the right to counsel, the impact on the appellant's Charter-protected interests was minimal and society's interest in adjudicating the serious firearms charges on the merits favoured admission.

The appellant appealed her conviction for importing opium and sought leave to appeal her sentence.

The conviction appeal was based on alleged errors in jury instructions regarding the weight of opium evidence and the W.(D.) instruction.

The sentence appeal argued the amount of opium was not "substantial" and that a conditional sentence was appropriate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's handling of evidence or jury instructions, and upholding the sentence as fit.

The appellant, Mark Staples, appealed his convictions for two counts of first-degree murder in the deaths of his father and sister.

The appeal raised several grounds, including alleged errors by the trial judge regarding demeanour evidence, post-offence conduct instructions, discreditable conduct, circumstantial evidence, Crown's closing arguments, impermissible opinion evidence, and refusal to admit evidence of another unsolved homicide.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's rulings or instructions, and concluded that the jury's verdict was reasonable given the substantial circumstantial evidence of motive, opportunity, and post-offence cleanup.

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario, following an appeal where the lower court's judgment and costs order were set aside and the application remitted for rehearing.

The parties were unable to agree on the disposition of the original application costs.

The Court of Appeal determined that the fairest approach was to leave the issue of the application costs to the trier of fact on the rehearing, whether before a Superior Court judge or in an arbitral process.

Appeal costs had previously been awarded to the appellants.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCRMD), appealed the Ontario Review Board's (ORB) decision to reject a joint submission for his transfer to a less secure facility.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness in the ORB's handling of the joint submission and that the ORB's decision to deny the transfer was reasonable given the appellant's recent history of aggressive and self-harming behaviour and the receiving institution's objections.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) damages for breach of a conditional sales contract and ordering that the judgment not be released by a bankruptcy discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the breach of contract claim, finding that the loan renewal did not negate the breach given the continuing obligation to provide security.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part by striking the order that the judgment survive bankruptcy, deferring this issue to the Bankruptcy Court due to RBC's awareness of the issues at the time of renewal.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge from the Ontario Review Board's jurisdiction, arguing that the Board's finding of a significant threat to public safety was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the Board's decision to maintain a conditional discharge.

The court found that despite some progress, the appellant's recent threatening and physically aggressive conduct, including an offer to pay someone to stab his psychiatrist and multiple Code White incidents involving staff assaults, supported the Board's finding of a significant threat.

Fresh evidence regarding the appellant's improved mobility and subsequent aggressive behaviour was admitted and considered.

The appellant, under a detention order from the Ontario Review Board (ORB) following a Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) finding, appealed the ORB's decision to continue his detention.

The appellant argued the ORB erred in finding he posed a significant risk to public safety and sought an absolute or conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the ORB's conclusion that the appellant posed a significant risk, based on psychiatric evidence of likely decompensation and violence if discharged, was reasonable.

The court also found the ORB reasonably considered and rejected a conditional discharge, given the risk of rapid deterioration.