P. Andras Schreck

The appellant, Timothy Keizer, appealed a decision by the Consent and Capacity Board (CCB) that found him incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment.

The CCB had upheld Dr. Nagari's finding that Mr. Keizer suffered from delusional disorder and was incapable of applying treatment information to his circumstances due to his failure to recognize his illness.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the Board's conclusion that Mr. Keizer suffered from a delusional disorder at the time of the hearing was unreasonable and unsupported by evidence.

The court emphasized that a patient's disagreement with a diagnosis does not automatically equate to incapacity, especially when the patient recognizes the manifestations of their condition and their refusal of treatment is based on past experience and a differing medical opinion, rather than a delusion.

The court also determined the appeal was not moot, given the potential impact on future substitute decision-maker decisions.

The defendant, Mer Mechanical Inc., moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs' subrogated claim was barred by a builder's risk policy with a waiver of subrogation.

The policy covered "occurrence" if the "inception of the event causing the loss" occurred during the coverage period.

The loss resulted from a faucet detachment after the policy expired, which the defendant attributed to "creep/stress relaxation" during installation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the "inception of the event" (faucet detachment) occurred after the policy expired, distinguishing it from the "cause" (improper installation).

The court emphasized that builder's risk policies primarily cover ongoing construction, and the insurable interest ceases upon project completion.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action at trial, the successful defendant sought substantial indemnity costs of $112,626.70.

The defendant argued that substantial indemnity was warranted because the plaintiff made unfounded allegations of improper conduct and because the defendant made a Rule 49 offer to settle that was more favourable than the trial outcome.

The court rejected both arguments, noting that the plaintiff's allegations had some basis and that Rule 49 does not automatically grant substantial indemnity costs to a defendant whose offer is beaten by a dismissal.

The court awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs fixed at $40,000, finding the claimed amount to be grossly excessive.

During a motor vehicle accident jury trial, the defendant requested that the jury be asked to provide particulars of the defendant's negligence and list the plaintiff's injuries if liability was found.

The plaintiff opposed these questions.

The court reviewed the historical practice and case law regarding jury questions, noting both advantages and disadvantages.

The court concluded that in this case, where negligence was essentially res ipsa loquitur and the medical evidence was conflicting, asking for particulars would not assist in testing the jury's understanding and could unnecessarily confuse them.

The request to include the questions was denied.

The Crown brought an application for certiorari to set aside a preliminary inquiry judge's decision discharging the respondent on a charge of first degree murder.

The respondent was present during an armed robbery and shooting at a restaurant but did not directly participate in the robbery or the killing, though he did briefly assault one of the victims.

The reviewing court found that the preliminary inquiry judge did not commit jurisdictional error in concluding there was insufficient evidence to commit the respondent for murder under either party liability or constructive murder provisions.

The application was dismissed.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for inducing breach of contract, nuisance, and trespass arising from a property line dispute.

The defendants had moved a fence onto the plaintiff's driveway shortly before the scheduled closing of the plaintiff's sale of her property, causing the purchasers to refuse to close.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding that the conflicting evidence regarding the historical location of the fence and the defendants' intent to procure a breach of contract raised genuine issues of credibility that required a trial.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for defamation over Twitter posts alleging the plaintiff made women uncomfortable at a social event.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the statements were true.

Applying the Hryniak framework, the court used its fact-finding powers to assess credibility on the paper record.

The court found the defendant established the defence of truth on a balance of probabilities, noting corroborating affidavits and the plaintiff's own bizarre and derogatory affidavit evidence.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action dismissed.

The plaintiff purchased a commercial building from the defendant.

Prior to closing, the defendant provided a statutory declaration claiming uninterrupted use of an adjacent driveway without ever seeking permission.

The plaintiff subsequently sued the adjacent owner for a prescriptive easement but lost after discovering the defendant had previously sought permission via an unsigned 1987 agreement.

The plaintiff then sued the defendant for negligent misrepresentation to recover its legal costs from the unsuccessful easement action.

The Superior Court dismissed the action, finding that while the declaration contained false statements and the defendant owed a duty of care, the plaintiff did not detrimentally rely on the misrepresentations because it would have continued the easement litigation based on its counsel's advice regardless of the 1987 agreement.

The applicants sought an order under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act declaring the respondent a vexatious litigant.

The respondent had engaged in a decade-long pattern of re-litigating issues related to a real estate transaction, despite numerous unsuccessful actions and appeals.

The court found that the respondent met the characteristics of a vexatious litigant, as he persistently brought proceedings to determine issues already decided and rolled forward grounds into subsequent actions.

The application was granted against the primary respondent, but dismissed against his daughter, who had not initiated the vexatious proceedings.

The plaintiff commenced an action relating to a 2006 real estate transaction, which was the third proceeding initiated regarding the same transaction.

The defendant lawyer moved to strike the claim against him for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, while the other defendants moved to dismiss the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court granted both motions, finding the claim against the lawyer incomprehensible and incapable of amendment, and the claim against the other defendants a clear attempt to re-litigate issues already decided in prior proceedings.

A personal support worker employed at a long-term care facility was convicted of assault causing bodily harm after punching a 97-year-old resident in his care, causing severe bruising.

The offender, a 26-year-old first-time offender with no prior criminal record, was sentenced following a summary conviction trial.

The Crown sought four to six months imprisonment plus probation, while the defence sought a non-custodial or intermittent sentence.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of six months to be served in the community, balancing the objectives of denunciation and deterrence against rehabilitation of a youthful first offender.

The accused was charged with firearm possession offences and obstructing a peace officer after taking a gun from his friend during a restaurant altercation and placing it in a rented limousine.

The accused argued he possessed the gun as part of a public duty to prevent harm.

The court accepted the accused's evidence that he took the gun to prevent anyone from getting hurt and had no intention of keeping or using it.

The court found the public duty defence applied and acquitted the accused on all counts.

The Federal Crown and a court-appointed Receiver applied to vary a forfeiture order that required the destruction of seized electronic devices and documents, as the CRA and the Receiver sought access to them for ongoing investigations into an illegal pyramid scheme.

The court held it lacked jurisdiction to use certiorari to set aside the destruction order made under s. 490.1(1) of the Criminal Code because a statutory right of appeal to the Court of Appeal existed.

However, the court granted the Receiver's application under s. 490.5, declaring its interest unaffected and suspending the destruction order, and allowed the appeal to set aside the destruction order made under s. 490(9).

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving an eight-year-old child.

At trial, an agreed statement of fact containing the evidence of the complainant's father was filed as an exhibit but was subsequently lost and could not be recreated.

The trial judge had relied on this missing exhibit as independent evidence of the complainant's post-event emotional state to confirm her testimony and reject the appellant's denial.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the incomplete appellate record made it impossible to determine if the trial judge erred in his reliance on the father's statement.

Finding a serious possibility that the missing exhibit deprived the appellant of a ground of appeal, the court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of failing to comply with a recognizance.

The trial judge provided deficient reasons and erred in law regarding the elements of the offence.

However, the Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Crown failed to adduce evidence negating a specific exception to the respondent's house arrest condition (attending counselling).

Because an acquittal was the only reasonable verdict on the evidence, the trial judge's errors did not have a material bearing on the outcome.

The applicant brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized during a search of his residence, arguing violations of his s. 8 and s. 10(b) rights.

The police obtained a search warrant based on information from a confidential informant, which the applicant challenged through a 'step six' Garofoli application.

The court found the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked sufficient grounds, as the informant's tip was minimally compelling and uncorroborated, and failed to establish currency for the presence of drugs.

Additionally, the police violated the applicant's s. 10(b) rights by delaying his access to counsel and failing to hold off questioning.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded the Charter breaches were serious and had a significant impact on the applicant's privacy and right to counsel.

Consequently, the firearms and drugs seized, along with the applicant's statements, were excluded from evidence.

The accused was charged with three counts of criminal harassment and one count of failing to comply with a probation order after repeatedly asking a 13-year-old girl to come to his apartment and swearing at her.

The court found that the accused did not repeatedly follow the complainant or engage in threatening conduct.

However, the court found the accused guilty of criminal harassment by repeatedly communicating with the complainant, as his conduct caused her to reasonably fear for her safety.

The accused was also found guilty of breaching his probation order to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.

At the outset of his trial for drug and weapons offences, the accused brought three Charter applications.

He sought a stay of proceedings under s. 7 due to a deleted text message containing a photograph used for identification, which was dismissed as the photograph itself was disclosed and no prejudice was shown.

He also challenged the search of his residence under s. 8, which was dismissed as the Information to Obtain established reasonable and probable grounds.

Finally, he challenged the warrantless search of his cell phones under s. 8.

The court found a serious breach due to police carelessness in failing to confirm the existence of a warrant, and excluded the extracted cell phone data under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with assault, uttering threats, unlawful confinement, obstructing a peace officer, and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown's case relied heavily on intercepted telephone calls in which a man threatened and admitted to assaulting a woman, as well as evidence seized during a search warrant.

The court applied the Villaroman test for circumstantial evidence and found the accused guilty of assault, uttering threats, and possession of cocaine found in a desk drawer.

The accused was acquitted of unlawful confinement, obstructing a peace officer, and possession of cocaine found in a Gucci bag.

The Crown applied for certiorari with mandamus in aid to review a preliminary inquiry judge's decision discharging the respondents on charges of first degree murder.

The preliminary inquiry judge had committed one respondent for second degree murder and the other for accessory after the fact, concluding there was 'no evidence' of planning and deliberation.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by concluding there was no evidence, rather than insufficient evidence, given the circumstantial evidence of the respondents following the deceased and shooting him.

The application was granted, the discharges quashed, and the matter remitted with a direction to commit both respondents for first degree murder.