P. Andras Schreck

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of careless storage of ammunition and one count of possession of ammunition contrary to a prohibition order.

The accused had a significant criminal record, including prior convictions for firearms offences and breaches of prohibition orders.

The Crown and defence presented a joint submission for a total sentence of three years' imprisonment.

Despite expressing grave reservations about the joint submission given the accused's history, the court accepted it, applying the Anthony-Cook standard.

The court imposed the jointly recommended sentence of three years, less credit for pre-sentence custody, but added a three-year probation order.

The applicant sought a stay under s. 11(b) of the Charter in a multi-accused fraud prosecution where the anticipated end of trial was 31 months and three days after charge.

The court held there was no defence delay and rejected the Crown's submission that the matter was exceptionally complex.

However, the slight exceedance of the 30-month superior court ceiling was justified by the transitional exceptional circumstance because much of the early delay arose before Jordan, when the parties reasonably treated co-accused election delay as neutral.

The application was therefore dismissed.

The accused was charged with assault, unlawful confinement, and failing to comply with a recognizance following an attack on a complainant.

The Crown's case relied primarily on DNA evidence found in a glove dropped by the assailant, which matched the accused's DNA with a high statistical probability.

The Crown also presented evidence that the accused's appearance was consistent with the complainant's generic description and that similar clothing was found in the accused's residence.

The court, however, found that the DNA evidence alone was insufficient to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt, especially given the presence of DNA from other individuals on the glove and the generic nature of the physical description and clothing.

Citing principles from R. v. Villaroman and R. v. Wills, the court emphasized that alternative inferences need not be based on proven facts and that probable guilt is insufficient for conviction.

The accused was found not guilty on all counts.

The offender was convicted of possessing a sawed-off shotgun with readily accessible ammunition and uttering threats to kill a former friend.

At the time of the offences, she was subject to a 10-year firearms prohibition and kept the weapon in an apartment shared with her two children.

The court distinguished the sentencing range for sawed-off shotguns from semi-automatic handguns but emphasized denunciation and deterrence.

The offender was sentenced to 36 months for the firearm offence and a consecutive 60 days for threatening, resulting in a net sentence of 33 months after credit for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and related offences.

He brought an application to stay the proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The total delay was calculated at over 44 months, with a net delay of over 30 months after deducting defence delay.

The court found the net delay exceeded the presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The Crown failed to establish that the transitional exceptional circumstance applied, as the delay was also unreasonable under the previous Morin framework.

The application was granted and the proceedings were stayed.

The Crown and the Ontario Provincial Police applied for certiorari to quash a trial judge's order requiring the disclosure of a Drug Recognition Expert's (DRE) rolling logs to the accused in an impaired driving trial.

The applicants argued the logs were irrelevant third-party records and that disclosure was prohibited by s. 258.1 of the Criminal Code and s. 37 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the rolling logs are relevant to the DRE's proficiency, constitute 'fruits of the investigation' subject to first-party disclosure, and are not shielded from disclosure by statutory privacy or public interest provisions.

During a jury trial for firearms offences, the Crown sought to call reply evidence to undermine the credibility of a defence witness who testified about two unidentified men looking for the complainant.

The Crown also sought to re-open cross-examination of the witness.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed reply evidence related solely to the witness's credibility and therefore offended the collateral fact rule.

The court also declined to permit further cross-examination, noting the Crown had already been given a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness.

During a jury trial for firearms offences, the defence called evidence suggesting third parties were responsible for the crime without bringing a pre-trial application to determine its admissibility.

The Crown applied for a mistrial, arguing the evidence was inadmissible and its late introduction caused irremediable prejudice.

The court ruled that while an application should have been brought, the failure to do so was an honest mistake.

The court found the evidence regarding two unidentified males was logically relevant and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by prejudicial effect, making it admissible.

However, evidence suggesting the complainant possessed the firearm was excluded as speculative.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding the Crown was not irremediably prejudiced, but allowed the Crown to reconsider calling reply evidence.

The accused was charged with failing to provide an approved screening device (ASD) sample contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

After being stopped for a traffic investigation, the accused was asked to provide a breath sample into an ASD but failed to do so despite 26 attempts.

The accused challenged the admissibility of evidence of his refusal on the grounds that his Charter rights to counsel (section 10(b)) and protection against arbitrary detention (section 9) were violated.

The court found that the accused was not handcuffed prior to arrest and that evidence of his refusal to provide a sample, as opposed to evidence obtained from compelled participation, was admissible.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

A police officer arrested the accused for impaired driving but failed to immediately advise him of his right to counsel, instead choosing to search for identification and seize an item from the vehicle.

The Crown conceded this constituted a breach of s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found the breach sufficiently serious to warrant exclusion of the breath test results, particularly given systemic failures by the Peel Regional Police to comply with the immediacy requirement.

The accused was convicted of impaired driving based on observations of erratic driving and physical indicia of impairment, but the charge of exceeding the legal limit was dismissed due to the exclusion of the breath test evidence.

The accused was charged with driving while impaired and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

At trial, the Crown relied on an unsigned certificate of a qualified technician to establish the accused's blood alcohol concentration pursuant to section 258(1)(g) of the Criminal Code.

The court determined that while a signature is typically required, the lack of a signature does not foreclose reliance on the certificate provided that the conditions set out in section 258(1)(g) have been established.

The court found that the certificate identified the qualified technician, was provided by him after administering breath tests, and was corroborated by a signed test record.

The accused was found guilty on the count of driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit and acquitted on the impaired driving count.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol following a roadside stop and arrest.

The accused applied to exclude breath sample evidence on the grounds that the arresting officer failed to advise her of her right to counsel immediately upon arrest, in violation of s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The Crown conceded the Charter breach.

The court found the breach serious due to systemic failures by the Peel Regional Police to comply with the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Suberu, which established that "without delay" means "immediately." Despite the reliability of the evidence and the accused's decision not to contact counsel, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter to maintain the repute of the administration of justice.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with driving while impaired and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of his arrest and detention on Charter grounds, arguing that the officer violated his section 8 and 9 rights by entering his property without consent and by detaining him for an excessive period after breath testing.

The court found that the officer lawfully entered the property pursuant to an implied licence to investigate a report of impaired driving, and that the accused's statement that he did not wish to speak was not a clear withdrawal of that licence.

The court further found that the detention period was justified based on the accused's blood alcohol level and other relevant factors.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The accused was stopped by police ostensibly for speeding and running red lights, but the officer's actual purpose was to investigate impaired driving.

The officer failed to immediately advise the accused of the true reason for the detention, conducted an unjustified pat-down search, and unlawfully detained the accused in the back of a police cruiser before administering a roadside screening device.

Although the officer made reasonable efforts to facilitate contact with counsel of choice, the court found violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The breath sample evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, and the charge was dismissed.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of 81 grams of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and possession of proceeds of crime under $5000 contrary to the Criminal Code.

The offender was a street-level dealer and addict who had no prior criminal record.

The court imposed a nine-month custodial sentence for the trafficking count and an 18-month concurrent conditional sentence for the proceeds count, followed by 12 months of probation.

The court emphasized that while deterrence and denunciation are important principles in drug trafficking cases, rehabilitation remains significant, particularly for first-time offender addicts.

The court rejected the Crown's initial position of 30 months imprisonment and instead imposed a more lenient sentence that reflected the offender's status as a street-level dealer motivated by addiction rather than greed, his genuine efforts at rehabilitation post-arrest, and his improved family circumstances.

The accused was charged with impaired driving after police conducted a roadside stop for speeding.

Officers detected an odour of alcohol on the driver's breath and requested an approved screening device (ASD).

Although the officers informed the driver that another officer would attend with an ASD, they did not advise him of his right to counsel or make a formal demand at that time.

A formal ASD demand was made 12 minutes later, which registered a fail.

The driver was arrested and subsequently provided breath samples showing alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The driver applied to exclude the breath test results under sections 8, 10(b), and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found no section 8 violation but determined there was a section 10(b) violation warranting exclusion under section 24(2).

The charge was dismissed.

Applicants charged with serious drug trafficking offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging delay in trial.

The trial was scheduled approximately 29 months after charges were laid, well exceeding the 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued that defence delay should be subtracted, bringing the net delay below the ceiling, or alternatively that exceptional circumstances applied.

The court found that the Crown's failure to provide timely disclosure, particularly the Information to Obtain the search warrant and surveillance materials, constituted the primary cause of delay.

The court rejected the Crown's characterization of defence delay and found no exceptional circumstances justified the delay.

The application was granted and proceedings were stayed.

An indigenous woman pleaded guilty to importing 347 grams of cocaine into Canada contrary to s. 6(3)(a) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown sought a three-month custodial sentence in addition to time served, relying on principles of general deterrence.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 24 months probation, finding that the offender's circumstances as an indigenous woman, combined with her significant personal trauma, systemic disadvantage, and demonstrated rehabilitation efforts, warranted a departure from the ordinary sentencing range.

The court applied the Gladue and Ipeelee framework, emphasizing that the Gladue principles apply to serious offences and that general deterrence cannot override the requirement to consider the unique circumstances of indigenous offenders.

The accused was arrested on impaired driving charges on November 28, 2014, but no Information was sworn until February 4, 2015—over two months later.

The trial commenced almost 22 months after arrest.

The accused challenged the delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing it exceeded the 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued delay should be calculated from the swearing of the Information, not arrest.

The court held that delay must be calculated from arrest, as the accused was subject to court process through the Promise to Appear.

After subtracting defence delay, the net delay exceeded 18 months, and the Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances.

The charges were stayed.

Two accused pleaded guilty to importing cathinone (the active ingredient in khat) contrary to s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown initially sought imprisonment but later revised its position to seek fines.

Both accused sought absolute discharges.

The court established that absent significant aggravating factors, custodial sentences are rarely appropriate for khat importation given the substance's limited harmfulness.

Both accused received absolute discharges, with mandatory firearm prohibition orders imposed.