P. Andras Schreck

The accused, a cabinetmaker with over 20 years of business experience, was charged with three counts of fraud over $5,000 relating to contracts entered into between November 2012 and April 2013.

During a period of financial difficulty, the accused accepted deposits representing 50% of estimated project costs from multiple customers but used the deposits to pay personal debts rather than purchase materials for the work.

None of the projects were completed and customers lost their deposits.

The Crown alleged fraud; the defence claimed the accused honestly believed the work would be completed.

Count 1 was conceded by the Crown.

The court found the accused guilty on Count 2 (relating to a January 2013 contract with one customer) but not guilty on Count 3 (relating to a contract with another customer).

The accused pleaded guilty to exposing his genital organs to his 11-year-old step-daughter contrary to section 173(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded by indictment.

The offence was the beginning of a pattern of sexual exploitation of the victim.

The accused is a recidivist with a prior conviction for sexual assault on his niece.

The court considered 812 text messages exchanged between the accused and the victim over a six-month period as evidence of uncharged conduct under section 725(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The parties disagreed on the amount of presentence custody to be attributed to the sentence, with the Crown seeking 10 months and the defence seeking 5 months and 29 days to avoid immigration consequences.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with three years probation and ancillary orders.

A young person (C.L.), age 14 at the time of the alleged offences, was charged with sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault against a younger complainant (J.P.), age 9 at the time.

The complainant alleged that C.L. forced him to perform oral sex on multiple occasions between November and December 2014.

The defence denied all allegations.

The case turned primarily on credibility assessment.

The court found that while the complainant was an impressive witness for his age, significant discrepancies existed regarding how the allegations were initially disclosed.

The court concluded that the Crown had not proven the charges beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on all counts.

A young person charged with sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault applied under section 276 of the Criminal Code to adduce evidence of prior sexual activity by the complainant.

The applicant sought to cross-examine the complainant about an alleged incident from summer 2013 to challenge the complainant's credibility regarding a prior inconsistent statement made to police.

The court granted the application, finding that the evidence met the requirements of section 276(2): it was a specific instance of sexual activity, relevant to the credibility issue at trial, and had significant probative value that was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

The accused was charged with two counts of aggravated assault following a stabbing incident outside a bar in Brampton.

Two victims were stabbed during an altercation.

The Crown's case relied primarily on security video evidence and circumstantial evidence, as no eyewitness directly identified the accused as the perpetrator.

The court found that while the evidence established guilt on a balance of probabilities and the accused was very likely guilty, a reasonable doubt remained regarding identification based on the video evidence and other circumstantial factors.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm against his father.

The accused admitted to the assault but claimed self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the accused's father had thrown a roast and a beer bottle at the accused, and then advanced toward him.

The accused responded by forcing his father to the ground and restraining him.

The court accepted the accused's evidence over the complainant's, finding the complainant's testimony unreliable due to inconsistencies regarding the cause of the argument, understatement of alcohol consumption, and poor recollection of events.

The court found that the accused's response was reasonable in the circumstances and dismissed the charge.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit and impaired driving following a motor vehicle collision.

The Crown was unable to rely on the statutory presumption under s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code because breath samples were not taken within two hours of the alleged offence.

The Crown sought to rely on a toxicologist's report and invited the trial judge to perform retrograde extrapolation calculations to determine the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The trial judge declined to perform such calculations and dismissed both charges.

The accused, an unlicensed massage therapist, was convicted of sexual assault after touching the victim's breasts and vaginal area during a massage at a wellness clinic.

The victim believed the accused was a registered massage therapist based on the clinic's website.

The Crown sought 15 months imprisonment; the defence sought a 9-month conditional sentence.

The court imposed a 6-month custodial sentence followed by 12 months probation, finding that denunciation and specific deterrence were the primary sentencing objectives.

The court rejected a conditional sentence due to the breach of trust, the victim's vulnerability, the non-momentary nature of the assault, and the accused's lack of remorse or acceptance of responsibility.

The accused was convicted of driving with an excess amount of alcohol in his blood contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

At trial, the accused alleged Charter violations and sought a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence.

The court found no s. 8 or 10(b) violation but determined that the accused's s. 9 Charter rights were violated when he was unjustifiably held at the police station for approximately four hours and twenty minutes after the investigation was completed.

The court declined to grant a stay or exclude evidence but considered whether a sentence reduction below the statutory minimum was an appropriate remedy for the Charter breach.

The appellant was charged with unsafe lane change under the Highway Traffic Act.

On the trial date, a paralegal acting as his agent appeared and requested an adjournment based on incomplete disclosure.

The adjournment was denied.

The paralegal then withdrew from the proceedings, stating he was instructed to "walk away." The Justice of the Peace entered a conviction without a hearing pursuant to section 9.1(2) of the Provincial Offences Act.

The appellant appealed on two grounds: that the adjournment should have been granted, and that section 9.1(2) did not apply.

The court found the refusal of the adjournment was within the Justice of the Peace's discretion but held that section 9.1(2) could not be applied because the appellant had appeared through an agent and therefore had not "failed to appear" at trial.

The accused was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, and assault with a weapon following a stabbing incident at a restaurant.

At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to introduce two statements made by the accused during police interviews.

The court found that the second statement, which comprised virtually the entire Crown case, was not made voluntarily.

The statement was obtained through interrogation techniques characteristic of the Reid technique, including the presentation of fabricated evidence, manipulation of the accused's mental illness, and oppressive conditions including extended questioning without adequate food or rest.

The accused, who suffered from schizophrenia, was subjected to approximately nine and a half hours of questioning over a twelve-hour period.

The court found a reasonable doubt as to voluntariness and excluded the statement.

Without the statement, the Crown conceded there was insufficient evidence to commit the accused for trial, and the accused was discharged on all counts.

The appellant was convicted of driving a motor vehicle while holding a handheld wireless communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

A police officer testified that while driving on the highway, he observed the defendant holding a cell phone in his left hand and appearing to manipulate the buttons.

The officer made this observation for a few moments before stopping the vehicle.

The appellant appealed on two grounds: misapprehension of the evidence and unreasonableness of the verdict.

The Justice of the Peace had stated the observation was made for "a few minutes" rather than "a few moments." The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence from his impaired driving trial based on two alleged Charter violations.

First, he argued that the approved screening device demand was invalid because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that he had operated a motor vehicle within the preceding three hours, as required by s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

Second, he argued that video surveillance of him urinating in a police cell violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The court found that the first breach was not established, as the officer's reasonable suspicion could be inferred from the circumstances.

The court found that the second breach was established but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, balancing the seriousness of the violation against the minimal impact and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The accused was charged with driving with an excess amount of alcohol in his blood.

The accused alleged violations of his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b), seeking a stay of proceedings or exclusion of breath readings.

The court found no breach of sections 8 or 10(b) rights.

However, the court found a breach of section 9 rights due to arbitrary detention (overholding) for approximately four hours and twenty minutes after the investigation was complete.

The court rejected a stay of proceedings and exclusion of evidence as remedies, finding that the breach occurred post-offence and was unrelated to evidence gathering.

The breath test readings were admitted and the accused was found guilty, with the court indicating it would consider a sentence reduction as a remedy for the section 9 breach.

The accused was charged with eight criminal offences arising from his attempt to purchase video games using fraudulent Visa gift cards at a shopping mall.

The Crown alleged fraudulent possession of credit card data, possession of credit cards obtained by commission of an offence in Canada, assault with intent to resist arrest, failure to comply with recognizance conditions, and fraud under $5,000.

The court found the accused guilty on counts relating to fraudulent possession of credit card data, failure to comply with recognizance conditions, and fraud, but acquitted on counts relating to possession of cards obtained by commission of an offence in Canada and assault with intent to resist arrest.

The court found the arrest was lawful but that the contact with the officer during the attempted flight was accidental rather than intentional assault.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while the concentration of alcohol in his blood exceeded the legal limit.

He alleged violations of his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b), seeking exclusion of breath test results and a stay of proceedings.

The court found no breaches of sections 8 or 10(b).

However, the court found a violation of section 9 Charter rights due to arbitrary detention after the breath samples were taken.

The court rejected a stay of proceedings and found insufficient nexus between the breach and the evidence to engage section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was found guilty, but entitled to a sentence reduction as a remedy for the section 9 breach.

The accused was charged with refusing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code and obstructing a peace officer contrary to s. 129(a).

A police officer observed the accused exit the driver's seat of a van upon noticing a police car behind him and move to the rear of the vehicle.

The officer conducted an investigative detention, pat-down search, and made an ASD demand.

The accused refused.

The accused challenged the validity of the detention, search, and ASD demand, and alleged breaches of his Charter rights.

The court found the ASD demand was valid based on the odour of alcohol.

While Charter breaches were found regarding the search and right to counsel, the evidence was not excluded under s. 24(2).

The accused was convicted.

The applicant was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with excess alcohol on September 21, 2014.

His trial was scheduled for December 2, 2015, approximately 14.5 months later.

He brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the basis that his right to a trial within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The court found that while the delay exceeded the Morin guidelines for the jurisdiction, it did not exceed them by much.

The applicant's claimed prejudice was limited and largely not credible, as he testified that adverse effects only began after the Crown's adjournment application on August 31, 2015.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while the concentration of alcohol in his blood exceeded the legal limit, following a traffic stop for running a red light at high speed.

The accused sought to exclude evidence based on alleged Charter violations.

The court found violations of sections 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter: the accused was unlawfully detained in a police cruiser without reasonable necessity, was not promptly advised of the reasons for detention, and was not advised of his right to counsel without delay.

However, the court exercised its discretion under section 24(2) to admit the evidence, finding that while the violations were serious, they had limited impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests and there was a strong societal interest in a trial on the merits.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while the concentration of alcohol in his blood exceeded the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused applied to exclude the results of a breath analysis on Charter grounds.

The court found violations of section 10(b) of the Charter in two respects: (1) the arresting officer failed to advise the accused of his right to counsel immediately upon arrest, instead delaying seven minutes to conduct other investigative steps; and (2) the breath technician failed to provide the accused with a second opportunity to consult counsel after the accused expressed mistrust of the duty counsel he had consulted.

The court excluded the breath test evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, emphasizing systemic problems within the Peel Regional Police regarding compliance with the immediacy requirement of section 10(b).

The charge was dismissed.