Christopher Mark Hogan

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action and third-party claim.

The court determined the quantum of costs payable by the plaintiffs to the defendant, Christine Raffan, and whether the plaintiffs or Ms. Raffan should pay the third-party costs.

The court awarded Ms. Raffan $300,000 in costs from the plaintiffs, finding the amount reasonable given the complexity, duration, and unproven fraud allegations.

The court further ruled that Ms. Raffan, not the plaintiffs, must pay the third-party costs, awarding David Corazza and Karen Caradonna $125,000 each, as their inclusion in the proceedings did not naturally flow from the plaintiffs' action.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a mistrial during their ongoing trial, alleging reasonable apprehension of bias after the court dismissed their action.

The action was dismissed because the plaintiffs' expert, a forensic accountant, failed to provide an opinion on the standard of care for a CGA, which was deemed essential for the case's success.

The court, acting as a gatekeeper for expert evidence, excluded the expert's testimony based on the two-step test from *White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co.* The motion for mistrial was denied, and the dismissal of the action was affirmed.

A young person (C.L.), age 14 at the time of the alleged offences, was charged with sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault against a younger complainant (J.P.), age 9 at the time.

The complainant alleged that C.L. forced him to perform oral sex on multiple occasions between November and December 2014.

The defence denied all allegations.

The case turned primarily on credibility assessment.

The court found that while the complainant was an impressive witness for his age, significant discrepancies existed regarding how the allegations were initially disclosed.

The court concluded that the Crown had not proven the charges beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on all counts.

A young person charged with sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault applied under section 276 of the Criminal Code to adduce evidence of prior sexual activity by the complainant.

The applicant sought to cross-examine the complainant about an alleged incident from summer 2013 to challenge the complainant's credibility regarding a prior inconsistent statement made to police.

The court granted the application, finding that the evidence met the requirements of section 276(2): it was a specific instance of sexual activity, relevant to the credibility issue at trial, and had significant probative value that was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.