D. Singer

The defendant moved to dismiss a defamation action brought by a long-term care home and its CEO regarding tweets she made alleging elder abuse and neglect of her mother.

The court granted the anti-SLAPP motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, finding that the tweets related to a matter of public interest and that the plaintiffs failed to show sufficient harm to outweigh the public interest in protecting the expression.

The action was dismissed with costs awarded to the defendant.

The plaintiff brought an action claiming 100% beneficial ownership of a family property that had been transferred multiple times among family members and ultimately sold to a third-party corporation.

The plaintiff sought to set aside the sale as a fraudulent conveyance.

The court found that the plaintiff and his father were equal 50% beneficial owners of the property.

The court declined to set aside the sale, finding the third-party corporation was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

The court ordered the plaintiff's parents to pay him 50% of the net sale proceeds under a constructive trust.

All counterclaims were dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action at trial, the successful defendant sought substantial indemnity costs of $112,626.70.

The defendant argued that substantial indemnity was warranted because the plaintiff made unfounded allegations of improper conduct and because the defendant made a Rule 49 offer to settle that was more favourable than the trial outcome.

The court rejected both arguments, noting that the plaintiff's allegations had some basis and that Rule 49 does not automatically grant substantial indemnity costs to a defendant whose offer is beaten by a dismissal.

The court awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs fixed at $40,000, finding the claimed amount to be grossly excessive.

The plaintiff purchased a commercial building from the defendant.

Prior to closing, the defendant provided a statutory declaration claiming uninterrupted use of an adjacent driveway without ever seeking permission.

The plaintiff subsequently sued the adjacent owner for a prescriptive easement but lost after discovering the defendant had previously sought permission via an unsigned 1987 agreement.

The plaintiff then sued the defendant for negligent misrepresentation to recover its legal costs from the unsuccessful easement action.

The Superior Court dismissed the action, finding that while the declaration contained false statements and the defendant owed a duty of care, the plaintiff did not detrimentally rely on the misrepresentations because it would have continued the easement litigation based on its counsel's advice regardless of the 1987 agreement.