Michael H. Tulloch

The appellant appealed his sentence for sexual interference and sexual assault, both involving the same complainant and occurring within the same date range.

The trial judge imposed consecutive two-year sentences on both counts.

The Court of Appeal found that the two counts were alternative ways of pleading the same incidents rather than distinct offences, and therefore one count should have been stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The court allowed the appeal, stayed count 6, and set aside any victim surcharge.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice for possession of fentanyl.

The trial judge had imposed consecutive sentences of two years and six years for possession of fentanyl, with both counts relating to drugs found in two different places in the appellant's residence on the same day.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by providing no explanation for making these sentences consecutive when they involved possession of the same drug in the same place on the same day.

The court altered the sentence by making the sentences concurrent.

The Crown conceded that a victim surcharge of $1,200 must be set aside.

The appellant sought to appeal his conviction and sentence from the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant abandoned the appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The court also vacated any victim fine surcharge that may have been part of the appellant's sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence of two years and six months imposed on September 13, 2017 for breach and enter of a commercial premises, robbery of a convenience store, theft, and failure to comply.

The appellant sought a reduction of the sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no joint submission existed and determined the sentence was entirely fit given the circumstances of the robbery and the appellant's extensive criminal record.

The Crown conceded that the victim surcharge must be set aside.

The appeal was allowed only to set aside the victim surcharge; the appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and forcible confinement arising from an altercation with his domestic partner.

The appellant had pled guilty to other related charges.

The trial judge conducted a judge-alone trial and found the appellant guilty on both counts, imposing a global sentence of 3 years and 9 months, less 3 months for pre-sentence bail conditions.

The appellant appealed on grounds of misapprehension of evidence and unreasonableness of verdict.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge provided detailed and comprehensive reasons addressing all concerns raised.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as fit, except the victim fine surcharge was set aside as unconstitutional.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence from the Ontario Court of Justice.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as the information amendment during trial was proper.

The sentence appeal was partially allowed.

While the trial judge erred in treating lack of remorse as an aggravating factor, the appellate court upheld the one-year imprisonment sentence as fit given the appellant's abuse of trust and planned fraud against a vulnerable family member.

The court extended the time to pay the fine in lieu of forfeiture from six months to two years and set aside the victim fine surcharge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault by pouring boiling water on a vulnerable adult victim.

The victim had initially recanted her allegations, claiming the injuries were self-inflicted, but later reverted to her original account during cross-examination.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on corroborating medical evidence from two treating physicians that the severe burns were inconsistent with self-infliction, combined with the victim's testimony regarding the circumstances of the assault.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: misapprehension of medical evidence, failure to exercise the gatekeeper function regarding expert evidence, misapplication of the burden of proof, and unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds and upheld the conviction.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of historical sexual assault against two teenage nieces committed between 1976 and 1986, and received a global sentence of six years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's admission of similar fact evidence regarding his 2009 convictions for sexual offences against his step-daughters.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's analysis that the probative value of the similar fact evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, particularly given the striking similarities in the circumstances of the incidents despite some dissimilarities in the nature of the acts.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and two-year custodial sentence imposed following his conviction for criminal harassment and four counts of failure to comply with probation orders.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in finding that criminal harassment constituted a serious personal injury offence and in finding a pattern of repetitive behaviour showing likelihood of inflicting severe psychological damage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dangerous offender designation and sentence, finding the trial judge's findings were well-supported by evidence and that the sentencing approach properly emphasized the least intrusive sentence required under the statutory scheme.

The appellant appealed his conviction for incest and sexual assault of his teenage daughter, who gave birth to two of his children.

He received a global sentence of ten years.

At trial, the appellant dismissed his counsel midway through cross-examination and applied for a mistrial based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.

The trial judge dismissed the mistrial application.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to apply the same standard for assessing ineffective assistance claims used on appeal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence, holding that the test for a mistrial application differs from the appellate test and remains within the trial judge's discretion.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of William Mason.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of the appellant's co-accused, Jason Lusted, who pleaded guilty to accessory after the fact and became the main Crown witness.

The Crown also led circumstantial evidence including phone records, fire marshal testimony, and evidence from Edmund Huard regarding a plot to kill Lusted.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: errors regarding phone records, withdrawal of fire marshal evidence, and admission of Huard's evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that Huard's evidence was inadmissible as it lacked probative value and required circular reasoning.

Two appellants, both found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder and incapable of consenting to medical treatment under provincial law, appealed detention orders imposed by the Ontario Review Board.

The central issue was whether an accused person incapable of consenting to medical treatment could nonetheless consent to a condition regarding psychiatric or other treatment under section 672.55(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that the capacity required to consent to such a condition differs from the capacity required to consent to the treatment itself.

An accused need only understand information relevant to the operation of the condition and appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of agreeing to it, including potential consequences for liberty.

The Court overruled its prior jurisprudence to the contrary and allowed the appeals, remitting the matters back to the Board for re-hearing.

The Crown appealed a 90-day intermittent sentence imposed following a guilty plea to production of marijuana and fraudulent consumption of electricity.

The sentencing judge imposed the minimal sentence based on personal views regarding the impending legalization of marijuana, without addressing proper sentencing principles.

The appellate court found the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to provide adequate reasons and imposed an unfit sentence.

The court allowed the appeal and imposed an 18-month sentence with execution stayed, finding that specific deterrence and rehabilitation had been met and that re-incarceration would not be in the interests of justice.

The appellant sought to withdraw guilty pleas to fail to remain causing death and fail to remain causing bodily harm under the Criminal Code, claiming he misunderstood the charges and believed he was pleading to Highway Traffic Act offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to meet the onus of demonstrating that his plea was not informed.

All objective evidence from plea negotiations, the plea inquiry, the plea itself, and sentencing hearing established that the charges were Criminal Code offences.

Crown appeal from an acquittal on a charge of possession of narcotics for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial judge erred in law by confining his analysis to exclusive possession and failing to consider joint possession as an alternative issue raised by the facts and submissions of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault of his 14-year-old niece on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The trial judge found that the appellant touched the complainant for a sexual purpose, despite his denial.

The appellant argued that trial counsel failed to explore the complainant's difficult relationship with her mother and failed to cross-examine the complainant's sister regarding potential bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to satisfy the prejudice requirement of the ineffective assistance test, as neither issue would have addressed the critical question of whether touching occurred.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding no error in principle in the five-month sentence imposed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine.

The respondent was convicted only of simple possession.

The Crown argued that the trial judge erred in excluding expert evidence regarding cocaine trafficking and in finding that the respondent was a heavy cocaine user without evidentiary basis.

The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal, finding no error in the trial judge's exclusion of the expert evidence or his findings regarding the respondent's cocaine use.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of child pornography entered by the trial judge on March 13, 2015.

The central issue was whether there was sufficient evidence for the trial judge to find that the appellant had knowledge of the child pornography on his computer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that the evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that the only rational explanation was that the appellant had knowledge of the contents of the computer, given his control and regular use of the computer, the vast quantities of child pornography found by police, and the absence of evidence that anyone else occupied the home.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a sentence of nine months in custody, three years probation, and $50,000 restitution imposed for an eleven-year fraud on a small union.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider mitigating factors including early guilty plea, cooperation, and intent to make restitution.

The sentencing judge rejected a request for a conditional sentence as part of a blended sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's rejection of the conditional sentence given the circumstances of the offence and the need for general deterrence, and determined that the custodial sentence was at the low end of the range reflecting mitigating factors.

The appellant appealed her sentence for contempt of court, imposed for refusing to testify at her father's perjury trial.

The father was charged with perjury for allegedly lying under oath at a previous trial of the appellant's fiancée.

The appellant had been sentenced to one year imprisonment consecutive to time already being served for perjury convictions related to testimony given at the fiancée's earlier trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the sentence was not unfit.