Marc Rosenberg

The appellant appealed a judgment finding no case for equitable set-off and refusing a stay of execution.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that although the motion judge erred in finding no basis for piercing the corporate veil, he correctly concluded there was no case for equitable set-off because the debt was incurred to a different company prior to a merger.

The court also upheld the refusal to grant a stay of execution due to the lack of connection between the claims.

The appellant company appealed an order declaring it in breach of a redemption obligation and entitling the respondent to immediate redemption of his preference shares for $1,600,000.

The appellant had refused to pay quarterly dividends to the respondent despite having the funds, suspecting the respondent of breaching non-compete obligations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's finding that the failure to pay dividends constituted a default under the Shareholders' Agreement, triggering the respondent's unconditional right to redeem his shares.

The court rejected the appellant's argument that the default provision only applied when the company lacked funds.

The appellant insurer issued a comprehensive general liability policy to the respondent insured.

The insured was sued for wrongful dismissal, including allegations of intentional racial and age discrimination.

The insurer sought a declaration that it owed no duty to defend the discrimination claims.

The application judge ruled the insurer was required to provide a defence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the fortuity principle of insurance law dictates that liability policies only cover accidental or fortuitous losses.

Because the underlying claims alleged intentional discrimination, they fell outside the scope of the policy, and the insurer had no duty to defend.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for an offence involving a machete.

The trial judge made several errors regarding self-defence, including reversing the burden of proof.

However, the Court of Appeal applied the curative proviso, finding that the errors did not affect the verdict because the trial judge accepted the Crown's version of events, under which self-defence did not arise.

The appeal from conviction and disposition was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended his evidence and misapplied the W.(D.) framework by approaching the case on an 'either/or' basis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly weighed all the evidence, rejected the appellant's testimony, and accepted the evidence of the two young complainants who described similar incidents without collusion.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to consider whether the Crown proved lack of consent and knowledge of lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the issues of consent or mistaken belief in consent, as the complainant was intoxicated and repeatedly said 'no'.

The sentence of 40 months' imprisonment, in addition to 16 months' pre-sentence custody, was upheld as fit.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm after losing control of his vehicle while speeding on a wet road.

He appealed his convictions, arguing his s. 11(b) Charter rights were violated and the Attorney General lacked authority to prefer the indictment under s. 577 of the Criminal Code after his committal was quashed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, agreeing with the trial judge's analysis.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, as the trial judge erred in principle regarding the appropriateness of a conditional sentence.

The sentence was reduced from two years less a day to 15 months imprisonment.

The tenants appealed a trial judgment finding their commercial lease invalid and terminating their month-to-month tenancy.

They argued the trial judge erred by excluding the female tenant from the courtroom while her husband testified.

The Court of Appeal held that while excluding a party violates rule 52.06(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, it did not cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice in this case.

The landlord's estate cross-appealed the dismissal of its claim for arrears of rent and taxes.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal in part, finding that while the landlord's course of conduct waived the rent arrears, the tenants' uncorroborated evidence regarding property and business taxes could not defeat the estate's claim under s. 13 of the Evidence Act.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual interference involving a child complainant.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting prior consistent statements made by the complainant.

The Court of Appeal found that while some statements were improperly admitted, the appellant suffered no prejudice as the trial judge did not rely on them in her reasons.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found the trial judge erred in principle by treating the appellant's decision to go to trial as an aggravating factor and by finding a risk of re-offending without supporting evidence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, but the sentence appeal was allowed, substituting an eight-month jail term with a 15-month conditional sentence.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of stolen property under $5,000 after taking stickers from his employer.

On appeal, he argued his plea was equivocal because his trial counsel submitted during sentencing that he honestly believed he was entitled to take the stickers due to common employee practice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the plea was not equivocal, the facts supported the plea, and the explanation offered in mitigation did not amount to a defence in law.

Following an appeal that reduced the respondent's trial judgment to $25,000, the appellant sought to deprive the respondent of trial costs under former Rule 76.10, arguing the action should have been brought under the simplified procedure.

The Court of Appeal held that it was reasonable for the respondent to have commenced and continued the action under the ordinary procedure, as the original claim was for $70,000 based on bona fide estimates and the trial award was $54,980.34.

The trial costs award was not disturbed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple property-related offences, including break and enters.

At trial, there was a joint submission for a three-year sentence, but the trial judge rejected it and imposed a five-year sentence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the proposed three-year sentence was within the appropriate range, given the appellant's youth, lack of prior lengthy sentences, and efforts to overcome addiction.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to three years by making certain sentences concurrent.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a three-year probation order imposed as part of her sentence.

The Court of Appeal found the probation order and its terms to be entirely fit and dismissed the application for leave to appeal as being without merit.

The appellants were convicted of two counts of first degree murder following a lengthy trial.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of three unsavoury witnesses, including a jailhouse informant.

On appeal, the appellants sought to introduce fresh evidence of post-trial recantations by two of these witnesses and argued that the trial judge made several errors, including failing to give an adequate Vetrovec warning and improperly admitting highly prejudicial evidence of a prior manslaughter conviction.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence of one witness's recantation and found that the trial judge erred in his Vetrovec warning and evidentiary rulings.

The cumulative effect of these errors warranted a new trial.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions were quashed.

The Causeway Foundation, a charitable organization, appealed a decision denying it a property tax exemption under s. 3(1) para 12(iii) of the Assessment Act.

The Foundation leased a building to the Causeway Work Centre, another charity.

The Court of Appeal found that the Foundation 'occupied' the property within the meaning of the Act, consistent with its companion decision in Salus.

However, the Court upheld the lower court's finding that the Foundation was not 'supported in part by public funds' because it did not receive direct government funding, and indirect funding via rent from the Work Centre was insufficient.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant Municipal Property Assessment Corporation appealed a Divisional Court decision granting a property tax exemption to the respondent, a charitable organization providing supportive housing.

The appellant argued that a 1998 amendment to the Assessment Act required the charity to physically occupy the premises itself, rather than renting units to tenants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the charity 'occupied' the land because it was used directly to fulfill its charitable mandate of providing housing to the poor and mentally ill, and the tenants' physical occupation did not oust the charity's occupation for the purpose of the exemption.

The appellant appealed his sentence for the forceful sexual assault of a 13-year-old girl.

The trial judge had declined to impose a conditional sentence, finding that the objectives of deterrence and denunciation required a custodial sentence given the violence, threats, and profound impact on the complainant.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held the sentence was not manifestly excessive, despite the appellant's positive background and family support contributions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for having care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower courts that the appellant was in care and control.

The court noted the appellant was heavily intoxicated, the keys were in the ignition, the car was running, and he had stated an intention to resume driving.

The young person appealed his conviction for importing cocaine.

He argued he was an unwilling dupe of his mother and did not know the drugs were in his suitcase.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were inadequate for failing to address this defence and for suggesting a reversal of the burden of proof.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed from a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

At the hearing, counsel for the appellant advised the court that he was unable to reach his client.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.