Marc Rosenberg

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for breach of contract.

The dispute centered on whether the appellant knew the building was not to involve post and beam construction and whether it breached the contract by unilaterally changing the design.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge, agreeing that the parties were ad idem on the terms and that the appellant's delivery of draft drawings using an uncontracted construction technique constituted a breach.

The court also upheld the trial judge's measure of damages, which aimed to put the respondent in the position it would have been had the contract not been breached.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a young person.

The trial judge had excluded evidence based on the conduct of security guards.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under R. v. Buhay, the security guards were not police agents and therefore not subject to the Charter.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his action for non-payment of costs.

The underlying action was rooted in a breach of contract claim from 1979.

The motion judge dismissed the action due to the appellant's failure to pay various costs orders, finding that he was not impecunious.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion and noting the appellant's history of picking and choosing which costs orders to pay.

The appellant's application to adduce fresh evidence of belatedly paying the costs was also dismissed.

Following a successful appeal regarding the jurisdiction to order the conveyance of a cottage property, the appellant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis due to the respondent's ill-advised interlocutory steps.

The Court of Appeal declined to award substantial indemnity costs, noting the litigation stemmed from the respondent's attempts to secure child support arrears evaded by the other respondent.

Applying the factors from Andrews v. Andrews, the court awarded the appellant modest costs of $3,000.

The appellant purchased the respondent's insurance brokerage business from a trustee in bankruptcy.

The agreement of purchase and sale did not contain a non-solicitation clause.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's declaration that the respondent was entitled to solicit his former clients.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that in an involuntary alienation of assets in a bankruptcy, there is no common law implied obligation on the part of the bankrupt not to compete and solicit former clients.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the basis of unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter and the admissibility of evidence seized pursuant to a wiretap authorization and search warrants.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge reasonably applied the Morin framework to find no s. 11(b) violation.

The Court also upheld the wiretap authorization, finding that jailhouse telephones are not places ordinarily used by solicitors under s. 186(2) of the Criminal Code, and that investigative necessity was established.

Finally, the Court held that the police inspection of the appellant's personal belongings held by jail authorities did not violate his reasonable expectation of privacy under s. 8 of the Charter.

The appeals from conviction were dismissed.

The respondents brought a motion to strike out a notice of intervention filed by the Attorney General of Ontario in an appeal from a judicial review decision.

The respondents argued that section 9(4) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act only grants the Attorney General the right to intervene in the original application, not on appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that section 9(4) is broad enough to encompass appeals, allowing the Attorney General to intervene as of right to fulfill their role as guardian of the public interest.

The appellant appealed various aspects of the trial judge's judgment, including child support, spousal support, equalization payment, RRSP transfers, costs, and custody.

The appellant failed to provide a trial transcript.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's findings of fact supported her legal conclusions, including imputing income and finding a traditional marriage.

Finding no errors in principle or misapprehension of evidence, the Court dismissed the appeal with costs.

The accused appealed his assault conviction to the summary conviction appeal court, which dismissed the appeal with brief, conclusory reasons.

The accused appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing the appeal judge's reasons were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal held that the failure to give adequate reasons constituted an error of law that deprived the accused of meaningful appellate review.

Upon reviewing the trial record, the Court found the trial judge misapprehended evidence and subjected the accused's testimony to stricter scrutiny than the complainant's.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $54,980.34 for the cost of replacing an entire swimming pool structure due to defective workmanship.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by awarding replacement costs when the evidence indicated the pool was structurally sound and only required repairs to the retaining walls and decking.

The Court held that awarding a new pool would provide a substantial gratuitous benefit.

The appeal was allowed, and damages were reduced to $25,000.

The appellant appealed a decision finding that an enforceable settlement agreement had been concluded between the parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motions judge was justified in finding an agreement was reached and that the terms, including a cash payment for shares, were clear and undisputed by the appellant at the time.

The appellant, a lawyer, was convicted of fraud after acting as a solicitor in transactions that defrauded banks.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable, and his sentence, arguing he should have received a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding ample evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant's own acts and declarations proved him guilty as a party to the frauds.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge did not err in principle in imposing a custodial sentence.

The parties were neighbours involved in a dispute over a shared well and water system located on the respondent's property.

The applications judge declared the appellants had an easement by grant for the use of the well, but no easement to repair, upgrade, or replace it.

On appeal, the appellants argued the judge erred in determining the scope of the easement.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence showing the well had been decommissioned and the appellants had installed alternate water systems.

The court dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, finding insufficient evidence that the original grant contemplated the actual replacement of the well.

The appellants appealed a trial decision which found that the respondent did not misuse confidential information to obtain a commercial contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the confidential material was not used by or of assistance to the respondent, as the minimum price had been agreed upon before the information was supplied.

The Crown appealed an acquittal of the respondent on charges of sexual assault.

The trial judge had withdrawn the case from the jury and entered an acquittal because the Crown failed to explicitly ask the complainant where the incidents occurred, and the trial judge denied the Crown's application to re-open the case to establish territorial jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal found there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that the offences occurred in Ontario.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred in refusing to allow the Crown to re-open its case under the non-controversial exception, as there was no prejudice to the unrepresented accused.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed an order of Justice Douglas Coo.

The Court of Appeal found the appeal devoid of merit, agreed with the motion judge's reasons, and dismissed the appeal with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding a real estate transaction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decisions to permit an amendment to the claim for GST, to interpret the Agreement of Purchase and Sale as not requiring formal tender since the respondent was ready, willing, and able to close, and to award costs.

The appellants appealed an order of Justice Cosgrove dated July 8, 2003, which made findings of contempt.

The Court of Appeal agreed with counsel that it was an appropriate case to allow the appeal and set aside the findings of contempt in accordance with a filed draft order.

The appellant pleaded guilty to twenty charges, including multiple armed bank robberies, and was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment following a joint submission.

On appeal, he argued the joint submission was unfair because it resulted from an eleventh-hour change in the Crown's sentencing position from what was discussed at the pre-trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge conducted the hearing fairly, the Crown had not resiled from a prior agreement, and the sentence was appropriate given the serious nature of the offences and the appellant's mental health challenges.

The appellant appealed his conspiracy convictions on the basis that the trial judge erred in refusing to permit cross-examination of the affiant and sub-affiants during an application to exclude wiretap evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge applied too strict a test, requiring a showing of fraud or misrepresentation, rather than the correct standard of showing a basis that cross-examination would elicit testimony tending to discredit a pre-condition to the authorization, such as investigative necessity.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.