Marc Rosenberg

The prosecution appealed the dismissal of its application for prohibition and certiorari to halt a securities prosecution.

The prosecution alleged the trial judge lost jurisdiction by interfering with its case presentation, failing to rule on evidence admissibility, and failing to restrain uncivil attacks by defence counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge has inherent trial management power to direct the order of evidence and defer evidentiary rulings.

While defence counsel's conduct was uncivil and improper, the trial judge's response did not deprive him of jurisdiction or prevent a fair trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued the trial judge gave inadequate instructions on in-dock identification and the W.D. framework regarding defence evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the instructions sufficient given the context of the trial and the evidence presented.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was deemed fit given the seriousness of the crime and the appellant's record.

The appellant appealed his convictions for uttering a death threat against a Crown Attorney and causing a disturbance, as well as his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding that the witnesses consistently described a threat to kill, the trial judge correctly inferred the requisite mens rea, and the appellant's yelling in court constituted a disturbance.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was not demonstrably unfit despite being at the high end of the range.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's order staying the respondent's second-degree murder trial for abuse of process and unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge had found over 150 Charter breaches by police and Crown counsel.

On appeal, the respondent conceded the trial judge's findings were unsupportable but argued the stay should be upheld because her trial counsel's incompetence caused the delay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding no evidence the respondent was unaware of her counsel's strategy, and set aside the stay of proceedings and costs order, directing a new trial.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing errors in the trial judge's assessment of her daughter's evidence, the use of a blended voir dire, misapprehension of an officer's evidence regarding a TTC machine, and the lawfulness of her arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that its jurisdiction is limited to errors of law alone and none of the issues raised met this threshold.

The court held that credibility assessments are for the trial judge, the blended voir dire did not cause unfairness, the misapprehended evidence did not affect the conclusions, and the arrest was lawful as the officer found her committing the offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for the rape of a 15-year-old girl.

He argued the trial judge erred in refusing to order production of the complainant's psychiatric records under s. 278.5 of the Criminal Code and in failing to set out the theory of the defence to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the likely relevance test for the records was not met and the defence theory was speculative.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the serious nature of the offence required a penitentiary term despite the appellant's health and immigration consequences.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding their right to an electricity connection under s. 28 of the Electricity Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants do not have an unqualified right to connection because their property can only be accessed over a third party's property and does not lie 'along any of the lines of the distribution system'.

The court held that Toronto Hydro's conditions of service requiring easements are reasonable and fall within its regulatory scheme.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the grounds that the trial judge erred in his charge to the jury.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge provided an inadequate Vetrovec warning regarding an accomplice witness and failed to properly instruct the jury on the frailties of both voice and eyewitness identification evidence.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, as the conviction rested mostly on unsavoury and frail evidence.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence for the sexual assault of an elderly woman in her home.

The sentence had been imposed following a joint submission after a partial preliminary inquiry.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle with the joint submission, noting the appellant's prior record for a similar offence and need for treatment.

Leave to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The young person appealed a 20-year weapons prohibition order.

With the consent of the Crown, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and substituted the legal maximum two-year weapons prohibition order.

The appellant appealed his conviction.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that the verdict was reasonably supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action for malicious prosecution against a Crown Attorney.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motions judge that there was no evidence of malice.

The court noted that the Crown Attorney chose not to call an unsavoury witness to prevent a wrongful conviction, which demonstrated an absence of malice, and that malice could not be inferred merely from a possible absence of reasonable and probable grounds.

The appellant estate appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for an undisclosed latent defect in a residential property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the deceased's son acted as her agent, that the deceased made false statements in the disclosure statement, and that the vendor knew of widespread wood rot in the crawl space which constituted a latent defect unknown to the purchasers.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant was successful on appeal in setting aside an order to convey a cottage property to the respondent.

All parties sought costs.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs to the appellant despite the respondent's ill-advised interlocutory steps, noting the litigation stemmed from the other respondent's evasion of child support and breach of the Family Law Act.

The court awarded modest costs of $3,000 to the appellant.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motions judge's reasons and result, finding it was not a case where the motions judge could have exercised her discretion in favour of the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $7,500.

The appellant appealed an order requiring her to convey a cottage property to the respondent, Diane Pirner.

The cottage had previously been transferred by the respondent's former husband to a family trust, and then to the appellant.

The application judge ordered the transfer to satisfy security for support and equalization payments.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge lacked jurisdiction under the Family Law Act to order the appellant to convey the property to the respondent, as the original conveyance was voidable, not void, and the appellant was not a straw person.

The appeal was allowed and the order set aside.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the validity of a sworn information.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it unnecessary to decide whether extrinsic evidence was admissible because the material in the information itself established the year it was sworn, proving the limitation period had not expired.

The information was not a nullity.

The appellant tenant breached a commercial lease by abandoning the premises.

The respondent landlord subsequently leased the property to a new tenant, with a 10-month overlap of the original lease term.

The tenant appealed the trial judge's calculation of damages, arguing the landlord received a benefit from avoiding a lengthy vacancy period.

The landlord cross-appealed regarding the deduction of tax consultant fees and the apportionment of rent-free periods and improvements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal, finding the tenant's mitigation argument was not pleaded and relied on speculation.

The cross-appeal was allowed in part, permitting the landlord to deduct the 50% contingency fee paid to a tax consultant to obtain a property tax rebate.

The Court of Appeal issued an endorsement on costs following an appeal and stay application regarding child custody.

The court ordered no costs for either the stay application or the appeal, noting that both parties have modest resources and custodial responsibilities for the child, and neither should have their resources depleted to pay costs to the other.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict regarding the amount of loss of earnings awarded to the plaintiff.

The appellant argued the verdict was perverse and that he was prejudiced by leading questions put to the plaintiff during examination-in-chief.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was evidence to support the jury's conclusion and noting that defence counsel at trial did not object to the leading questions.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $25,785.