Kikélola Roach

The appellants commenced a proposed class action alleging that the procedures used to process claims for Ontario Disability Support Program benefits were inefficient and procedurally unfair, claiming negligence and breaches of ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The motion judge struck the statement of claim but granted leave to amend the s. 7 claim solely regarding the failure to give reasons for denying benefits.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the negligence and s. 15 claims, but expanded the leave to amend the s. 7 claim to include other potential procedural fairness deficiencies beyond just the failure to give reasons.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision denying a stay of proceedings under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion.

The court agreed that the underlying application was a straightforward Charter-based constitutional challenge of a federal law regarding citizenship, rather than a matter involving the administrative handling of citizenship files.

Following the dismissal of the respondent's motion for leave to appeal, the applicant sought costs of $7,603.25 on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondent argued the amount was excessive and suggested $2,850.

The court disallowed costs for the applicant's own time as he acted as the client, not counsel, but allowed fees for his counsel's preparation and attendance.

Costs were fixed at $3,150 on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant, who suffered from bipolar disorder, was arrested and placed in a detention centre where he killed his cellmate.

He was found not guilty by reason of mental disorder and committed for eight years.

He sued the police and detention centre for negligence in failing to obtain a psychiatric assessment or provide timely medication.

The trial judge dismissed the action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge made some legal errors in interpreting the Mental Health Act and the test for systemic negligence, there was no palpable and overriding error in his factual findings that the respondents met the standard of care and that any breach did not cause the damages.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the remedy decision of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario regarding a finding of employment discrimination.

The respondent cross-appealed the quantum of damages and the award of legal costs.

The appellant also brought a constitutional challenge arguing that s. 41(4) of the Human Rights Code, which allows costs to be awarded to respondents but not complainants, violated ss. 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the constitutional challenge, finding that economic interests are not protected under s. 7 and that complainants do not constitute an analogous group under s. 15(1).

The court upheld the Tribunal's findings on lost income and interest but allowed the cross-appeal in part, reducing the general damages award from $35,000 to $25,000 because the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to include $10,000 for legal costs under s. 41(1)(b).

The appellant appealed a trial decision dismissing his claim regarding a damaged sculpture.

The trial judge found that the purported assignment of the sculpture to the appellant was invalid under s. 53(1) of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, as the sculpture had been pledged to the respondent as collateral for an outstanding debt.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings, including the valuation of the sculpture based on expert testimony and the conclusion that the respondent owed no duty of care to the appellant when the sculpture was damaged.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants were previously successful in their appeal to stay a libel action brought by the respondent.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellants their costs of the appeal and the proceeding before the motion judge on a partial indemnity scale.

The parties could not agree on the quantum of costs for the motion.

The appellants sought $32,773.37.

Noting that the case involved a novel application of the real and substantial connection test in a libel context and was a matter of public interest, the court fixed the costs of the motion at a modest $7,500 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The respondent sued the Washington Post and three of its reporters for defamation regarding two articles published in 1997.

At the time of publication, the respondent lived in Kenya and the newspaper had minimal circulation in Ontario.

The respondent moved to Ontario three years later and commenced the action.

The appellants brought a motion to stay the action on the basis that Ontario lacked jurisdiction.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal applied the Muscutt factors and found no real and substantial connection between the action and Ontario.

The appeal was allowed and the action was stayed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action for malicious prosecution against a Crown Attorney.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motions judge that there was no evidence of malice.

The court noted that the Crown Attorney chose not to call an unsavoury witness to prevent a wrongful conviction, which demonstrated an absence of malice, and that malice could not be inferred merely from a possible absence of reasonable and probable grounds.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the Canada Elections Act requirement that a political party must nominate candidates in at least 50 electoral districts to obtain registered party status and its associated benefits.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the 50-candidate threshold violates the right to meaningful participation in the electoral process guaranteed by section 3 of the Charter.

The Court found that the threshold diminishes the capacity of marginal or regional parties to communicate their ideas, thereby undermining the right of citizens to play a meaningful role in the electoral process.

The infringement was not justified under section 1 of the Charter, and the relevant provisions were declared unconstitutional.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding him incapable of consenting to treatment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's decision was reasonable and supported by ample medical evidence indicating the appellant suffered from a delusional disorder that impaired his ability to understand treatment information and appreciate its consequences.