McLachlin C.J.

The insured, a physician with a history of opiate addiction, died from an intravenous injection of Demerol.

His life insurance policy provided coverage for death effected through 'accidental means'.

The insurer denied the claim, arguing the self-injection was a deliberate act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that 'accidental means' does not refer to a narrower subclass of 'accidental deaths'.

Both phrases connote a death that was unexpected.

The Court found that the insured did not expect to die but made a miscalculation regarding the dosage.

The appeal was dismissed, and the beneficiary was entitled to the accidental death benefit.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Prince Edward Island Court of Appeal finding an Internet lottery scheme unlawful under the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, adopting the reasons of the Chief Justice of Prince Edward Island.

The Surrey School Board passed a resolution declining to approve three books depicting same-sex parented families as supplementary learning resources for Kindergarten and Grade One classrooms.

The appellants challenged the resolution.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Board's decision was unreasonable because it failed to act in accordance with the secular mandate of the School Act.

The Board allowed the religious views of some parents to trump the need for equal respect and tolerance for all family models, and failed to apply the appropriate criteria for approving supplementary learning resources.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remanded to the Board.

The parties cohabited for approximately 10 years.

Following separation, the respondent applied for a declaration that the definition of 'spouse' in s. 2(g) of the Nova Scotia Matrimonial Property Act was unconstitutional for failing to provide her with the presumption of an equal division of matrimonial property, in violation of s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the exclusion of unmarried cohabiting persons of the opposite sex from the Act is not discriminatory within the meaning of s. 15(1).

The distinction does not affect the dignity of these persons and respects the fundamental personal autonomy and choice of individuals who decide not to marry.

The appellant requested access to personal information held by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).

CSIS refused to disclose the information, claiming exemptions under the Privacy Act for national security and foreign confidences.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of s. 51 of the Privacy Act, which mandates in camera and ex parte hearings when these exemptions are claimed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mandatory ex parte provision did not violate s. 7 of the Charter.

However, the mandatory in camera provision violated s. 2(b) of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1 because it was overly broad.

The Court read down s. 51(2)(a) to apply only to the ex parte submissions.

On a cross-appeal, the Court held that the law enforcement exemption in s. 22(1)(b) is not limited to current investigations.

The appellant, a journalist, requested access to a document detailing the expenses of Members of the National Assembly.

The request was denied under ss. 34 and 57 of the Act Respecting Access to Documents Held by Public Bodies and the Protection of Personal Information.

The Commission d’accès à l’information upheld the refusal, finding the document was produced 'for' a Member and that Members are not 'public bodies'.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the standard of review for the Commission's decisions is reasonableness, and that the Commissioner's interpretations of ss. 34 and 57 were reasonable.

The respondent was dismissed from his employment after his daughter and wife accused his employer (who was his brother-in-law) of sexual abuse.

The respondent filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of marital and family status.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the enumerated grounds of marital and family status in the Ontario Human Rights Code are broad enough to encompass discrimination based on the particular identity of a complainant's spouse or family member.

The Court found that the respondent was arbitrarily disadvantaged based on stereotypical assumptions about his familial affiliations, constituting prohibited discrimination.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Law Society of Alberta sought to discipline a Crown prosecutor for failing to disclose exculpatory DNA evidence to the defence in a timely manner.

The prosecutor argued that his actions were protected by prosecutorial discretion and that the Law Society lacked jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while core elements of prosecutorial discretion are immune from review absent flagrant impropriety, the duty to disclose relevant evidence is a legal obligation, not a matter of discretion.

Therefore, the Law Society has the jurisdiction to review a prosecutor's conduct to determine if a failure to disclose was done dishonestly or in bad faith, as this constitutes a breach of professional ethics.

The Supreme Court of Canada heard three appeals concerning the constitutionality of s. 488.1 of the Criminal Code, which sets out a procedure for determining claims of solicitor-client privilege in relation to documents seized from a law office under a warrant.

The Court held that s. 488.1 violates s. 8 of the Charter because it more than minimally impairs solicitor-client privilege.

The provision allows privilege to be lost through the inaction of the lawyer, requires the naming of clients, lacks notice to clients, imposes strict time limits without judicial discretion, and permits the Attorney General to inspect documents before privilege is determined.

The Court struck down s. 488.1 and established common law guidelines for law office searches.

The appellant, a cult leader, was convicted of multiple sexual offences against teenage girls.

At trial, the judge admitted evidence of each count as similar fact evidence for the others, and restricted the defence from cross-examining one complainant on the absence of references to sexual abuse in her teenage diary.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the admission of the similar fact evidence, finding its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect.

However, the Court held that the trial judge erred in restricting the cross-examination on the diary, as the complainant's privacy interest did not substantially outweigh the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

A new trial was ordered for the counts relating to that specific complainant, while the other convictions were upheld.

The respondents, staff lawyers with the federal Department of Justice, sued the federal Crown for breach of contract regarding salary disparities.

During discovery, the government claimed Cabinet confidentiality over certain documents under s. 39 of the Canada Evidence Act, including some previously listed as producible.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 39 provides absolute protection once information is validly certified by the Clerk of the Privy Council, and the common law concept of waiver does not apply.

The Court also upheld the constitutionality of s. 39, finding it does not impermissibly infringe on the core jurisdiction of superior courts or unwritten constitutional principles.

The Attorney General of Quebec sought leave to appeal directly to the Supreme Court of Canada from Quebec Superior Court decisions ordering the state to pay defence counsel's fees at rates exceeding legal aid tariffs.

The Supreme Court held that a direct appeal does not lie, as section 676.1 of the Criminal Code provides for an appeal of costs orders to the provincial court of appeal.

The Court interpreted 'costs' broadly to include future payments for legal services.

The applications for leave to appeal were referred to the Quebec Court of Appeal.

The appellant bank and respondent trust company entered into agreements to finance a condominium project.

When the real estate market collapsed, the respondent breached its commitment to provide takeout financing, leaving the appellant with a significant shortfall.

The trial judge awarded the appellant damages including compound pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the rate specified in the loan agreement.

The Court of Appeal substituted simple interest.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that courts have jurisdiction at common law and in equity to award compound interest as expectation damages to fully compensate a plaintiff for the time-value of money.

The appellants, Air Ontario pilots, brought an action against the respondents, Air Canada pilots, for breach of contract based on the union constitution after the respondents refused to implement an arbitration award integrating their seniority lists.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the historical legal fiction of a web of contracts between individual union members is no longer necessary or practical.

Instead, the Court recognized that a trade union is a legal entity capable of entering into a contract of membership with each individual member, and therefore, union members cannot be held personally liable to one another for breaching the union constitution.

The appellant, a victim of a motor vehicle accident, had her statutory accident benefits terminated by the respondent insurer.

The insurer's notice of termination advised her of the right to seek mediation but did not outline the full dispute resolution process or the relevant limitation periods.

After unsuccessful mediation, the appellant filed an action more than two years after the termination.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the two-year limitation period under the Insurance Act does not begin to run until the insurer provides a valid refusal, which requires adequate compliance with s. 71 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

Because the insurer failed to inform the appellant of the complete dispute resolution process, including the right to arbitrate or litigate and the applicable time limits, a proper refusal was not given, and the limitation period was not triggered.

The appeal was allowed.

The respondent artist authorized the reproduction of his paintings on paper posters.

The appellant art galleries purchased these posters and used a chemical process to transfer the ink from the paper onto canvas, which they then sold.

The artist obtained a seizure before judgment of the canvas-backed reproductions, claiming copyright infringement.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the transfer process did not constitute a 'reproduction' under section 3(1) of the Copyright Act, as no new copies were created.

The Court distinguished between economic rights and moral rights, finding that the artist was improperly asserting a moral right in the guise of an economic right to justify the seizure.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder after shooting a criminal accomplice in the back of the head.

He claimed self-defence, testifying that he believed the victim and another accomplice were planning to kill him.

The trial judge left the defence to the jury but made errors in the charge.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the defence of self-defence lacked an 'air of reality' because there was no evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that the accused reasonably believed he had no alternative but to kill the victim.

Therefore, the defence should not have been left to the jury, and the errors in the charge were harmless.

The appellants, foreign nationals living in Canada, challenged s. 16(4)(c) of the Public Service Employment Act, which gives preference to Canadian citizens in open competitions for federal public service employment.

They argued this preference violated their equality rights under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that while the provision infringes s. 15(1) by discriminating on the analogous ground of citizenship, it is saved under s. 1 as a reasonable limit demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

The Court found the objectives of enhancing the meaning of citizenship and encouraging naturalization to be pressing and substantial, and the preference to be rationally connected and minimally impairing.

The appellant's home was destroyed by fire.

The respondent insurer denied the claim, alleging arson, despite its own experts and investigators concluding the fire was accidental.

The insurer maintained this bad faith defence through a lengthy trial to force a lower settlement.

The jury awarded compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive damages.

The Court of Appeal reduced the punitive damages to $100,000.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the $1 million jury award, holding that the insurer's breach of the duty of good faith was an independent actionable wrong and the jury's award, while high, was a rational response to the insurer's exceptionally reprehensible conduct.

The appellants' locked safe was stolen from their restaurant and later recovered by police.

An officer investigating the appellants for suspected tax violations, who was not involved in the theft investigation, photocopied documents from the safe without a warrant and forwarded them to Revenue Canada.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellants retained a residual expectation of privacy in the stolen safe's contents.

The officer's actions constituted an unreasonable search under s. 8 of the Charter.

The Court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2), finding that the officer's disregard for regular police procedures and failure to leave the investigation to taxation authorities rendered the breach sufficiently serious that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.