McLachlin C.J.

The government of British Columbia sought the British Columbia Utilities Commission's approval of a 2007 Energy Purchase Agreement between BC Hydro and Alcan.

The respondent First Nations asserted that the agreement should be subject to consultation under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, due to historical and ongoing impacts of the dam project on the Nechako River.

The Commission found it had jurisdiction to consider consultation but concluded the agreement would not adversely affect any Aboriginal interest, thus no duty to consult arose.

The Supreme Court of Canada restored the Commission's decision, holding that while the Commission had the power to assess the adequacy of consultation, its finding that the agreement caused no novel adverse impacts was reasonable.

The respondents built an aerodrome on land zoned as agricultural in Quebec without obtaining prior authorization from the Commission de protection du territoire agricole du Québec.

The Commission ordered the land restored to its original state pursuant to provincial agricultural zoning legislation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the provincial legislation is valid as relating to land use planning and agriculture, it is constitutionally inapplicable to aerodromes under the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity because it impairs the core of the federal power over aeronautics.

The appellant was arrested for murder and informed of his right to counsel.

After an unsuccessful attempt to contact his preferred lawyer, he spoke with duty counsel and expressed satisfaction with the advice.

He subsequently provided an incriminating statement to the police.

The trial judge excluded the statement, finding a breach of the appellant's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel of choice.

The Court of Appeal reversed the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the police did not breach the appellant's right to counsel, as he was afforded a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel and voluntarily chose to speak with duty counsel.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at his residence using an unannounced 'dynamic entry' by a tactical team.

The appellant argued the search violated his s. 8 Charter rights because the police used excessive force, failed to knock and announce, and did not have the warrant on their person upon entry.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the police had reasonable grounds to depart from the knock and announce principle due to concerns about officer safety and the destruction of evidence.

The Court also found that s. 29(1) of the Criminal Code was satisfied because the lead investigator, who arrived shortly after the tactical team, had the warrant in his possession.

The appellant was charged with multiple counts of first degree murder.

At trial, the Crown argued he was the sole perpetrator, while the defence suggested others were involved.

The trial judge initially instructed the jury that they must acquit if they had a reasonable doubt the appellant was the actual shooter.

Following a jury question, the judge amended the instruction to include liability if the appellant was 'otherwise an active participant'.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and appealed, arguing the amended instruction undermined trial fairness.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the instructions adequately conveyed the alternate routes to liability and no miscarriage of justice occurred.

The union filed a grievance against a decision not to renew the contract of a university professor, arguing it amounted to a dismissal without good and sufficient cause under the collective agreement and s. 124 of the Act respecting labour standards.

The arbitrator found the collective agreement established an equivalent remedial procedure and ordered the parties to proceed under it.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the collective agreement's provisions regarding dismissal were sufficiently clear and provided an equivalent procedure to s. 124, giving the arbitrator jurisdiction to hear the grievance without incorporating the statutory provision.

The union filed a grievance against the Cégep's decision to withdraw employment priority from a teacher, alleging it constituted dismissal without good and sufficient cause under s. 124 of the Act respecting labour standards.

The arbitrator found she lacked jurisdiction to apply s. 124 as the collective agreement did not provide an equivalent remedial procedure.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 124 is not implicitly incorporated into the collective agreement, and where an agreement lacks adequate protection, the Commission des relations du travail has exclusive jurisdiction.

The Criminal Lawyers' Association sought access to a police report and legal advice regarding an investigation into alleged police misconduct in a murder case.

The Minister refused disclosure under the law enforcement and solicitor-client privilege exemptions of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The CLA argued that the Act's failure to apply a public interest override to these exemptions violated freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 2(b) does not guarantee access to all government documents, but only where access is necessary for meaningful public discussion and does not encroach on protected privileges.

The Court found no Charter violation, as the exemptions themselves already incorporate public interest considerations.

The matter regarding the law enforcement exemption was remitted to the Commissioner for reconsideration of the Minister's exercise of discretion.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder and detained in a mental health facility, sought an absolute discharge and treatment orders as remedies under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada established a new approach for determining whether an administrative tribunal is a court of competent jurisdiction under s. 24(1).

The Court held that the Ontario Review Board has the jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies because it has the authority to decide questions of law.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the specific remedies sought by the appellant—an absolute discharge for a dangerous patient and a treatment order—were expressly precluded by the Board's statutory scheme under the Criminal Code.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting his stepdaughter.

A confession made to police was ruled inadmissible at trial due to an improper inducement.

However, an e-mail sent by the accused to his former wife containing a second apology was admitted without a voir dire and without objection from defence counsel.

The accused was convicted.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge should have held a voir dire on his own motion to determine if the e-mail was a derived confession or made to a person in authority.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge did not err in failing to hold a voir dire on his own motion, as the former wife was not a person in authority and there was no obvious connection between the police inducement and the subsequent e-mail to trigger the derived confessions rule, especially given defence counsel's consent to its admission.

The appellant, a Lieutenant-Colonel, was convicted of assault after pushing his wife during an argument where she threw his diploma on the floor.

He argued the force was justified under s. 39(1) of the Criminal Code as defence of personal property.

The military judge found the force used was excessive and disproportionate.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the military judge properly applied the principles of reasonable doubt and correctly assessed both subjective and objective factors in determining that the force used was more than necessary.

The appellant municipality abolished its business occupancy tax and restructured its property tax system.

The respondent federal Crown corporations, which previously made payments in lieu of property taxes but not business taxes, deducted an amount equivalent to the abolished business tax from their payments in lieu of taxes.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondents' decisions were unreasonable because they based their calculations on a fictitious tax system rather than the one actually in place.

The Court also found that the port authority's silos were not 'reservoirs' exempt from the calculation.

The respondent, a criminal defence lawyer, sought to withdraw as counsel of record for an accused after his legal aid funding was suspended.

The Territorial Court refused her application to withdraw.

The Supreme Court of the Yukon Territory dismissed her application for certiorari.

The Court of Appeal allowed her appeal, finding the Territorial Court had no discretion to refuse withdrawal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that a court has the inherent or necessarily implied jurisdiction to refuse counsel's request to withdraw for non-payment of fees if allowing withdrawal would cause serious harm to the administration of justice.

The accused was convicted of possession of child pornography after police searched his computer pursuant to a warrant.

The warrant was obtained based on an Information to Obtain (ITO) sworn by a police officer after a computer technician reported seeing suspicious bookmarks and a webcam pointed at a child's play area.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the search violated s. 8 of the Charter because the ITO, which contained misleading and incomplete information, failed to establish reasonable and probable grounds to believe the accused possessed child pornography.

The Court distinguished between the offences of accessing and possessing child pornography, holding that possession requires control over the underlying data files, not merely viewing images online.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant's union was certified to represent employees at a Wal-Mart store in Jonquière.

On the day the Minister of Labour referred the dispute over a first collective agreement to arbitration, Wal-Mart announced the store's closure.

The appellant filed a complaint under ss. 15 to 17 of the Quebec Labour Code, claiming he lost his employment due to union activities and seeking reinstatement.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the procedural vehicle and statutory presumption under ss. 15 to 17 are not available where a workplace no longer exists.

A definitive business closure constitutes 'good and sufficient reason' for dismissal under s. 17, and any remedy for a closure motivated by anti-union animus must be sought under the unfair labour practice provisions in ss. 12 to 14.

The appellant, a freight forwarding company with branches across Canada, consolidates and deconsolidates freight but contracts with third-party carriers for interprovincial transport.

A union applied to the Alberta Labour Relations Board for a declaration that the company's labour relations were subject to federal jurisdiction.

The Board and the Court of Appeal held the company was a federal undertaking.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that because the company does not itself perform interprovincial carriage of goods, it remains a local undertaking subject to provincial jurisdiction under s. 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The appellant, a U.S. corporation, submitted a bid for a military procurement contract.

When another bidder was awarded the contract, the appellant filed a complaint with the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) alleging violations of the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT).

The CITT ruled the appellant had standing, but the Federal Court of Appeal quashed the ruling.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that non-Canadian suppliers do not have standing before the CITT to bring a complaint under the AIT, as the AIT is a domestic free trade agreement and its procurement provisions apply only to Canadian suppliers.

The appellant was approached by a police officer investigating the use of a stolen credit card at a liquor store.

The officer told the appellant to 'wait a minute' while he asked preliminary questions.

After receiving further information over the radio, the officer arrested the appellant and informed him of his right to counsel.

The appellant argued he was detained from the moment the officer told him to wait, and that his right to counsel was violated.

The Supreme Court held that while the right to counsel must be provided immediately upon detention, the appellant was not detained during the initial exploratory questioning.

The appeal was dismissed.

A 14-year-old Jehovah's Witness was apprehended by child protection services after refusing a potentially life-saving blood transfusion.

The applications judge ordered the transfusion under s. 25(8) of the Child and Family Services Act, which allows a court to authorize treatment in the best interests of a child under 16.

The adolescent appealed, arguing the legislation violated her Charter rights by irrebuttably presuming she lacked capacity to make medical decisions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the legislation is constitutional when the 'best interests' standard is interpreted as a sliding scale that gives increasingly determinative weight to the young person's views depending on their maturity.

The appellant pleaded guilty to producing marihuana in her home.

The trial judge imposed a conditional sentence and a fine, declining to order forfeiture of her home.

The Court of Appeal set aside the fine and ordered forfeiture, holding that forfeiture and imprisonment should be considered together as a global punishment.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and set aside the forfeiture order, holding that the forfeiture inquiry under s. 19.1(3) of the CDSA is a discrete and distinct inquiry from sentencing, and that partial forfeiture of real property may be ordered.