Marc Rosenberg

The appellant appealed his conviction for holding out, arguing the trial judge erred by relying on a police officer's testimony regarding slang terms as expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the testimony was properly admitted as the officer's lay understanding of a conversation to which he was a party.

This evidence, combined with the packaging and neighbourhood context, was sufficient to prove the charge.

The appellant appealed a judgment regarding the interpretation of a mortgage provision.

The applications judge concluded that interest for one year was payable from the date of the registration of the mortgage, even though the full funds were not advanced.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with this conclusion and noted there was no language limiting the use of funds to finance an improvement on the land.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $5,500.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of two inmates charged with second-degree murder following the fatal stabbing of a fellow inmate at Kingston Penitentiary.

The trial judge acquitted the accused on the basis of self-defence under s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in finding an air of reality to the self-defence claim and in assessing its subjective elements, specifically by finding that words alone could constitute an assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the victim's words, considered in the context of his aggressive conduct and history of violence, were sufficient to constitute an assault, and that the trial judge properly inferred the accused's subjective state of mind from the circumstantial evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for firearms offences.

Police found the appellant asleep behind the wheel of a running vehicle and opened the unlocked door, smelling alcohol and subsequently discovering two loaded handguns.

The appellant argued this violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal held that even if opening the door constituted a s. 8 breach, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) as the breach was not serious, the appellant had a diminished expectation of privacy, and the evidence was necessary for serious charges.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit given the appellant's prior record and possession of loaded semi-automatic handguns.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to consider defence evidence and failed to provide adequate reasons for accepting the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge failed to consider important evidence from the appellant's wife, did not give reasons for rejecting it, and overlooked problematic aspects of the complainant's evidence including a motive to fabricate.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered, though the Court noted the Crown may wish to consider whether proceeding is in the interests of justice given the appellant had already served his conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal decision that allowed a Crown appeal and ordered a new trial.

The central issue was the sufficiency of an information to obtain a warrant following a single-car accident where the appellant had consumed alcohol.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the summary conviction appeal judge that the information was sufficient based on the totality of the circumstances, including an anonymous tip about erratic driving and evidence of alcohol consumption.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal rejected the appellant's constitutional argument and found the finding of detention in hospital was not unreasonable.

However, the Court held that the Board erred by applying an 'appropriate' standard rather than the 'least onerous and least restrictive' test to the level of detention and conditions, contrary to Tulikorpi and Pinet.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Board for an expedited re-hearing.

The appellant appealed her conviction on the basis that highly prejudicial evidence from a confidential informant was placed before the jury without a limiting instruction.

The Court of Appeal found that while the evidence was admissible to show the officers' state of mind, it was not admissible for its truth.

Because the Crown cross-examined the appellant on this evidence and referred to it in closing, and the trial judge referred to it in the charge, the curative proviso could not be applied.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud and theft, arguing for the first time on appeal that the Crown prosecutor was in a conflict of interest for having previously represented him on an assault charge.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence but found no actual conflict of interest or prejudice, as the matters were independent and no relevant confidential information was used.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the custodial sentence due to the seriousness of the frauds committed against a charitable institution.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for eight robberies of financial institutions committed while on parole for the same offence.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the appellant's lengthy record and the circumstances of the offences.

A post-sentence report did not alter the fitness of the sentence, as much of the information was already before the trial judge.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his third conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing defence evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge improperly discounted defence witnesses' testimony because they had to reconstruct events years later, holding the defence to an impossible standard.

Given that this would be the appellant's fourth trial for an incident that occurred 13 years prior, the Court concluded that proceeding further would violate the community's sense of fair play.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a stay of proceedings entered.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to the United States on drug and sexual offences, and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order.

The appellant argued the Authority to Proceed was insufficient for lacking particulars, and that there was no evidence he held out the substance he supplied as a controlled drug.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sufficiency argument but allowed the appeal regarding the ecstasy charge, finding no evidence that "ecstasy" corresponded to the specific chemical listed in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Court dismissed the judicial review application regarding the Minister's jurisdiction and consideration of the appellant's statelessness, but remitted the surrender order to the Minister for reconsideration in light of the quashed committal on the ecstasy charge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault, arguing that the trial judge misdirected himself on the defence of accident and failed to adequately address conflicting expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made clear findings of an intentional assault and properly handled the conflict in expert evidence.

The court noted that the trial judge's careful analysis of the expert testimony justified rejecting the basis for the defence expert's opinion.

The appeal from sentence was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable.

The victim had described his assailant's build, hair, clothing, age, and state of intoxication.

The appellant was found in the area twenty minutes later matching the description, had scratches on his chest, admitted to being in a fight, and was immediately recognized by the victim.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge properly dealt with minor inconsistencies and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention at a medium secure hospital unit.

He argued the Board erred in finding he remained a significant threat to public safety and that detention was the least onerous disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's risk assessment and disposition were reasonable given the appellant's untreated schizoaffective disorder and history of threatening behaviour.

The Court also rejected arguments that the participation of amicus curiae rendered the hearing unfair.

The appellant appealed his conviction by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown conceded that the appeal must be allowed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and aggravated assault, as well as his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on the appellant's defence of lack of intent due to intoxication regarding the attempted murder charge.

The conviction for attempted murder was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The conviction for aggravated assault against a second victim was upheld, but the sentence was reduced from eight years to four years on a joint submission.

The appellant, a former director and executive, appealed a trial judgment that set aside his employment contract using the oppression remedy under s. 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act.

The appellant argued the oppression remedy should only be available to minority shareholders unable to use normal corporate machinery, and that the trial judge improperly substituted her view for the Board's business judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the oppression remedy addresses abuse of power and is not limited to minority shareholders.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the Board's process in approving the contract was seriously flawed and fell outside the range of reasonableness.

Leave to appeal the costs award was also refused despite the respondents failing to prove fraud, given the appellant's egregious conduct.

The appellants, former senior executives of the respondent corporation, appealed a trial judgment finding that no 'change in control' had occurred to trigger generous compensation provisions in their employment contracts.

During a period of financial difficulty, a shareholder group accumulated proxies for over 35 percent of the voting shares to requisition a special meeting to replace the board of directors.

A settlement was reached before the meeting, and the executives subsequently claimed payouts from a trust fund established for change of control scenarios.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's conclusion that the mere accumulation of proxies did not confer the right to control or direct the voting power of the corporation, and thus did not constitute a change in control under the agreements.

The appellant abandoned its appeal following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Crystalline Investments Ltd. v. Domgroup Ltd. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned but exercised its discretion under Rule 61.14(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to award no costs.