Marc Rosenberg

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that his guilty plea was not voluntary.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant likely maintained his innocence to his counsel and pleaded guilty only because he incorrectly perceived he had no alternative.

He sought to withdraw the plea almost immediately prior to sentencing, and the Crown did not oppose.

The Court allowed the appeal, struck out the guilty plea, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial in the interests of justice.

The appellant, a first offender of otherwise good character, appealed his sentence for a serious commercial offence.

He argued the trial judge erred in refusing to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material error in principle.

The trial judge appropriately prioritized general deterrence given the commercial nature of the offence when rejecting a conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding custody, access, spousal support, and costs.

She argued the trial judge erred in his orders, demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias, and improperly denied spousal support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's custody and access orders were supported by evidence and reasonable.

The court found no apprehension of bias, upheld the denial of spousal support based on the parties' financial positions, and found no error in the trial costs award.

The appellant, a bank employee, was convicted of fraud after using confidential passwords to redeem $20 million in customers' mutual funds.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on circumstantial evidence and erred in admitting notes seized from his desk without a warrant.

The Crown appealed the sentence of two years less a day served conditionally.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate and the admission of the notes reasonable under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

However, the Court allowed the Crown's sentence appeal, holding that a large-scale fraud by an employee in a position of trust required a penitentiary sentence for general deterrence.

Giving credit for the conditional sentence served, the Court imposed an additional one-year custodial sentence.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on charges related to marihuana cultivation.

The trial judge had excluded evidence of a light bulb and fertilizer found in the respondent's possession, reasoning that they lacked a specific connection to the particular operation.

The Court of Appeal held that this was an error, as the items were probative of knowledge when considered in context with the respondent's possession of keys to the basement where the marihuana was growing.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The young offender appealed their conviction.

The Court of Appeal found that there was evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion and that she properly directed herself on the elements of the offence.

As the appeal did not raise a question of law alone, leave to appeal was refused.

The appellant pleaded guilty to his involvement as the central figure in a large-scale marijuana grow operation and was sentenced to 18 months' incarceration.

He appealed the sentence, arguing for a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's decision to prioritize general deterrence and concluding the sentence was demonstrably fit.

The appellant appealed an order regarding child support adjustments, arguing the application judge erred in finding no material non-disclosure of corporate income, failing to claw back corporate payments to the respondent's current spouse, and failing to average the respondent's income over three years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the substantive grounds of appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's findings on disclosure, the reasonableness of the spouse's remuneration, and the parties' agreed-upon mechanism for adjusting support.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding costs, reducing the application judge's substantial indemnity costs award to partial indemnity, as the allegations of non-disclosure did not amount to egregious fraud-like conduct.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice, which had dismissed his appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision.

The Court of Appeal found the appeal to be moot and declined to exercise its discretion to hear it on the merits.

The court noted that the issues raised, including a question regarding a patient resisting appointed counsel, would be better addressed in a case with a live factual matrix.

The appeal was quashed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge failed to properly resolve important inconsistencies and contradictions in the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by relying on the complainant's demeanour and absence of motive to fabricate instead of resolving the core inconsistencies in her story.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in considering matters relevant to his credibility that did not directly relate to the amount of alcohol consumed.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, holding that evidence may be relevant to credibility even if it does not directly and expressly relate to alcohol consumption.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for operating a vehicle 'over 80'.

The accused was stopped and a roadside breath demand was made, but the officer had to wait 16 minutes for a screening device to arrive.

During this time, the accused was not advised of his right to counsel, despite having a cellular phone and being near a police station.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that because the officer was not in a position to require a breath sample before there was a realistic opportunity to consult counsel, the demand was not made 'forthwith' under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code, and the failure to provide s. 10(b) Charter rights was not justified.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving causing bodily harm arising from a collision where his vehicle struck a stopped car on a highway ramp shoulder.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on speed and driving on the shoulder but failed to determine why the appellant's vehicle entered the shoulder.

The Court of Appeal held that the reason for entering the shoulder was a pivotal issue in determining whether there was a marked departure from the standard of care.

The failure to address this issue constituted an error of law.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The original mortgagors sold their property and the purchaser assumed the mortgage.

The mortgagee and the purchaser later agreed to renew the mortgage without notifying the original mortgagors.

When the mortgage went into default, the mortgagee sold the property under power of sale and sued the original mortgagors for the deficiency.

The Court of Appeal held that the original mortgagors were entitled to notice of the renewal agreement.

Because they did not receive notice and did not consent to the renewal, they were released from their obligations under the mortgage.

The appellants appealed their convictions.

The Court of Appeal found that the verdict was not unreasonable, as there was direct evidence from the complainant identifying one of the appellants, which was confirmed by independent evidence.

However, the Crown conceded that the appeal must be allowed based on the challenge for cause procedure.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence, including a period of parole ineligibility, for conspiring to import 100 kilograms of drugs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit and free of errors in principle.

The court noted the appellant was a career criminal and the mastermind of the offences, justifying the lengthy consecutive sentence and disparity with co-accused.

The period of parole ineligibility was deemed appropriate given the appellant's history of violating probation, parole, and interim release.

The appellants were investigated by Revenue Canada for claiming fraudulent limited partnership losses related to software valuation.

Search warrants were issued based on an Information to Obtain (ITO) that relied on an outside consultant's opinion, which the deponent incorrectly described as a 'valuation report'.

The appellants applied to quash the warrants, arguing the ITO was deceptive and improperly relied on hearsay.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding no deliberate deception and that the remaining information was sufficient to issue the warrants.

The appellants appealed.

The Crown moved to quash the appeal as moot because the seized items had been returned and no charges laid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, exercising its discretion to hear the moot appeal.

On the merits, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that the mischaracterization was not deliberate and that the deponent was entitled to rely on hearsay from other Revenue Canada employees and hired consultants.

The appellants were convicted of possession of heroin and marihuana for the purpose of trafficking after drugs were found during a warrantless search of a family-visit trailer at Collins Bay Penitentiary.

They appealed, arguing the search violated their s. 8 Charter rights, the proceedings were unreasonably delayed, and lost videotape evidence impaired their defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the family-visit trailer constituted a 'cell' under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, making the warrantless search lawful.

The court also rejected the delay and lost evidence arguments, and upheld the sentence imposed on the appellant husband.

The appellants were jointly tried and convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder.

On appeal, the first appellant argued that his trial was rendered unfair because the trial judge permitted the co-accused's counsel to adduce highly prejudicial evidence of his violent disposition and bad character, ostensibly to support the co-accused's defence that he lied to police out of fear.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the propensity evidence lacked sufficient probative value to justify its severe prejudicial effect on the right to a fair trial.

The first appellant's appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The co-accused's appeal from conviction was dismissed, but his sentence for attempted murder was varied to correct an illegal period of parole ineligibility.

The infant plaintiff allegedly suffered damages as a result of negligent surgery and follow-up treatment in Quebec while the plaintiffs were residents of that province.

The plaintiffs subsequently moved to Ontario and commenced an action in Ontario.

The defendants brought motions to stay the action on the basis that Ontario courts had no jurisdiction or that Ontario was not a convenient forum.

The motions judge granted the motions and stayed the actions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no real and substantial connection between the claim and Ontario, and concluding that Quebec was clearly the more appropriate forum.