Marc Rosenberg

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding damages for unpaid commissions, computer use, and the Infranor contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the claim was for unpaid commissions rather than loss of profits, the respondent had paid for computer use, and the trial judge's conclusion regarding the Infranor contract was open to him on the record.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a finding of liability under the Sale of Goods Act and the dismissal of its counterclaim regarding a defective machine.

The respondent cross-appealed the damages award, seeking compensation for lost business.

The Court of Appeal upheld the liability finding, noting the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in determining the machine was not reasonably fit for its purpose.

However, the Court reduced the damages awarded for lost time during service calls to prevent overcompensation and allowed a portion of the counterclaim for moving expenses.

The cross-appeal for loss of business was dismissed as the claims were too speculative.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to give a W. (D.) instruction regarding his exculpatory statements and a witness's sighting of the victim, admitting evidence without a limiting instruction, and failing to give adequate Vetrovec warnings for two witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no obligation to give the requested W. (D.) instructions, no prejudice from the admitted evidence, and that the trial judge's instructions regarding the unsavoury witnesses were adequate or within his discretion.

The appellant appealed his convictions for pointing a firearm, robbery, and using a firearm while committing an indictable offence.

The convictions were largely based on a videotaped KGB statement given by a witness who claimed no memory of the events or the statement at trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision to admit the statement, finding it met the necessity and reliability requirements, and concluded the verdict was not unreasonable.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge made serious errors of law regarding the defence of mistaken belief in consent within a marriage.

However, the appeal from the acquittal was dismissed because the trial judge had found the accused credible, which required an acquittal under the rule in W.(D.).

The Court allowed the Crown's appeal regarding costs, setting aside the costs order against the Crown as there was no evidentiary basis for a finding of misconduct.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentence proposed in the joint submission was not out of the range and would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, considering the appellant's age, record, and role in the offence.

The appeal was allowed, and the custodial sentence was reduced to time served, with the probation order remaining in place.

The Crown appealed a costs order made by a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the costs order, agreeing with the Crown that the lower court judge had no jurisdiction to make the order.

The appellant appealed his conviction for uttering a threat to cause serious bodily harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that it was implicit in the trial judge's reasons, having rejected the appellant's evidence, that the appellant had the requisite intent to commit the offence.

The appellants appealed an order declining jurisdiction on judicial review and habeas corpus regarding a child apprehension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the applications judge properly declined jurisdiction because an effective alternative remedy existed in the ongoing proceedings before the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court also noted that no appeal lies from a refusal to grant leave under s. 6(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, and that habeas corpus was unavailable as the child was detained under valid court orders.

The appellant appealed his conviction for murder and his sentence, which included a 14-year period of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions on aiding and abetting, recent possession, or other evidentiary issues.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The Court found the trial judge erred in principle by placing undue emphasis on the appellant's minor criminal record when setting the parole ineligibility period.

The period of parole ineligibility was reduced from 14 years to 12 years.

The appellant Ministry appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding the Human Rights Tribunal's supervisory jurisdiction over the implementation of its previous orders.

The Tribunal had found that the Ministry acted in bad faith in attempting to comply with an order mandating a human rights training program to address a poisoned work environment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal retained jurisdiction under s. 41 to recast its orders and impose system-wide remedies.

The Court also rejected the Ministry's argument that it was denied procedural fairness, concluding it had sufficient notice of the allegations of bad faith.

The respondent was charged with offences under the Ontario Water Resources Act.

During the trial, the respondent sought disclosure of a binder of documents held by a third party (the City).

The trial justice of the peace refused the application, stating the respondent must bring an O'Connor application.

The respondent then brought an application for prohibition to the Superior Court, which granted a stay of proceedings due to a breach of the right to a fair trial.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial court committed no jurisdictional error warranting mid-trial intervention by a superior court, and that a stay of proceedings was a disproportionate remedy.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the lower court's decision based on the evidence before it.

The Court also declined to admit a post-judgment letter as fresh evidence, as it did not meet the necessary prerequisites.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that dismissed his claim based on the defence of qualified privilege.

The appellant argued the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error regarding the sequence of events and the appellant's objections to a development.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made strong credibility findings against the appellant and correctly concluded the appellant had no genuine objection, making the defence of qualified privilege available.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing his claims in contract and negligence against the City of Toronto and its officials.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, deferring to the trial judge's findings that no contract was formed and that there was no negligence on the part of the City's officials.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants, Ontario defendants, sought to stay proceedings in Ontario on the basis of forum non conveniens, arguing there were parallel proceedings in the United States.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash and the appeal, noting the remarkable feature that the Ontario defendants sought to stay proceedings in their home jurisdiction while their U.S. counterpart denied the proceedings were parallel.

The court found a clear juridical advantage for the respondent to proceed in Ontario, where the contracts were offered and the defendants' assets were located.

The appellant appealed a decision refusing to intervene in his removal as a Trustee of a pension fund pending investigations of alleged misconduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that there was no evidence the remaining trustees were likely to act contrary to the best interests of the plan members or that the appellant's removal would prejudice the members.

The court confirmed that the evidence did not meet the threshold of demonstrating a likelihood of abuse of discretion.

The appellant appealed an order fixing the interest rate payable on an overpayment under the Fuel Tax Act.

The trial judge had set the rate based on a letter from the appellant's counsel stating it should match the rate charged on underpayments.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge had no jurisdiction to impose a different rate under the general provisions of the Act when specific regulations dictated the interest rate for overpayments.

The interest rate was ordered to be calculated in accordance with the Regulations.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal by a jury.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in excluding the respondent's statement based on his right to silence, in permitting the defence to lead evidence of a statement to police regarding post-offence conduct, and in failing to give a stronger jury charge concerning the victim's hospital statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the trial judge erred in excluding the statement, the Crown failed to show the verdict would not necessarily have been the same, as the statement had little probative value and the case ultimately depended on identification evidence.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent Bank.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge correctly determined that a key paragraph in the Bank's supporting affidavit should be ignored because the affiant failed to disclose the sources of her knowledge.

However, having made that determination, the motion judge erred in granting summary judgment, as there remained a genuine issue for trial regarding how much, if anything, the corporate appellant owed the Bank.

The appeal was allowed and the Bank's motion for summary judgment was dismissed.