Marc Rosenberg

The appellant appealed a judgment enforcing a settlement of his civil action against the respondents, which included a claim for overtime.

The appellant also brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to adduce fresh evidence, finding it could not reasonably be expected to have affected the result.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge made no palpable and overriding error in enforcing the settlement or refusing to set it aside.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that she failed to rebut the presumption of resulting trust regarding a property purchased with funds from a joint account but registered in her name.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that there was no evidence the respondent intended a gift, noting that the property was placed in the appellant's name for legitimate reasons related to the respondent's dangerous work as a police officer.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant was convicted of offences arising out of a home invasion.

At trial, two witnesses who had previously given videotaped statements to the police implicating the appellant recanted those portions of their statements.

The trial judge admitted the prior inconsistent statements for the truth of their contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the videotaping of the statements and the availability of the declarants for cross-examination provided sufficient threshold reliability, despite the absence of an oath or a KGB warning.

The appellant appealed his designation as a long-term offender, arguing that the predicate offence of obstructing justice could not constitute a 'serious personal injury offence' under section 752 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant had sent a threatening letter to a former partner while on bail, leading to convictions for criminal harassment and obstructing justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that obstructing justice meets the definition of a serious personal injury offence because it carries a maximum sentence of ten years or more and, on the facts of this case, the conduct inflicted or was likely to inflict severe psychological damage on the recipient.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to give weight to the joint position of counsel that some time in custody was required.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to 90 days intermittent, to be served on weekends, with probation while not in custody.

The appellant appealed convictions and sentences imposed by a Justice of the Peace.

On consent, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions on three counts and ordered them permanently stayed.

The sentences on two other counts were reduced to $3,500 each.

The Court of Appeal determined the costs of an appeal and cross-appeal.

Although success was divided, the respondent achieved much greater success by successfully defending against the main appeal on liability and succeeding on the cross-appeal.

The court fixed the respondent's costs at $40,000, inclusive of GST and disbursements, noting the complexity of the matter and the lengthy record.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Ministerial Surrender Order under s. 57 of the Extradition Act, ordering her extradition to Florida for impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The applicant, a single mother of two teenage daughters, argued the Minister failed to properly consider whether surrender would be unjust or oppressive under s. 44(1)(a) of the Act, and failed to consider alternatives such as delaying surrender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the Minister fully considered the applicant's concerns and alternatives, and reasonably concluded that surrender was not unjust or oppressive.

The appellant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and attempted murder.

The appeal raised numerous issues, including the validity of his warrantless arrest, the legality of a gunshot residue test and the seizure of his clothing, and the admissibility of similar fact evidence and hearsay.

The Court of Appeal found that the police had reasonable grounds for the arrest and that the gunshot residue test was a valid search incident to arrest.

However, the trial judge erred in admitting highly prejudicial similar fact evidence of a subsequent shooting, as it lacked the requisite degree of similarity to prove identity.

The trial judge also failed to properly resolve factual issues regarding an alleged violation of the appellant's right to counsel.

Due to the erroneous admission of the similar fact evidence, the appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the activity in the VIP room of his business did not exceed the community standard of tolerance and that the trial judge erred in his assessment of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the activity resembled that in R. v. Mara and East, and it was open to the trial judge to find it exceeded the community standard of tolerance.

The court also found the appellant was actively involved in the day-to-day management and the conviction was supported by the evidence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario released an addendum on costs following an appeal.

The respondents were awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $10,000 inclusive of GST and disbursements.

The appellant, a nursing home manager, was convicted of assaulting elderly residents.

Two of the complainants died before trial, and the trial judge admitted their videotaped statements to police under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, relying on striking similarities between their statements and those of other residents.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and entered acquittals.

The majority held that under the Supreme Court's decision in Starr, corroborative evidence from other complainants regarding different events cannot be used to establish threshold reliability when the declarant is unavailable for cross-examination.

The appellants, who are Black, were convicted of robbery and related offences.

During jury selection, defence counsel were permitted to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on racial bias.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that the trial judge's instructions to the triers on the challenge for cause procedure were inadequate and that the trial judge erred in his rulings regarding peremptory challenges when sworn jurors had to be replaced.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the instructions to the triers were sufficient and that, although the trial judge erred in law by initially granting extra peremptory challenges, the error caused no prejudice to the appellants.

The appellant, an inmate, was convicted of second-degree murder for stabbing a fellow inmate and was sentenced to life imprisonment with 18 years of parole ineligibility.

He appealed the conviction, arguing errors in the jury instructions regarding self-defence, manslaughter, after-the-fact conduct, and character evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury charge.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred by allowing the jury to hear evidence of the appellant's prior attempted murder conviction before making their parole ineligibility recommendation.

The parole ineligibility period was reduced to 16 years.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a particularly egregious fraud involving elderly victims.

The appellant, who was in a position of trust, deprived the victims of a substantial portion of their savings and refused to acknowledge the harm or propose a method for repayment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's refusal to impose a conditional sentence, as the principles of promoting responsibility and acknowledgment of harm would not be met.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for robbery.

He sought to introduce fresh evidence, which the Court of Appeal rejected as not capable of belief.

The Court found the trial judge conducted the trial with scrupulous fairness despite the appellant choosing to self-represent.

The verdict was not unreasonable, and the trial judge did not err in failing to expressly address the defence of intoxication, given the appellant's own testimony.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing for a conditional sentence and that the sentence was manifestly excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these arguments, noting the appellant's record for similar offences and that he was on probation for assaulting the same victim.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part because the trial judge failed to credit the appellant for pre-trial custody on a 2:1 basis.

The sentence on count 3 was reduced to two months consecutive.

The appellant appealed a lengthy jail sentence imposed for offences involving violence and a specific victim.

The Court of Appeal noted that the appellant had a very lengthy record for similar offences, including previous convictions relating to the same victim.

The court held that protection of the public and the victim was paramount, and while the sentence was at the high end of the range, it was not manifestly excessive.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The trial judge had imposed conditional discharges.

The Court of Appeal held that a discharge is not legally available for the offence of dangerous driving causing death.

The appeal was allowed, the conditional discharges were set aside, and suspended sentences with probation were substituted.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings against a young person due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Crown argued the trial judge gave undue emphasis to prejudice and erred in attributing delay related to closed-circuit television facilities to institutional delay.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in finding prejudice from bail conditions, it was open to him to infer prejudice from faded memories.

The Court also agreed that a substantial part of the delay regarding the closed-circuit television application was institutional.

The appeal was dismissed.