Lois B. Roberts

The appellant husband appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice (Family Court Branch) in which the presiding judge severed the husband's divorce claim and made substantive orders in favour of the wife, including orders regarding pension division and an extension of the limitation period under the Family Law Act.

The wife had not filed an answer and may have been in default.

The Court of Appeal found that while the court could impose terms to secure the wife's participation, it was not open to the court to grant substantive relief in favour of the wife that had not been sought.

The order was set aside and the matter was remitted to a different judge.

The applicant sought a review of a motion judge's decision refusing to set aside the dismissal of an appeal for delay.

The original appeal concerned a judgment ordering the applicant to pay amounts owing on a collateral mortgage securing a line of credit.

The motion judge found that the applicant's explanation for the delay was unconvincing, as he had an obligation to manage his affairs while out of the country, and that the merits of the appeal were weak.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the reasoning and dismissing the review motion with costs awarded to the respondent.

Two appellants, both found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder and incapable of consenting to medical treatment under provincial law, appealed detention orders imposed by the Ontario Review Board.

The central issue was whether an accused person incapable of consenting to medical treatment could nonetheless consent to a condition regarding psychiatric or other treatment under section 672.55(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that the capacity required to consent to such a condition differs from the capacity required to consent to the treatment itself.

An accused need only understand information relevant to the operation of the condition and appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of agreeing to it, including potential consequences for liberty.

The Court overruled its prior jurisprudence to the contrary and allowed the appeals, remitting the matters back to the Board for re-hearing.

The appellant purchased an agreement of purchase and sale for a property containing a pub-style restaurant, golf course, residential apartments, and other amenities.

A dispute arose regarding whether the residential apartments constituted a legal non-conforming use under applicable zoning by-laws.

The appellant refused to close, claiming the deficiency was not remedied.

The motion judge dismissed the appellant's motion for summary judgment and the action, finding the appellant had waived its objection through conduct.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the appellant had not communicated an unequivocal and conscious intention to abandon its right to rely on the deficiency, and therefore was entitled to return of deposits.

The appellant, a fitness club operator, appealed a judgment declaring it had lost its right to extend its commercial lease with the respondent landlord.

The application judge found the appellant had breached the lease by: (1) operating a fitness club at Park Road in violation of geographic non-compete restrictions; and (2) failing to calculate and report gross revenue in accordance with lease provisions for percentage rental payments.

The appellant was given notice to cure but failed to do so.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no overriding or palpable errors in the application judge's interpretation of the lease, rejection of waiver and promissory estoppel defences, and refusal to grant relief from forfeiture.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim against an individual respondent on a Rule 21 motion.

The appellant was employed by the corporate respondent and alleged his employment was wrongfully terminated as reprisal for a workplace injury claim.

The motion judge struck the claim against the individual respondent, finding insufficient pleading of grounds to establish personal liability outside the scope of corporate duties.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, holding that while tortious conduct allegations may form the basis for personal liability against officers or directors, such claims must be specifically and adequately pleaded with clarity and precision.

Bald or vague assertions of intentional tortious conduct are insufficient to defeat a Rule 21 motion.

A police detective constable was convicted of one count of perjury and two counts of attempting to obstruct justice after a trial before a Superior Court judge sitting without a jury.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The convictions arose from the appellant's participation in a scheme to plant a firearm in a suspect's residence through a confidential informer, and his subsequent submission of an Information to Obtain a search warrant that contained false statements, material omissions, and misleading information about the origins and circumstances of the firearm.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's explanations for the omissions and inconsistencies.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding the trial judge's credibility findings were supported by evidence, the inferences drawn were reasonable, and the evidence of guilt was overwhelming.

The sentence of five years imprisonment on each count, served concurrently, was upheld as appropriate given the serious nature of the offences and the appellant's position of trust as a police officer.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a jury trial.

On appeal, the court found that the Crown engaged in improper conduct during cross-examination and closing address, including eroding the appellant's right to silence by suggesting he should have provided information to police earlier, and mischaracterizing forensic evidence.

The trial judge failed to provide correcting jury instructions to address these issues.

The court found that the cumulative effect of these problems resulted in an unfair trial and a miscarriage of justice.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant's employment was terminated in October 2012.

In December 2012, the appellant entered into a settlement agreement and release with the respondent.

In October 2014, the appellant commenced an action for wrongful dismissal, defamation, and conversion of his book of business.

The respondent brought a motion to dismiss under Rule 21.01(3)(d) based on the settlement agreement and release.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding no breach of good faith, no fraudulent misrepresentation, and that the settlement agreement was neither unconscionable nor unenforceable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge improperly treated the Rule 21.01(3)(d) motion as a summary judgment motion and made findings of fact that were inappropriate at that stage.

The appellants moved under Rule 59.06(2)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for reconsideration of the Court of Appeal's decision maintaining awards of damages against them.

The appellants contended that the trial judge miscalculated damages as of a specific date by failing to consider post-date gains from a transaction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the appellants were attempting to reargue an issue that had been decided against them at trial and on appeal, and that the theory of damages was not raised in the original appeal.

The appellant sought to purchase real property from the respondent under an offer accepted on October 10, 2015, which included a due diligence clause requiring written notice within 30 days that the condition was satisfied.

The appellant failed to provide such notice by the deadline of November 9, 2015.

Subsequently, the appellant submitted an amendment to the agreement that purported to extend the due diligence period to 60 days.

The application judge found that a new agreement had been created.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred by failing to properly consider the distinction between resurrection of the original agreement and creation of a new agreement, and by not adequately addressing the parties' intentions regarding the fact that the original agreement had become null and void.

The matter was remitted to proceed by action.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for damages arising from termination of employment without cause.

The appellant was employed for over 19 years and received 8 weeks' notice and severance pay consistent with statutory minimums.

The key issues were whether a termination clause must expressly state it displaces common law notice rights, whether the clause violated the Employment Standards Act by failing to reference severance pay, and whether the clause entitled the appellant to 19 weeks' notice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the termination clause clearly displaced common law rights without requiring express language, did not violate the ESA, and entitled the appellant to 19 weeks' notice (one week per year of service), resulting in an award of compensation for an additional 11 weeks plus interest.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the death of a fellow inmate at the Don Jail.

The Crown's case was that the appellant was part of a group that assaulted the deceased.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on post-offence conduct and the failure to adequately relate evidence to the mens rea element of manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions were proper and that the evidence was fairly presented to the jury.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and unlawful confinement against his daughter when she was under 16 years of age.

The sole ground of appeal was that the trial judge provided insufficient reasons for meaningful appellate review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge's reasons were brief, they were sufficiently clear to demonstrate why the conviction was reached.

The trial judge properly assessed credibility and reliability of witnesses, accepted the complainant's evidence regarding the April 16, 2013 offences, and correctly applied the W.(D.) analysis to reject the appellant's denial and defence evidence.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that detained him at the Secure Forensic Service of Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences with restricted privileges.

The appellant advanced two grounds of appeal: that the Board's finding of significant threat to public safety was unreasonable, and that the Board erred in law by failing to apply section 14 of the Evidence Act regarding corroboration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds, finding ample evidence supported the significant threat threshold and that section 14 of the Evidence Act does not apply to Review Board proceedings as they fall under federal jurisdiction.

The appellant's collateral Charter application regarding medication was also dismissed as not cognizable on appeal.

The appellant appealed a ten-year driving prohibition imposed following her conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm.

She argued the prohibition was manifestly unfit and sought a five-year prohibition, contending the trial judge erred in emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation for a young, first-time offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that denunciation and deterrence were paramount given the seriousness of the offence, the appellant's prior poor driving record, and the devastating harm caused to the victims.

The court upheld the sentence as a whole, noting the trial judge exercised restraint by reducing the custodial sentence while lengthening the driving prohibition to protect the public.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated February 24, 2017.

The appellant sought a conditional discharge, arguing it was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition necessary to protect the public.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision to impose a detention order with community living privileges at the discretion of the hospital, finding that the Board reasonably determined this was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition given the appellant's admitted risk to public safety, history of non-compliance with medication, alcohol use, and pattern of rule violations.

The appellant appealed his conviction on four grounds following a jury trial where he was convicted of failing to stop after an accident, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, and attempt to obstruct justice.

The appellant's main defense was that a third party, Derek Rego, was the driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions regarding the third party suspect defense, treatment of the sister's evidence, and comments concerning another witness's evidence were adequate when read as a whole.

The court also found the impaired driving conviction was reasonable based on evidence of alcohol on the appellant's breath, bloodshot eyes, unsteady gait, and erratic driving.

Both the appellant and Crown abandoned their sentence appeals.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's damages assessment following a failed real estate transaction.

The motion judge awarded DHMK Properties Inc. damages based on the difference between the agreed purchase price ($5.3 million) and the property's market value in August 2014 ($4.27 million), without accounting for the vendor's warranty obligations regarding net income or providing reasons for the valuation date selection.

The Court of Appeal found two critical errors: the failure to consider the effect of the vendor's warranty on damages calculation, and the unexplained selection of August 2014 as the valuation date rather than the scheduled closing date.

The court set aside the judgment and remitted the damages assessment to the Superior Court.

A landlord leased land to a tenant for construction and operation of a driving range.

Upon the tenant's default in rent payments, the landlord terminated the lease and prevented the tenant from removing trade fixtures and chattels from the premises.

The tenant sued for damages for unlawful distraint and conversion.

The trial judge found the assets were trade fixtures and awarded compensatory and exemplary damages.

On appeal, the court upheld the finding of liability for conversion but set aside the exemplary damages award, finding it resulted in double recovery for the tenant.