Lise G. Favreau

The moving party, convicted of impaired driving, sought to re-open his application for leave to appeal, arguing that due to an administrative error, the panel was not provided with all the material filed.

The moving party had relied on arguments from factums in two other related applications.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, noting that the panel had in fact obtained and reviewed the related factums before determining the original application.

The moving party failed to establish a clear and compelling case that a miscarriage of justice would likely occur absent a re-opening.

Robert Vanier, former CEO of Onco Petroleum Inc., appealed his conviction for publishing a false prospectus under s. 400 of the Criminal Code, for which he received an 8-year sentence.

The false prospectus misrepresented the company's liquid funds.

Vanier, self-represented at trial, raised several grounds of appeal, including trial unfairness (denial of a Rowbotham application, inadequate preparation assistance, language issues, and evidence presentation), errors in jury instructions (distinction between motive and intent, witness credibility), and the admissibility of evidence found on an abandoned hard drive (Charter s. 8).

He also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge relied on unproven aggravating factors and failed to deduct pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no errors by the trial judge regarding trial fairness, jury instructions, or the s. 8 Charter analysis.

The court also found no error in the sentence, affirming that the trial judge's assessment of aggravating factors was appropriate and that pre-sentence custody deductions were not warranted as Vanier was incarcerated for a separate conviction.

The appellant, Jasper Atienza, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

He raised three grounds of appeal concerning the trial judge's jury instructions: (1) whether the evidence showed only one vehicle at the shooting scene; (2) the probative value of post-offence association with co-accused Laurie Phan regarding planning and deliberation; and (3) inferring guilt from his failure to disclose his destination when leaving an apartment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions.

The court affirmed the trial judge's discretion in reviewing evidence, noting the weakness of the two-car theory and that Ms. Phan's acquittal rendered any potential error regarding post-offence association harmless as it negated a joint planning theory.

The court also found no prejudice from the brief reference to the appellant's undisclosed destination.

The appellant, Laura Coristine, appealed her convictions for six counts of assault against her ex-husband, Jim Quinn.

She argued that the trial judge misapprehended her evidence and erred in assessing the complainant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge did misapprehend some minor aspects of the appellant's evidence, these errors did not amount to a miscarriage of justice given the overall assessment of credibility.

The court also found no reversible errors in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, including his consideration of the complainant's motive to lie, the "unusual" nature of some allegations, and the proper use of notes as an aide mémoire.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application to set aside a Notice of Sale and stay a pending sale related to a vendor takeback mortgage default.

They argued the redemption amount was inflated due to an illegal interest rate and unjustified charges, prejudicing their ability to obtain financing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the issue moot as the property had been sold and no stay was sought pending appeal.

The court noted evidentiary problems and stated that the questions of amounts owing were better suited for adjudication in the outstanding mortgage action.

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario following an appeal.

The respondents (original plaintiffs) were found entitled to costs.

The court determined that costs should be awarded on a partial indemnity basis, as the appeal was not entirely without merit and the appellants' conduct was not criticized.

Costs were fixed at $12,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

Claude Séguin appealed his conviction for possession of fentanyl for trafficking, possession of methamphetamine pills, and possession of criminally obtained property, as well as his 12-year incarceration sentence.

His grounds of appeal included alleged violations of his linguistic rights (right to a French trial), inaccurate transcription of proceedings, an erroneous finding of fact regarding his control over a storage room where fentanyl was found, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that Séguin had explicitly chosen to proceed in English, the trial judge's factual findings were reasonable and supported by evidence, and there was no merit to the claims of transcription errors or ineffective counsel.

The court also found no error in the imposed sentence, noting the serious nature of the offences and the large quantity of fentanyl involved.

The appellant brought an appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario from a Superior Court of Justice order.

The Court of Appeal determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as there was no right of appeal to that court from the order below.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction, and the respondent was awarded costs.

Robert Vanier was convicted of two counts of perjury for making false statements under oath in Personal Information Forms (PIFs) submitted to the TSX and CNQ exchanges.

He appealed, arguing that s. 131 of the Criminal Code did not apply because the statements were not "permitted, authorized, or required by law" to be made under oath, and that he should have been charged under s. 134.

He also claimed a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the statements were indeed permitted by law as they stemmed from the Securities Act and the exchanges' regulatory powers, and that there was no unreasonable delay.

The appellant, Belmar Roofing Inc., appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for breach of contract and negligence for a defective roof installation.

The appeal primarily challenged the trial judge's reliance on the respondent's engineer's expert evidence, which the appellant argued was contradicted by a draft report and exaggerated the roof's danger.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's acceptance of the engineer's testimony, as the engineer adequately explained the omission in the final report and maintained his opinion on the roof's hazards.

The court found ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions and no basis to interfere with the damages assessment.

The appellant, Donavan Locke, appealed orders from the Superior Court of Justice dismissing his second and third actions (alleging deceit and conspiracy against his former common-law partner and her lawyers regarding a property transfer) and dismissing his own motions (including a constitutional question and criminal contempt).

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the motion judge's decision, affirming that summary judgment was appropriate due to the appellant's lack of evidence and damages.

The court also upheld the dismissal of the appellant's motions, noting the constitutional question was "ill conceived" and there was no basis for criminal contempt.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay costs to each respondent.

The appellant, Elaine Nairne, appealed a trial judge's order regarding spousal support quantum and duration, arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the significant income disparity and differing marital contributions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's holistic assessment of the spousal support award, which included a substantial interest-free mortgage benefit to the appellant on the matrimonial home.

The court affirmed the principle of significant deference to trial judges in spousal support decisions, while noting that the trial judge's approach to assessing compensatory and needs-based entitlement was arguably narrow.

A minor modification was made to the order regarding the specific employer reference for the respondent's retirement.

The appellant, Devon Dinall, appealed his convictions for trafficking cocaine, conspiracy to traffic cocaine, and possession of proceeds of crime.

His defence at trial was that he was involved in a marijuana trafficking conspiracy, not cocaine.

The primary ground of appeal argued that the trial judge erred in jury instructions on conspiracy and the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule, specifically by failing to instruct on the possibility of multiple overlapping conspiracies and misrepresenting his admission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury charge, viewed functionally and as a whole, clearly conveyed that conviction required proof of participation in a cocaine conspiracy, despite one misstatement.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's instruction regarding expert evidence on drug slang.

The appellants, trustees of the Estate of Vincent Di Santo and the Vincent Di Santo 2003 Family Trust, appealed an order that permanently removed them and appointed CIBC Trust Corporation as replacement.

The original order also granted further interim funding to the respondent, Ottavio Di Santo.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's decision that permanent removal was sought and necessary.

The court upheld the motion judge's finding that the trustees' mindset had become intractable, they were in a position of conflict, acted unilaterally, or could not objectively exercise their discretion, thus meeting the high threshold of "clear necessity" for trustee removal.

The appellants, a lawyer and his professional corporation, appealed a default judgment obtained against them for knowingly assisting in a client's fraud.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario confirmed its jurisdiction to hear the appeal, treating the motion judge's decision as equivalent to a refusal to set aside a default judgment.

The Court upheld the motion judge's refusal to set aside the noting in default, citing the appellants' bad faith and deliberate delay tactics.

While agreeing that the negligence claim was not properly pleaded, the Court affirmed the finding of liability for knowing assistance in fraud, based on the lawyer's issuance of a misleading "comfort letter" and the disbursement of funds from his trust account despite knowledge of the property's prior sale.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court decision affirming a Consent and Capacity Board (CCB) finding that the appellant, S.H., was incapable of consenting to anti-psychotic treatment.

S.H. had been found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) and detained under the Ontario Review Board.

The core issue was S.H.'s capacity to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of taking or refusing treatment, particularly given his delusional disorder and religiously-toned beliefs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower courts' findings, concluding that S.H.'s inability to recognize his mental condition and its manifestations prevented him from appreciating the consequences of treatment decisions.

The Court also addressed the interplay of Charter values, specifically freedom of religion, in capacity determinations, affirming that while such values are important, they do not alter a finding of incapacity when beliefs are a manifestation of a mental condition that precludes appreciation of treatment consequences.

The appeal and a fresh evidence motion were dismissed.

The moving parties (defendants/appellants) sought to set aside parts of a motion judge's order that lifted an automatic stay of a fraud judgment and ordered payment into court.

The basis for their request was the motion judge's failure to consider a Croatian share transfer document.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the Croatian document lacked evidentiary weight as it was not accompanied by a certified English translation as required by s. 125(2) of the Courts of Justice Act, was not produced at trial, and was attached to an affidavit from an unreliable witness containing hearsay.

The appellant, a pharmacist, was convicted of trafficking in fentanyl and sentenced to 13 years in prison.

She appealed her convictions, arguing that her s. 8 Charter rights were violated when police obtained information about her pharmacy from the regulatory college without a warrant, and that the search warrant for her home lacked sufficient grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the regulatory information and sufficient grounds for the warrant.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the sentence to 8 years due to the extraordinary collateral consequences of a rare genetic disease affecting both the appellant and her young daughter.

This is a costs endorsement following a judgment by the Court of Appeal for Ontario, which had previously dismissed both the appellant's appeal and the respondents' cross-appeal.

The Court determined the costs payable, awarding the primary respondents $50,000 from the appellant, despite the respondents seeking over $71,000 and the appellant proposing $40,000.

The Court was not persuaded by the appellant's public interest argument or the relevance of costs awarded in a comparable case that were based on party agreement.

Additionally, the Law Foundation of Ontario, which responded to the cross-appeal, was awarded $10,000 in costs from the primary respondents.

L'appelant a été reconnu coupable d'agression sexuelle.

Il a interjeté appel, alléguant que le juge de première instance avait erré dans l'évaluation de la crédibilité et de la fiabilité des témoins, et que les motifs étaient insuffisants.

La Cour d'appel a confirmé les conclusions du juge de première instance, soulignant le degré élevé de déférence accordé aux évaluations de crédibilité et ne trouvant aucune erreur significative dans le raisonnement ou la suffisance des motifs du juge.

L'appel a été rejeté.