Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant appealed his conviction for break and enter and sexual assault of a police officer, as well as his sentence of time served.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to address the appellant's apparent intoxication in the context of the specific intent offence of break and enter.

Both counsel agreed to substitute a conviction for forcible entry contrary to s. 72(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant's conviction for sexual assault was upheld as the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and credibility.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The victim fine surcharge was set aside on consent.

The appellant appealed his conviction for receiving a financial benefit from sexual services contrary to s. 286.2(1) of the Criminal Code.

Duty counsel argued that the trial judge erred in applying the presumption under subsection (3) when other findings suggested uncertainty about whether the complainant gave all earnings to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the presumption and noting that the trial judge's findings regarding control for a second charge did not undermine the presumption's application.

The appellant sought to set aside a decision by Justice Pardu refusing to extend the time to appeal a Superior Court decision.

Justice Pardu had found that the appellant demonstrated intention to appeal within the prescribed time and accepted his explanation for the delay, with no prejudice to the respondent.

However, she dismissed the motion on the sole ground that the grounds of appeal were devoid of merit.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding that the appellant's claims were directly related to his employment and fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of an arbitrator under the settlement agreement.

Appeal from a Superior Court judgment dismissing claims for liability arising from the failure of a daycare business and for unjust enrichment.

The appellants alleged that the respondents caused the failure of their daycare enterprise and sought damages for losses.

The appellants also claimed unjust enrichment based on renovations made to the leased premises.

The trial judge found that the appellants failed to prove the respondents caused the business failure and that the appellants' testimony was less credible than that of the respondent.

The appellants were in default of four months' rent when the lease was terminated.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact and dismissed the appeal.

The moving party sought an extension of time to serve and file a notice of appeal from an order dismissing a motion to set aside a default judgment.

The notice of appeal was served one day late due to inadvertence of counsel.

The respondent opposed the motion, arguing prejudice, the moving party's pattern of breaches of court orders, and lack of merit of the proposed appeal.

The court granted the extension, finding that the one-day delay was minimal and explained, that no real prejudice resulted from the delay itself, that the moving party's prior defaults had been addressed through costs orders, and that the proposed appeal was not so devoid of merit as to warrant denial of the right to appeal.

The appellant sought leave to amend his Statement of Claim to assert an alternative claim for a 33% ownership interest in the corporation, based on the theory that escrow release conditions had not been satisfied.

The motion judge denied the amendment, finding it constituted a new, statute-barred cause of action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the proposed amendments did not assert a new cause of action but rather sought alternative relief based on material facts already pleaded in the original Statement of Claim.

The court found no presumed or actual non-compensable prejudice to the respondents.

The appellant, president of the Amalgamated Transit Union (International), appealed the dismissal of a motion to strike an action brought by four rank-and-file members of the International's Toronto-based affiliate, Local 113.

The members sought a declaration that certain provisions of the International's Constitution were void for unconscionability, arguing these provisions prevented disaffiliation.

The motion judge dismissed the motion to strike but granted a temporary stay pending exhaustion of the International's constitutional amendment process.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the dismissal of the motion to strike and the temporary stay, finding the action presented arguable issues of unconscionability and that the court had jurisdiction to determine the matter.

The appellant appealed his conviction for numerous firearms offences arising from an incident in downtown Toronto where he attempted to discard a loaded handgun.

He challenged the conviction on the basis that the trial judge erred in failing to grant a stay of proceedings based on the failure of police to preserve CCTV footage, contrary to section 7 of the Charter.

The trial judge applied the framework from established case law and found no breach of section 7.

The appellant received a remedy through a jury instruction regarding the failure to preserve evidence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The sentence appeal was rendered moot as the appellant had already served his sentence, and leave to appeal sentence was refused.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code for acts committed over five months and sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

He appealed on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

Trial counsel had presented telephone records purporting to show over 900 calls between the appellant and the complainant to support a defence of consensual contact, but failed to authenticate the records as required by law.

The trial judge disregarded the unauthenticated records, found the complainant credible, and convicted the appellant.

The Court of Appeal found that trial counsel's failure to address authentication fell below the standard of reasonable competence and prejudiced the appellant in a manner that might have impacted the verdict.

The court admitted fresh evidence, allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated September 19, 2018.

The appellant had been on track for a conditional discharge but experienced two significant periods of decompensation in the year preceding the Board hearing.

The Board expressed serious concerns about inadequate medical investigations, including the absence of neurological examination and CT scan, and noted the appellant's significant decline from a relatively high-functioning individual to one who was confused, amotivated, and unable to manage her own medication.

The Board refused to order a four-month review despite being specifically requested to do so.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's refusal to restore his wrongful dismissal action to the trial list.

The action had been struck from the trial list in 2016 after the appellant failed to diligently pursue documents from a third party (Siemens) that he claimed were necessary to prove his claim for unpaid commissions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the appellant had provided no reasonable explanation for his delay in obtaining the required documents and that the respondents would suffer non-compensable prejudice if the action were restored.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

An appeal from a Superior Court judgment was heard before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The matter settled prior to or during the appeal hearing.

The appeal was dismissed without costs.

The appellant appealed convictions on 14 counts arising from three separate incidents: a June 2013 driving incident involving dangerous driving, criminal harassment, and intimidation; a June 2013 arrest incident involving dangerous driving and escaping lawful custody; and various incidents involving neighbours and school-related matters.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility assessments, arguing insufficient reasons, uneven scrutiny of evidence, and misapplication of the W.D. test.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions, finding the trial judge's reasons were detailed and thorough, credibility findings were properly grounded, and no reversible errors occurred.

The plaintiffs brought an action under s. 258(1) of the Insurance Act to recover insurance monies to satisfy a judgment arising from a settlement in a personal injury action.

The issue was which insurer—Gore Mutual (insurer of the vehicle owner) or Allstate (insurer of the injured passenger)—should satisfy the judgment.

The motion judge found Gore liable, concluding that the vehicle owner had not breached the insurance policy's cooperation clause and, alternatively, that relief from forfeiture was available.

Gore appealed, arguing the vehicle owner breached the policy by failing to cooperate and failing to provide updated contact information.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the vehicle owner's conduct did not constitute substantial non-cooperation as required to breach the cooperation condition.

The Estate Trustee During Litigation brought a motion to quash an appeal in a matter involving the estate of Elias Gefen.

The appeal involved multiple parties including the estate trustee, family members, and various institutions.

The motion to quash was granted on March 14, 2019.

The court awarded costs of the motion and appeal to the Estate Trustee During Litigation in the amount of $30,000 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes, payable jointly by the appellant and respondents to the motion.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against the respondents following trial.

The core issue was whether the trial judge erred in refusing to permit the appellant to amend his pleadings during trial to assert a claim in negligence.

The appellant had originally pleaded claims for assault and breach of the Residential Tenancies Act but abandoned these during trial, seeking instead to amend to plead negligence relating to the loss of his pet cat.

The trial judge refused the amendment, finding it would constitute a new cause of action that was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding that the original pleading did not contain sufficient material facts to support a negligence claim and that the proposed amendment sought to introduce new material facts rather than merely clarify or provide alternative relief based on facts already pleaded.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision enforcing a Separation Agreement dated October 30, 2012, between the parties.

The appellant sought to set aside the agreement, alleging non-disclosure of assets by the respondent and arguing he did not understand the nature or consequences of the agreement.

The motion judge found no basis to set aside the agreement under section 56(4) of the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the motion judge properly applied the legal test, made findings open to him, and that the parties were sophisticated individuals who had received independent legal advice.

The court noted that both parties had failed to fully disclose assets, making the appellant's claim disingenuous, and that the agreement itself contained acknowledgments of sufficient disclosure.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner ordered the disclosure of a KPMG forensic investigation report prepared for Algoma Public Health concerning potential conflicts of interest in the hiring of an interim Chief Financial Officer with a criminal record.

The report contained personal information of Dr. Kim Barker, the former Medical Officer of Health and Chief Executive Officer.

The Commissioner found that although the personal information was exempt from disclosure under section 14 of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, the public interest override under section 16 applied, warranting full disclosure.

The Divisional Court quashed the Commissioner's decisions, finding the reasons inadequate because the Commissioner failed to identify each piece of protected personal information and separately weigh it against the public interest.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Commissioner's reasons were adequate and his decision reasonable, rejecting the requirement for a piece-by-piece analysis in all circumstances.

The respondents granted a second mortgage on their Richmond Hill home to secure a $120,000 loan from the appellant.

Upon maturity, the appellant issued a discharge statement and subsequently a Notice of Sale with significantly inflated charges.

The respondents challenged the amounts and the premature notice in a Superior Court application under section 12 of the Mortgages Act.

The application judge determined the proper discharge amount and disallowed certain charges, including an illegal interest penalty and unsupported professional fees.

The appellant appealed, arguing the application judge lacked jurisdiction and that the matter should have been assessed by an assessment officer under section 43 of the Mortgages Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding he had jurisdiction to address all issues and that the respondents' application was a justifiable response to the appellant's unreasonable conduct.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for sexual assault charges in 2002 and received an absolute discharge from the Ontario Review Board in 2003.

He challenged the constitutionality of Christopher's Law (Sex Offender Registry) and the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA), which imposed mandatory lifetime sex offender registration and reporting requirements on him with no possibility of exemption.

The Court of Appeal found that while the legislation did not violate section 7 of the Charter (fundamental justice), it violated section 15(1) (equality rights) by discriminating against persons found NCRMD who received absolute discharges.

The court declared the provisions of no force or effect as applied to such persons, suspended the declaration for 12 months, but exempted the appellant from the suspension, ordering his removal from the registries.