Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The respondent consented to the appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the order of Carey J. dated July 24, 2018 was made without jurisdiction, as an order under Rule 31.10 cannot be made without a proceeding having been undertaken in Ontario.

The order was set aside.

The respondent undertook not to enforce the order of Bondy J. dated July 17, 2018.

Costs were awarded to the appellant.

The appellant purchaser appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action for the return of a $100,000 deposit on a real estate transaction.

The property's depth was significantly less than described in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

The respondent vendor had manually added 'To be verified' next to the depth dimension.

The motion judge found this proviso shifted the risk of inaccuracy to the purchaser.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the proviso did not impose a pre-contractual obligation on the purchaser to verify dimensions, nor did it transfer the risk or negate the 'more or less' clause.

The deposit was ordered returned to the appellant.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder on three grounds: (1) whether the trial judge erred in refusing to put the defence of provocation to the jury; (2) whether the trial judge misdirected the jury on the use of evidence that the appellant did not apply the brakes immediately after striking the victim; and (3) whether the trial judge erred in failing to recuse Crown counsel for failing to disclose certain information communicated by a Crown witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellants sought a declaration that a 99-year lease registered against their property in 1972 was void, alleging it violated the Planning Act's subdivision prohibition.

The lease was entered into in 1968 between the respondent and the appellants' predecessor in title.

The application judge found that an oral lease agreement existed with part performance before the relevant statutory exemption was removed on May 2, 1968, thereby validating the lease.

The appellants appealed on three grounds: procedural fairness, lack of evidentiary support for part performance, and misapplication of the part performance test.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge denied procedural fairness by raising the oral lease and part performance issues only at the conclusion of argument and then refusing to permit the appellants to file further evidence to address these issues.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed a judgment dismissing its claim that the disclosure statement was false, deceptive, or misleading regarding the disclosure of parking lease obligations.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's conclusion that sufficient information was included in the disclosure statement and that it was not false, deceptive, or misleading.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision to strike a negligence claim without leave to amend.

The respondent, a lawyer acting as a notary, had notarized an affidavit containing allegations against the appellant.

The affidavit was subsequently published in a newspaper article.

The appellant's original defamation claim was statute-barred, so he amended to allege negligence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that no duty of care existed between the appellant and respondent.

The court held that a lawyer does not owe a duty to third parties to verify the accuracy of affidavit contents, and there was insufficient proximity between the parties to ground a duty of care.

The appellant was convicted of voyeurism after a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown's case was that during a camping trip, the appellant used his cellphone to record the complainant changing into her bathing suit.

The appellant denied intentionally recording.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's reasoning regarding the intentional nature of the recording, arguing the trial judge engaged in speculation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error.

The trial judge had made clear findings that the appellant's conduct—including plugging in the phone as a pretext, positioning it to record, and the series of steps required to activate the video function—demonstrated intentional conduct beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellants sought to add three health care providers as defendants to a medical malpractice action more than two years after the original injury.

The motion judge dismissed the motion on the basis that the limitation period had expired.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge applied the wrong test under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that the motion judge failed to make proper findings of fact regarding when the appellants knew or ought reasonably to have known of their claims against the proposed defendants.

The court also found that the motion judge erred in treating lack of due diligence as a standalone ground for finding claims statute-barred.

The key distinction was that the claims against the proposed defendants differed from the claim against the original defendant, as they involved allegations that the health care providers failed to take immediate action once cauda equina syndrome was suspected, information that was only revealed during examinations for discovery in 2015.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision requiring him to return a $50,000 deposit to the respondent in a real estate transaction.

The respondent had refused to close the purchase after discovering a second TransCanada Pipeline easement running under the pool, cabana, and patio that had not been disclosed in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale, along with undisclosed litigation between the appellant and the pipeline company.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding that the appellant breached the APS by failing to convey title free from undisclosed restrictions and by attempting to require the respondent to sign an agreement the appellant had contracted to execute.

The appellant, Cornerstone Builders Ltd., appealed a partial summary judgment granted by the motion judge in favour of the respondent, 1652620 Ontario Inc. The motion judge awarded payment of monies due under a promissory note and struck out portions of the counterclaim.

The core dispute arose from a shareholders' agreement requiring a non-competition agreement upon cessation of shareholding.

After the appellant purchased the respondent's shares in 2011, a falling out occurred and the respondent's principal established a competing business without signing the non-competition agreement.

The appellant ceased making payments on the promissory note.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding errors in the motion judge's approach to the stay of execution, the adjournment of the summary judgment motion, and the striking of counterclaim allegations.

The appellant appealed her conviction for sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and sexual invitation involving two foster children.

The appeal raised multiple grounds including reasonable apprehension of bias arising from the trial judge's prior involvement in the appellant's former husband's trial, improper elicitation of evidence from a key witness, failure to consider lost evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and alleged errors in the trial judge's reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the trial was fair, counsel was competent, and the trial judge's reasons were adequate and supported by the evidence.

The appellant successfully appealed a summary judgment in a class proceeding.

The motion judge had found that the auditor owed a duty of care to the investor clients of Buckingham Securities regarding the audit of Form 9 reports filed with the Ontario Securities Commission.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, finding no duty of care was owed despite the auditor's negligence.

The appeal addressed the application of the Anns/Cooper test for establishing duty of care.

The court awarded the successful appellant costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting a young child and sentenced to three years imprisonment with orders under s. 161(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code prohibiting attendance at places where children under 16 are present and prohibiting employment or volunteer work involving positions of trust or authority over children under 16.

On appeal, the appellant sought to challenge the constitutionality of these orders for the first time, arguing they constitute punishment contrary to s. 11(i) of the Charter and were retroactively applied.

The Crown opposed raising the constitutional challenge on appeal.

The court granted leave to raise the constitutional argument, finding that the interests of justice favoured permitting the appellant to advance the argument despite it not being raised at trial.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing his application for orders in lieu of prohibition, procedendo, and certiorari with respect to a trial judge's ruling on territorial jurisdiction.

The appellant had been arrested by York Regional Police in Mississauga on drug trafficking charges alleged to have occurred in Peel Region, but was transported to York Region where the information was laid and trial proceedings commenced.

On the first day of trial, the appellant challenged the court's territorial jurisdiction.

The trial judge dismissed the application, and the appellant sought extraordinary remedies from the Superior Court, which were also dismissed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, holding that extraordinary remedies are available only for jurisdictional errors, not for errors of law in the exercise of jurisdiction.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated February 6, 2018.

The appellant sought a conditional discharge from a detention order, arguing that the proposed conditional discharge terms would provide equivalent public protection.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal but allowed it in part, finding that while the Board's refusal to order a conditional discharge was reasonable and supported by evidence, the Board had erred by failing to remove the 24-hour supervision requirement from the disposition.

The court amended the disposition to remove this phrase, allowing the appellant to continue his transition to less supervised community living.

The Crown appealed from directed acquittals on charges of break and enter, pointing a firearm, and forcible confinement arising from an alleged assault on Alex Gingras.

The trial judge had granted a directed verdict motion at the end of the Crown's case.

The respondent did not appeal his convictions on other charges.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge improperly assessed the credibility and reliability of the Crown witness and that there was evidence capable of supporting convictions on all three counts.

The court rejected the respondent's alternative argument that the verdicts would necessarily have been the same had the trial judge properly refused the directed verdict motion, as it could not assume the respondent would not have testified.

The appeals were allowed, the acquittals were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed a decision of Justice MacDonnell of the Superior Court of Justice, which had dismissed their application for mandamus relating to a ruling by a Justice of the Peace.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing with the analysis provided by MacDonnell J. The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of three sexual offences committed against different complainants during a professional relationship and was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment to be served in the community.

The appellant appealed his convictions while the Crown appealed the sentence.

Following the appellant's death during the appeal process, the court considered whether to proceed with the appeals or dismiss them as moot.

The court dismissed both appeals as moot, finding no exceptional circumstances warranting departure from the general rule that an accused's death renders an appeal moot.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed on February 1, 2011 by Justice Gary T. Trotter of the Superior Court of Justice.

On consent, the Court of Appeal for Ontario varied the sentence in one respect only: the credit for presentence custody was reduced from 6 months to 6 months less one day.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud over $5,000 and possession of property obtained by crime exceeding $5,000.

The trial judge found that the appellant became wilfully blind to the fraudulent nature of funds deposited into his business account.

The appellant claimed he was unaware of the fraud and that the funds originated from identity theft of a third party.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that the trial judge properly applied the doctrine of wilful blindness based on inherently suspicious circumstances and cumulative circumstantial evidence, including the pattern of deposits, frequent cash withdrawals, and purchases unrelated to any legitimate business purpose.