Melissa Wright

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that Gabriel Kit Chun Fung knew or was willfully blind to the fact that he was purchasing stolen goods or goods fraudulently obtained by Nadia Minetto, the accounting manager of Wescom Solutions Inc. Between early 2012 and July 2014, Fung purchased approximately $6.2 million in iPhones and iPads from Minetto, who had fraudulently obtained them using Wescom's corporate credit card.

The trial judge divided the transactions into three stages and found Fung was not willfully blind in Stage 1, was willfully blind in Stage 2, and had actual knowledge in Stage 3.

The trial judge awarded damages of $5,094,767.72 plus interest.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred by applying an objective standard to the wilful blindness analysis and by making adverse credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that despite the trial judge's mischaracterization of the wilful blindness standard, the factual findings supported a subjective finding of wilful blindness.

The Moving Parties (Fuego Digital Media Inc., ProtocollS Inc., Fuego Digital Media QSTP-LLC, Karl Gretton, and Kevin Higgins) brought a motion to dismiss the action against them, arguing it was statute-barred, res judicata, or an abuse of process.

The Plaintiff (DAC Group (Holdings) Limited) brought a cross-motion to amend its claim to add Patricia Ruth Higgins as a party for a fraudulent conveyance claim and to seek a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL).

The court dismissed the Moving Parties' motion, finding that the claims were not plainly and obviously statute-barred, issue estoppel did not apply to the non-arbitration parties, and abuse of process was not clear at this stage.

The court granted DAC's cross-motion to add Patricia Ruth Higgins and permit a CPL, as Higgins and his wife consented.

The applicant sought to set aside an arbitration award, alleging the arbitrator breached the rules of natural justice and exceeded his jurisdiction.

The applicant argued the arbitrator unfairly denied an adjournment, admitted new expert evidence, altered the definition of disputed software, and improperly relied on a draft award provided by the respondent.

The applicant also contended the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief against non-parties.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding no procedural unfairness or jurisdictional error, and ordered the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award.

The applicant sought to determine whether an order granting a conditional stay of enforcement of an arbitration award was final or interlocutory, as this determination established jurisdiction.

The arbitration concerned ownership of software, with the arbitrator awarding ownership to the respondent, granting injunctive relief, and ordering costs exceeding $1.5 million.

The applicant commenced an application to set aside parts of the award.

The application judge granted a conditional stay of enforcement pending the disposition of the application, conditioning the stay on monthly payments of $25,000.

The court determined that the stay order was interlocutory because the merits of the underlying application remained to be determined and the matter was pending under the relevant statutory provisions.

The plaintiff, IPEX Inc., settled numerous class actions related to its defective Kitec Pipe.

IPEX then sued its resin suppliers, AT Plastics Inc. and Lubrizol Advanced Materials Inc., for breach of contract and indemnity, seeking to recover the settlement amount.

The defendant suppliers brought motions for partial summary judgment, arguing that IPEX could not prove causation without individual claims data.

The court dismissed the defendants' motions, finding that IPEX could plausibly establish causation for its breach of contract claim without individual data, and that the tort claim should proceed to trial alongside the contract claim to avoid bifurcation and inconsistent findings.

The court also found that the reasonableness of the settlement and the assignment argument were not suitable for summary judgment.