Joanna Vatavu

The defendants, Lubrizol Advanced Materials Canada, Inc. and Lubrizol Advanced Materials, Inc. (LZAM), sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion for partial summary judgment.

The original motion concerned IPEX's claim to recover settlement funds paid in class actions related to defective Kitec Pipe, alleging breach of contract and contribution/indemnity from LZAM for supplying defective resin.

The court dismissed LZAM's motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions, no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision, and no issues of public importance.

The plaintiff, IPEX Inc., settled numerous class actions related to its defective Kitec Pipe.

IPEX then sued its resin suppliers, AT Plastics Inc. and Lubrizol Advanced Materials Inc., for breach of contract and indemnity, seeking to recover the settlement amount.

The defendant suppliers brought motions for partial summary judgment, arguing that IPEX could not prove causation without individual claims data.

The court dismissed the defendants' motions, finding that IPEX could plausibly establish causation for its breach of contract claim without individual data, and that the tort claim should proceed to trial alongside the contract claim to avoid bifurcation and inconsistent findings.

The court also found that the reasonableness of the settlement and the assignment argument were not suitable for summary judgment.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking to preclude the defendants from advancing certain grounds in a second summary judgment motion that largely repeated arguments previously rejected by another motions judge.

The defendants argued that a renewed motion was justified in light of the Supreme Court of Canada’s clarification of the summary judgment framework in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The court held that Hryniak applies retroactively and does not permit parties to reopen prior summary judgment determinations where appeal routes have been exhausted.

The court also found that issue estoppel and abuse of process barred relitigation of the same issues, particularly where the alleged “new” evidence had been available at the time of the first motion.

The plaintiff’s motion was granted, limiting the scope of the defendants’ pending motion for summary judgment.

The applicant mining company brought an application concerning mining royalty interests subject to contractual rights of first refusal.

After the respondent corporation dissolved and distributed its royalty interests to its principal shareholder, the applicant alleged that the transfer triggered the contractual rights of first refusal contained in two agreements governing mining royalties.

The court held that the dissolution and distribution of assets constituted a “transfer,” “grant,” or other disposition within the meaning of the agreements.

The respondent’s argument that the rights were only triggered by receipt of a bona fide third‑party purchase offer was rejected.

The court declared that the rights of first refusal were breached and granted declaratory and injunctive relief preventing enforcement of the royalty obligations.

A commercial dispute between competing importers of Caribbean food products involved allegations of defamation, statutory unfair competition under s. 7 of the Trade-marks Act, depreciation of goodwill under s. 22, and unlawful interference with economic relations.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants made false statements to a supplier accusing the plaintiffs of importing and selling infringing competing products, which were subsequently relayed to the supplier in a written report.

The court held that the oral statements were statute‑barred as slander but that the written republication constituted actionable libel.

Although qualified privilege initially applied, the court found the defendant acted with malice and intentional dishonesty, defeating the defence.

The plaintiffs failed to prove economic loss or that the statements caused termination of their distributorship, but general damages were presumed for libel and awarded to one plaintiff.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion for summary judgment in an action regarding the supply of defective pipes.

The defendants argued the motion judge erred in interpreting supply agreements, limitation periods, and the effect of settlement conduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding that the issues were particular to the parties, did not raise conflicting decisions on matters of principle, and did not involve matters of broad public importance.

Following the dismissal of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the court determined the appropriate costs payable to the successful plaintiff.

The defendants had succeeded on one of four principal issues, resulting in partial success that justified a reduction in the plaintiff’s recoverable costs.

The court considered the proportional success of the parties and the relative time and resources expended by counsel.

Applying reductions for both partial success and excessive docketed time, the court fixed costs at a fair and reasonable amount under Rule 57.01.

The defendants brought a summary judgment motion seeking dismissal of a commercial action alleging defective raw materials supplied for thermoplastic piping systems.

They argued the claims under an earlier supply agreement were barred by the Limitations Act and that liability disclaimers in later agreements excluded all contractual and tort liability.

The court held the limitation period for the indemnity claim had not expired because the claim arose only after the plaintiff was served with underlying litigation relating to the alleged defects.

While the contractual disclaimers were sufficient to exclude liability for negligence, they did not clearly exclude the statutorily implied condition of fitness for purpose under the Sale of Goods Act.

The court also found that alleged post‑contractual conduct potentially modifying the agreements raised a genuine issue requiring a trial.

Summary judgment was therefore refused and the action allowed to proceed.