Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The applicant, serving a five-year sentence for incest, applied for bail pending his sentence appeal.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred in upholding the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence under the Nur framework and that his sentence was unfit.

The motions judge dismissed the application, finding that while the constitutional challenge was not without merit, the applicant failed to demonstrate that a successful appeal would result in a significantly lower sentence such that he would have already served it by the time the appeal is heard.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice that substituted a conviction for an acquittal on charges of failing to comply with building inspector's orders.

The moving party argued that his defence—that he had previously obtained the required permits—was not a collateral attack on the orders.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeal raised a question of law respecting the interpretation and application of the doctrine of collateral attack, and that special grounds existed.

The appellant was successful on appeal and sought costs for both the appeal and the underlying summary judgment motions.

The parties agreed to fix the appeal costs at $75,000.

For the motions, the appellant sought partial indemnity costs of approximately $212,500.

The respondents argued this amount was excessive and not within their reasonable contemplation, suggesting a cap of $125,000.

The Court of Appeal found that while there was some overlap in the respondents' work, it was not considerable, and fixed the motion costs at $175,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for large-scale fraud obtained through the Government of Canada’s Small Business Financing Program.

The conviction appeals challenged the trial judge's summary dismissal of three s. 11(b) Charter motions for unreasonable delay, arguing that the judge erred by not addressing the merits due to non-compliance with deadlines.

The sentence appeals contested the length of imprisonment and a restitution order for one appellant, and the imposition of a custodial sentence for another.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction and sentence appeals, affirming the trial judge's proactive case management and the fitness of the sentences.

R.D. appealed his conviction for sexual interference, sexual assault, and uttering threats, citing deficiencies in the jury charge and an unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in not applying an aggravating factor related to a position of trust.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both R.D.'s conviction appeal, finding the jury charge adequate and the delay not unreasonable, and the Crown's sentence appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that a position of trust was not established in the particular circumstances.

The appellants, former members of an incorporated church's congregation, were expelled.

They commenced an action to void the expulsion, alleging the church failed to follow its internal procedures and violated their rights.

The motion judge granted summary judgment, finding no underlying contract.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the church's constitution and by-laws constituted a contract binding on both members and the organization.

The court found a genuine issue for trial regarding whether the contractual provisions for expulsion were breached, as the respondents failed to adduce sufficient evidence of the procedures followed.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and conspiracy to import cocaine after a controlled delivery of a package containing over 3.5 kilograms of cocaine.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, misapplied the law on importing and post-offence conduct, and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge made minor factual errors, they were not essential to the convictions given the overwhelming circumstantial evidence of guilt, including the appellant's possession of shipping details, phone records, and flight from police.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of sexual interference and incest.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred by allowing improper cross-examination regarding the complainant's motive to fabricate and by failing to provide a limiting instruction on a prior inconsistent statement.

The Court of Appeal found both errors to be significant and prejudicial, particularly the improper cross-examination which risked shifting the burden of proof, and the lack of instruction on the prior inconsistent statement which could have led the jury to use it for the truth of its contents.

The court rejected the Crown's argument to apply the curative proviso, concluding that the verdict would not necessarily have been the same without these errors.

A new trial was ordered.

This appeal concerns the correct analytical approach to fixing costs when an action is settled before adjudication on the merits.

Two infant plaintiffs were catastrophically injured when struck by a vehicle in 2004.

After more than ten years of litigation, the parties settled in June 2017, three months before trial.

The settlement provided for $1 million from each of the Potrebics and Pipolos, with costs to be determined by the court.

The motion judge apportioned costs based on his assessment of the parties' respective liability for damages, finding the Potrebics solely responsible.

The appellants challenged this apportionment and the quantum of costs awarded.

In a highly contentious family law matter involving child custody and support, the trial judge appointed two amicus curiae—one for the self-represented mother and one for the father after his counsel withdrew due to non-payment of fees.

The Crown appealed the amicus appointments.

Although the appeal became moot when the trial concluded with both amicus participating, the Court of Appeal issued a comprehensive judgment establishing principles governing amicus appointments in private family law cases.

The court held that the trial judge erred in principle by appointing the mother's former counsel as amicus (injecting adversarial elements inconsistent with amicus's impartial role) and by appointing a second amicus (contrary to principle in family law contexts).

The court emphasized that amicus appointments should be rare, essential to adequate discharge of judicial functions, and subject to clear, detailed orders specifying the scope of duties.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated March 6, 2019.

The appellant, declared not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, appealed a conditional discharge disposition that prohibited him from driving and required abstinence from alcohol.

The appellant argued the Board's conclusion that he posed a significant threat to public safety was unreasonable and unsupported by evidence, particularly given his suspended driver's licence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's disposition reasonable and supported by evidence, but expressed concern about the lack of information available regarding the licence suspension and directed that detailed information be obtained for the next review.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The parties agreed that the appeal should be allowed to correct the credit given for pre-trial custody.

The appellant had served eight months pre-trial, and the parties agreed the credit should have been 12 months at a 1:5.1 ratio.

With the correct allocation for pre-trial custody, the sentence imposed (suspended sentence with 12 months probation) remained unchanged, as did the other ancillary orders.

The appeal was allowed to reflect the proper credit for time served.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement awarding costs to the appellant in connection with both the appeal and the motion before the motion judge.

The appellant, acting in person, was awarded all-inclusive costs of $4,000 for the appeal and $3,500 for the motion.

An insurer appealed a decision finding that an insured's adult daughter was covered under a homeowner's insurance policy after she was injured falling from a porch.

The daughter had lived with her mother for over 60 years, paid rent, and performed household chores.

The policy excluded coverage for persons residing in the household except residence employees.

The application judge found the daughter was not a residence employee but was covered as a tenant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal, holding that once a person is established as a member of the household, they cannot be covered as a tenant under the exclusion clause, regardless of whether they pay rent.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition finding that she continued to pose a significant threat to public safety and refusing an absolute discharge.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder in 2004 for theft of a motor vehicle and assault on police officers.

After 15 years in psychiatric care, the Board considered two incidents—a May 2018 threat to kill a co-resident and an October 2018 assault on a bus passenger—in concluding she remained a significant threat.

The appellant argued the Board improperly relied on unproven allegations based on hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board properly applied the legal test and appropriately considered hearsay evidence in its inquisitorial proceedings.

The appellant, Dr. Colin Ward, appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for negligence in performing a laparoscopic colectomy on the respondent, Karen Armstrong, in February 2010.

The trial judge found that Dr. Ward breached the standard of care by bringing a LigaSure device within one to two millimetres of the respondent's left ureter, causing a thermal injury that resulted in stricturing of the ureter and eventual removal of the kidney.

The majority of the Court of Appeal (Paciocco and Juriansz JJ.A.) allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law by defining the standard of care as a goal or result (avoiding injury) rather than as the means a prudent surgeon would employ.

The majority held that since the trial judge found Dr. Ward took the steps a prudent surgeon would take, he should have been exonerated.

Van Rensburg J.A. dissented, finding the trial judge's findings on standard of care were fully supported by the evidence and that staying at least two millimetres away from the ureter was a necessary step, not merely a goal.

The respondents moved under section 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside or vary an order of the motion judge dismissing their motion for security for costs under Rule 61.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellants sought security for costs of both the appeal and the trial costs already awarded.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in law or principle.

The court clarified that when considering security for costs of an appeal under Rule 61.06(1)(b) in conjunction with Rule 56.01(1)(d), the reference to "costs of the defendant or respondent" must be read as "costs of the respondent in the appeal" not the costs awarded at trial.

The court found the appellants had sufficient assets in Ontario to pay the estimated appeal costs of $30,000 and that ordering security would undermine the appellants' right to appeal.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal from a jury trial judgment in a historical sexual assault case.

The appellant challenged the jury instruction on loss of income damages, the punitive damages award, and the prejudgment interest rate.

The Court of Appeal upheld the entitlement to and quantum of damages for loss of income and punitive damages but reversed the prejudgment interest award.

The respondent sought substantial indemnity costs of $179,660.31, relying on a presumption under the Victims' Bill of Rights.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs of $100,000, finding that the full amount sought would not be in the interests of justice, particularly given the disproportionate relationship between trial costs and appeal costs.

The appellant appealed his convictions for unlawful confinement, sexual assault causing bodily harm, and choking with intent, as well as his sentence.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's decision to permit cross-examination on his prior conviction for attempted murder under the Corbett framework, and alleged improper Crown conduct during cross-examination and closing argument.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion to allow the cross-examination given the defence's all-out attack on the complainant's credibility and the absence of other evidence to neutralize that attack.

The Crown's conduct was found to be vigorous but proper advocacy.

On the sentence appeal, the Crown conceded that the dangerous offender hearing should have proceeded under post-2008 legislation but sought to uphold the designation under the curative proviso.

The Court of Appeal rejected this submission, finding that the curative proviso was unavailable due to significant evidentiary overlap between the designation and sentencing stages and the possibility that fresh evidence could affect the designation determination.

Four co-accused appealed convictions arising from a large-scale police investigation into criminal gang activity in Toronto (Project Battery and Project Rx).

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of wiretap authorizations and general warrants, alleging violations of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The key issues involved: (1) material non-disclosure regarding the use of a Mobile Device Identifier (MDI); (2) warrantless police entries into common areas of condominium buildings; and (3) warrantless installation of hidden surveillance cameras in condominium hallways.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions but found that the warrantless installation of hidden cameras violated section 8 rights.

However, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellants' convictions were dismissed except for a one-year sentence reduction for one appellant due to the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence regarding drug quantities.