Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's order granting sole custody of their daughter to the respondent father, ordering her to pay child support, equalization, and full recovery costs of $249,765.47.

The appellant argued that the trial process denied her natural justice, the credibility assessment was flawed, and the trial judge erred in determining income and post-separation adjustments.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's credibility assessment, her focus on the child's best interests, or her financial determinations.

Leave to appeal the costs award was also denied, as the trial judge properly exercised her discretion based on the appellant's bad faith conduct.

The appellant, a ranking creditor, appealed a motion judge's decision that residential condominium purchasers were not obliged to pay the Receiver their proportionate share of the notional value of land conveyed to the City of Toronto to meet the developer's parkland obligations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation of the standard form Tarion Addendum clause, finding that the term 'parks levy' in the agreement indicated a payment of cash-in-lieu rather than a conveyance of land.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following an appeal where the appellants achieved mixed success, the appellants requested to make written costs submissions, arguing that each side should bear their own costs of the appeal and costs below should be in the cause.

The Court of Appeal affirmed its original costs order, finding that the respondent was more successful on the appeal as the appellants' claim was largely statute-barred.

The original award of $6,500 in appeal costs to the respondent was maintained.

Following a successful appeal that set aside a summary judgment dismissing the appellants' claim, the respondent sought to vary the costs order.

The respondent argued that the costs of the action unrelated to the summary judgment motion should not be payable since the action would proceed.

The Court of Appeal agreed and amended its previous judgment to vacate the motions judge's costs order and award the appellants $5,447.39 for the costs of the summary judgment motion.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict dismissing their claim against their home insurer following a fire that destroyed their house and its contents.

The insurer denied coverage on the basis that the appellants failed to report a material change in risk (using space heaters instead of a wood stove) and made wilfully false statements in their Proof of Loss.

The Court of Appeal found errors in the trial judge's instructions regarding the material change in risk, but upheld the dismissal of the action because the jury's finding of 39 wilfully false statements vitiated the claim.

The court also upheld the refusal to grant relief from forfeiture due to the appellants' unreasonable conduct.

However, the court allowed the costs appeal, reducing the trial costs awarded to the insurer from $616,843.27 on a substantial indemnity basis to $430,000 on a partial indemnity basis, finding the appellants' conduct in pursuing bad faith claims was not reprehensible enough to warrant an elevated scale.

The appellant commenced an action to recover a $50,000 deposit from an aborted real estate transaction.

The respondents counterclaimed for breach of contract.

After years of delay, the motion judge dismissed the appellant's action for delay but did not address the counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by failing to consider that dismissing the claim left the mirror-image counterclaim alive, which was not in the interests of justice.

The dismissal was set aside and the matter remitted to the Superior Court.

The appellant appealed an order striking his answer and amended answer in a family law proceeding due to his ongoing failure to comply with court orders regarding costs, household expenses, and financial disclosure.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding the appellant's non-compliance to be wilful and egregious.

The court emphasized that striking pleadings is an exceptional remedy but was justified here given the appellant's repeated disregard for his fundamental obligations.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application for damages arising from the respondent's refusal to honour the exercise of stock options.

The options were granted under a consulting agreement with a two-year term but specified a five-year exercise period.

The respondent argued the options expired six months after the consulting agreement ended, relying on an incorporated stock option plan.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the application judge erred in contractual interpretation.

The specific five-year exercise period in the grant took priority over the general termination provision in the incorporated plan.

Damages were awarded to the appellants in the amount of $2,820,000.

The appellant brought a motion under s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside an order of a single judge requiring its principal to provide a personal undertaking to pay the costs of the action and appeal as security for costs.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in misapprehending that the principal had agreed to provide such an undertaking.

Conducting a de novo review, the Court held that while the corporate appellant had insufficient assets in Ontario, an order for security for costs was not just in the circumstances due to the respondent's delay, the appeal not being devoid of merit, and the inappropriateness of requiring a personal undertaking from a non-party principal.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment enforcing a mortgage against her.

She argued the motion judge erred in denying an adjournment, failing to find the mortgage charged a criminal rate of interest, and granting summary judgment despite her allegations of fraud.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the adjournment and fraud issues, and declined to hear the criminal interest rate argument as it was raised for the first time on appeal.

The appeal was allowed solely to correct calculation errors in the judgment amount related to an abandoned advance.

The appellants, Ontario farmers, purchased agricultural machinery from the respondents, whose business is located in Quebec near the Ontario border.

The appellants sued the respondents in Ontario and served the statement of claim outside Ontario.

The motion judge set aside the service and stayed the proceeding, finding that the respondents did not carry on business in Ontario and therefore Ontario courts lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error.

The evidence showed the respondents solicited sales in Ontario, derived 40% of their sales revenue from Ontario, operated a mobile repair service in Ontario, and maintained a GPS system in Ontario to support the machinery sold there.

Therefore, the respondents carried on business in Ontario, establishing a real and substantial connection, and Ontario courts have jurisdiction.

The Town of Grimsby appealed a decision declaring that a private works yard was a permitted use on the respondent's property, which was zoned as a 'Utility Zone'.

The Town argued the use must be related to a public or quasi-public utility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge correctly applied the modern principles of statutory interpretation.

The zoning by-law unambiguously defined 'Works Yard' as a permitted use without restricting it to public or utility purposes, and the by-law's plain language governed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal on summary judgment of his claims against the Attorney General of Canada and the Ottawa Police Services Board for negligent investigation and harassment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis in evidence or law to interfere with the motion judge's comprehensive reasons and fact-finding powers.

Costs of $2,500 were awarded to each respondent.

The parties were involved in multiple actions concerning their respective security businesses.

In one action, the motion judge struck the defendant's counterclaim as an abuse of process because it duplicated a counterclaim in another action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in principle by failing to consider the context of the litigation, noting the plaintiff initiated the multiple proceedings.

A second appeal by the plaintiff from an order refusing to strike a counterclaim in another action was quashed as the order was interlocutory and the appeal properly lay to the Divisional Court.

The appellant, Gerard Lee, former CEO of Lalu Canada Inc., appealed the dismissal of his application for advance funding of legal costs to defend a fraud action.

The application judge denied funding, finding a strong prima facie case of fraud against Lee regarding "acquisition fees" he had received.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's interpretation of the consulting agreement and assessment of evidence regarding concealment.

The court also affirmed the application judge's application of the "strong prima facie case" test for denying advance funding, finding it commensurate with the stringent standard required.

This appeal concerned an option agreement granting a right of first refusal for land.

The appellant, 864773 Ontario Inc., purported to exercise its option to purchase the property for $10 million, arguing it was a "like amount" to a third-party offer of $15.3 million, considering alleged development costs.

The application judge found the offer invalid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal, affirming that the $10 million offer was not a "like amount" to the $15.3 million offer, particularly in the absence of expert evidence to support the claimed adjustments for development costs.

The court also allowed the respondents' cross-appeal to vary the judgment language to facilitate the sale to the third party.

The appellant sought to set aside a motion judge's order dismissing her motion to set aside the administrative dismissal of her appeal.

The appeal had been administratively dismissed twice due to the appellant's repeated failure to meet perfection deadlines, despite extensions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's motion, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's discretion, noting the extensive delay, the unconvincing justification for non-perfection, and the lack of proof for the appellant's claims of material tampering or respondent non-cooperation.

The appellant, Jessy Herlichka, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing three errors by the trial judge: flawed instructions on the defence of intoxication, refusal to qualify a proposed defence expert in a specific area of expertise, and an inadequate curative instruction after a Crown witness suggested the appellant murdered the victim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions on intoxication, the limitation of expert testimony, or the curative instruction, concluding that the jury was properly equipped to determine the requisite state of mind for murder.

This is an appeal from a judgment rescinding a settlement agreement.

The respondent, Irene Deschenes, had settled a sexual assault claim against the Roman Catholic Episcopal Corporation of the Diocese of London in Ontario (the "Diocese") in 2000.

Subsequently, it was discovered that the Diocese had misrepresented its knowledge of the priest's prior abuse, as police statements from 1962 indicating earlier assaults came to light.

The motion judge rescinded the settlement based on innocent misrepresentation.

The appellants (Diocese and others) appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in applying the law of unilateral mistake, assessing materiality, and failing to uphold the finality of settlements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the settlement was properly rescinded for innocent misrepresentation, finding the misrepresentation material and relied upon, and that the interests of fairness and justice outweighed the principle of settlement finality in these circumstances.

The appellant, Wayne Laski, and the Estate of Harold Morton Laski appealed a motion judge's decision to strike their action against BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc. and Norman Yu.

The action alleged negligent misrepresentation and breach of disclosure duty related to a transfer of securities from Harold Laski to a joint account with Wendi Laski, which passed by right of survivorship outside the estate.

The motion judge struck the estate's claim for non-compliance with procedural rules and the appellant's personal claim based on issue estoppel, collateral attack, abuse of process, and lack of duty of care/damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's discretionary decision to proceed with the motion in the appellant's absence due to repeated non-compliance with adjournment conditions.

The court also affirmed the striking of the personal claim, finding no error in the application of issue estoppel and noting the appellant's failure to demonstrate damages.