Karen M. Weiler

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge committed a reversible error by misapplying the third step of the W.(D.) framework, effectively reversing the burden of proof by requiring the accused's evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the complainant's evidence was not true.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 relating to a mortgage scheme.

He appealed his conviction on the grounds of an unreasonable verdict and a reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that while there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction, the trial judge's active role in eliciting evidence and making adverse comments about the credibility of Crown witnesses during their testimony created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and forcible confinement, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his alibi and erred in refusing to allow re-examination on a driving issue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons, read as a whole, supported the rejection of the alibi and that the compelling identification evidence rendered the re-examination issue non-determinative.

The appellant appealed his fraud conviction, arguing that the information specified the wrong corporate victim and that the Crown failed to prove the cheque was cashed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice from the variance in the information and holding that the filing of a proof of claim and delivery of the cheque were sufficient to prove a risk of deprivation.

The appellant appealed a decision of a summary conviction appeal judge that set aside his acquittal for assault and ordered a new trial.

The trial judge had acquitted the appellant after finding a reasonable doubt as to whether the appellant intentionally applied more force than the ordinary touching that takes place with implied consent in a conjugal relationship when he took his wife's arm.

The Court of Appeal held that the summary conviction appeal judge erred in her interpretation of the trial judge's reasons and in setting aside the acquittal.

The appeal was allowed and the acquittal restored.

The appellant employer appealed its conviction under the Occupational Health and Safety Act for failing to take every reasonable precaution to protect a worker after an employee lost his leg in a moving kiln car.

The employer argued that the trial judge failed to consider existing safety measures, convicted on a basis not pleaded in the particulars, and misapplied the onus of proof for a strict liability offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered the circumstances, the particulars provided sufficient notice, and the trial judge correctly applied the burden of proof and due diligence defence.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board which found he continued to pose a significant risk to the public and ordered his detention.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample medical evidence to support the Board's determination regarding the appellant's harassing behaviour.

The majority held that the Board's conditions for detention and its decision not to order a transfer to another facility were reasonable.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the Board to explore less restrictive placements.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing the Board unreasonably found him to be a significant risk to the public and misapplied the least restrictive alternative test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that psychiatric evidence supported the significant threat finding and that a detention order with permission to live in the community satisfied the least restrictive alternative standard, particularly given the appellant's history of substance abuse linked to his mental illness.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing he was denied due process and Charter rights because he was not present at his hearing and was not appointed counsel.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant had refused to appear and refused to sign documents for counsel, making it open to the Board to proceed in his absence.

The Court also upheld the Board's decision to keep the appellant in a restrictive ward due to his continued denial of mental illness, refusal of treatment, and disruptive conduct.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for breaching his probation.

The conviction appeal was not pressed in oral argument and was dismissed as there was ample evidence to support it.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the custodial portion had already been served and was moot.

The court found the sentence was not outside the range and there was no error in principle, noting the appellant breached his probation in a calculated and escalating manner by exposing the victim's personal information online.

The respondent, a judgment creditor of a deceased's estate and his company, brought an action claiming relief under the oppression remedy provisions of the Business Corporations Act.

The trial judge found that the transfer of the company's assets to other companies controlled by the deceased's widow, and the assumption of a mortgage, constituted oppression and ordered the appellants to pay the judgment debt.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the mortgage, which was a legitimate charge against the company's assets.

The Court also held that the respondent, as a contingent creditor, did not have a reasonable expectation that the company would be managed to ensure his debt was paid in priority to others, including tax authorities.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

Developers appealed decisions of the Divisional Court regarding the interpretation of 'conflict' under O. Reg. 82/98 between pre-existing subdivision agreements and municipal development charge by-laws.

The Court of Appeal held that the Divisional Court correctly applied a standard of correctness to the Ontario Municipal Board's decisions.

The Court affirmed that a conflict exists only if the subdivision agreement, properly interpreted, precludes the infrastructure charges imposed by the development charge by-law.

The appeals and cross-appeal were dismissed.

The appellants were jointly tried and convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder.

On appeal, the first appellant argued that his trial was rendered unfair because the trial judge permitted the co-accused's counsel to adduce highly prejudicial evidence of his violent disposition and bad character, ostensibly to support the co-accused's defence that he lied to police out of fear.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the propensity evidence lacked sufficient probative value to justify its severe prejudicial effect on the right to a fair trial.

The first appellant's appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The co-accused's appeal from conviction was dismissed, but his sentence for attempted murder was varied to correct an illegal period of parole ineligibility.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking and the sentence imposed.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred by relying on the appellant's prior record for drug offences to conclude he was guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking, and that there was an inconsistency regarding whether the appellant was a user of crack cocaine.

The Court of Appeal agreed, vacated the conviction, substituted a conviction for simple possession, and reduced the sentence to time served.

The section 109 weapons prohibition order was also vacated.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking, as well as his sentence imposed in absentia.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in admitting expert evidence from a police officer regarding drug trafficking and the roles of persons in a three-person transaction.

The Court of Appeal held that while the officer was allowed too much latitude, the core of his testimony was admissible and the trial judge was aware of its limitations.

The court also rejected arguments that the verdict was unreasonable and that evidence from one count could not be considered for another.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit and the sparse reasons were due to the appellant having absconded.

The infant plaintiff allegedly suffered damages as a result of negligent surgery and follow-up treatment in Quebec while the plaintiffs were residents of that province.

The plaintiffs subsequently moved to Ontario and commenced an action in Ontario.

The defendants brought motions to stay the action on the basis that Ontario courts had no jurisdiction or that Ontario was not a convenient forum.

The motions judge granted the motions and stayed the actions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no real and substantial connection between the claim and Ontario, and concluding that Quebec was clearly the more appropriate forum.

The appellant, a paralegal and private investigator, was convicted of attempting to obstruct justice after contacting a complainant in a domestic assault case where his client was bound by a non-communication order.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to give a Vetrovec warning regarding the complainant's testimony, failing to properly instruct the jury on the defence theory, and giving vague instructions on the actus reus.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion regarding the Vetrovec warning, and concluding the jury instructions were full and accurate.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a firearm, assault with intent to resist arrest, and failing to comply with a recognizance.

He argued that the verdicts were inconsistent because he was acquitted of a related cocaine possession charge, that the trial judge failed to give a proper W.(D.) instruction on reasonable doubt, and that evidence should have been excluded due to an unlawful detention.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdicts were not inconsistent, the jury was properly instructed on the burden of proof, and the police had reasonable grounds to pursue and detain the appellant when he fled.

The appellant, a Francophone, requested and was granted a trial in French before a judge and jury under section 530 of the Criminal Code.

However, the trial judge and the Crown prosecutor spoke almost entirely in English during the first five days of the trial, with simultaneous translation provided to the accused but not transcribed.

The Court of Appeal held that the accused's language rights under sections 530 and 530.1 were violated, as these provisions require the judge and Crown to actually speak the accused's official language, not merely understand it.

The curative proviso in section 686(1)(b)(iv) could not apply to such a significant violation.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a Francophone, requested and was granted an order under s. 530 of the Criminal Code for a trial before a judge and jury that spoke French.

However, the trial judge and Crown counsel spoke English throughout much of the trial, and the first five days of testimony took place solely in English with translation provided to the accused.

No transcript of the interpretation was entered in the record during those five days.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant's rights under ss. 530 and 530.1(e) and (g) were infringed, as the trial judge and Crown counsel are required to actually use the official language of the accused's choice, not just understand it.

The remedial provision in s. 686(1)(b)(iv) could not be applied to this violation.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.