Karen M. Weiler

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering her continued confinement in a hospital.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding an adequate evidentiary basis for the Board's conclusion that the appellant posed a significant risk of dangerousness due to her mental illness, personality disorder, and history of medication non-compliance.

However, the Court noted a lack of evidence regarding community management and medication supervision, expressing hope that these issues would be explored at the next hearing.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court (General Division).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit and noting unanimous opinions that there was a significant risk the appellant would reoffend.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with 15 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued the trial judge erred in his Vetrovec warning, his rolled-up charge on intent, his dismissal of a Corbett application, and the length of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions, the Corbett ruling, or the sentence imposed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to trafficking one gram of marijuana and appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that despite the appellant's terrible criminal record, the sentence had to be proportionate to the offence under s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code.

Leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to time served.

The appellants, who are addicted to alcohol, were denied income support under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act (ODSPA) because s. 5(2) excludes individuals whose only substantial impairment is substance dependence.

They appealed to the Social Benefits Tribunal, arguing the exclusion violated the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal and the Divisional Court held the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to apply the Code.

The Court of Appeal found that while the Tribunal does have jurisdiction to decide questions of law and apply the Code, the human rights process is the more appropriate forum for this dispute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, who were addicted to alcohol, were denied income support under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act (ODSPA) because s. 5(2) excludes individuals whose only substantial impairment is substance dependence.

They appealed to the Social Benefits Tribunal, arguing the exclusion violated the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal and the Divisional Court held the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to apply the Code.

The Court of Appeal found that the Tribunal does have implied jurisdiction to decide questions of law, including whether the ODSPA contravenes the Code.

However, the Court concluded that the human rights process is the more appropriate forum for resolving this dispute, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant pled guilty to impaired driving causing bodily harm and was sentenced to a fine, probation, and a three-year driving prohibition.

He appealed the driving prohibition, arguing it was outside the appropriate range and that the sentencing judge erred in thinking three years was the maximum.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the three-year prohibition was within the trial judge's discretion and appropriate given the overall sentence, which avoided incarceration due to the appellant's mitigating circumstances.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to apply the W.(D.) framework properly and misapprehended material evidence regarding the appellant's driving and alleged motive for racing.

The appellant appealed his perjury conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing to allow him to re-elect trial by judge and jury after a mistrial.

The appellant claimed a substantial change in the Crown's case justified overriding the Crown's refusal to consent to the late re-election.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that there was no substantial change in the Crown's case and noting the attempted re-election was out of time without a satisfactory explanation.

In a supplementary endorsement, the Court of Appeal for Ontario clarified its previous judgment regarding the post-maturity interest rate on a promissory note.

The court set aside its previous endorsement and specified that the intent was to ensure the interest after maturity remained the same as before maturity.

Accordingly, the post-maturity interest rate was set at 10 per cent per annum, calculated semi-annually not in advance.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and failing to provide a breath sample.

The trial judge granted a stay of proceedings because the Crown failed to disclose a police station security videotape before it was routinely erased.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the Crown's appeal.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed that the videotape was marginally relevant and its loss breached the accused's Charter rights due to the Crown's unexplained failure to preserve it.

However, the Court held that a stay of proceedings was an inappropriate remedy because the prejudice to the accused was minimal.

The appeal was allowed, the stay set aside, and a new trial ordered where the defence could lead evidence about the lost tape.

The Crown appealed the 15-month conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and flight from police causing bodily harm.

The Crown argued the trial judge misapprehended the length of the driving prohibition under the Highway Traffic Act and erred in imposing a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal declined to interfere with the conditional sentence due to the Crown's delay in perfecting the appeal and a shift in its argument without notice.

However, the Court imposed an additional two-year driving prohibition to match the trial judge's intended disposition.

The respondent attended a church service to protest same-sex marriages and intentionally pushed the pastor when he asked her to stop disrupting the service.

The trial judge acquitted her of assault, applying the principle of de minimis non curat lex (the law does not concern itself with trifles), and the summary conviction appeal court affirmed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the application of the de minimis principle to undisputed facts is a question of law alone, and that the respondent's intentional push in the context of disrupting a church service was not a trifling matter.

A finding of guilt was entered and the respondent was granted an absolute discharge.

The appellants were stopped for speeding on a highway.

The police officers, suspecting the appellants were drug couriers based on neutral indicators, detained them and requested to search their rental car without advising them of their right to counsel.

After the passenger withdrew his initial consent, the officers searched the trunk and found 22 pounds of marijuana.

The Court of Appeal held that the police breached the appellants' rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The majority concluded that the breaches were serious and that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute under s. 24(2).

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and acquittals were entered.

The appellant Crown appealed a declaration that the respondent, Regulvar Ontario, was not a 'person resident in a designated jurisdiction' under the Fairness is a Two-Way Street Act.

The Act restricts construction access for corporations controlled directly or indirectly by residents of Quebec.

Regulvar Quebec owned 30% of Regulvar Ontario's shares, with the rest held by individuals who were directors or officers of Regulvar Quebec.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's use of the de jure control test, finding that Regulvar Quebec did not have the ability to elect the majority of the board of directors.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a decision declaring that Regulvar Ontario was not a 'person resident in a designated jurisdiction' under the Fairness is a Two-Way Street Act (Construction Labour Mobility), 1999.

The Act restricted access to construction jobs in Ontario for persons resident in Quebec.

Regulvar Ontario's head office was in Ontario, but 30% of its shares were held by Regulvar Quebec.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's use of the de jure control test from Duha Printers, finding that Regulvar Quebec did not control Regulvar Ontario directly or indirectly.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant husband, a Canadian diplomat, appealed an order under the Hague Convention requiring the return of his two children to Poland.

The husband had brought the children to Canada for a visit but subsequently decided to separate from the respondent wife and retain the children in Canada.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the children were habitually resident in Poland and that the husband's retention of them in Canada was wrongful under the Convention.

The court rejected the argument that the husband's diplomatic status automatically made Canada the children's habitual residence.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder.

At trial, he claimed to have suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and amnesia, rendering him unable to remember the events.

The defence introduced statements the appellant made during a court-ordered psychiatric assessment, which the Crown then cross-examined him on.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to caution the jury against using disbelief of his amnesia as circumstantial evidence of guilt, by allowing cross-examination on protected statements under s. 672.21 of the Criminal Code, and by failing to instruct the jury not to rely on third-party opinions of his truthfulness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions and holding that the appellant waived the protection of s. 672.21 by introducing the statements himself.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the resulting sentence.

He argued that the trial judge made four significant errors in his instructions to the jury, including failing to address the defence theory of fabrication regarding delayed disclosure, misstating the evidence about when the appellant asked for intercourse, giving confusing instructions on consent related to age difference, and introducing undefined legal terms during a re-charge.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the cumulative effect of these deficiencies in the jury charge warranted setting aside the conviction and ordering a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof by treating the case as a credibility contest between him and the police officer.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the trial judge's reasons adequately explained why the appellant's evidence was rejected and that it was implicit she found his testimony incredible, leaving no reasonable doubt.