Karen M. Weiler

The Crown appealed an order upholding a summary conviction court's decision to proceed with an application for costs after charges against the respondent were withdrawn.

Relying on the companion appeal of R. v. Fach, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the lower court's decision, and prohibited the summary conviction court from proceeding with the costs application.

The Court also rejected the respondent's allegations of abuse of process by the Crown in withdrawing the charges.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and assault against his wife.

During deliberations, the jury asked to review the testimony of the appellant and the complainant.

The trial judge permitted the jury to watch an unofficial video recording of the trial proceedings in the jury room without counsel present and without controlling which portions were viewed.

The Court of Appeal held this was a fatal error, as responses to jury questions must occur in open court to ensure the accused's right to be present and the judge's control over the proceedings.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her action on the grounds that her re-amended statement of claim was verbose, pleaded evidence, attempted to re-litigate matters finally disposed of, and was an abuse of process.

The appellant also brought a preliminary motion to strike the respondents' affidavits because they were sworn by associates in the same law firms as counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the preliminary motion, finding the affidavits dealt with facts already on the record.

The Court also dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the underlying basis for the appellant's claims—the trustee's right to proceed with the sale of the matrimonial home after the husband's discharge from bankruptcy—had been conclusively determined in earlier proceedings.

The appellant wife appealed an order directing the sale of the matrimonial home and a distribution of $75,000 of the proceeds to each party.

The wife argued the distribution order impaired her claim for an unequal division of the proceeds.

The Divisional Court found the motion judge erred by ordering a specific distribution without knowing the sale price, rather than holding back funds to cover the wife's claim.

The court varied the order to distribute $15,000 to the husband and $75,000 to the wife, with the balance held in trust pending trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for threatening bodily harm.

At trial, the complainant's statement to police was admitted as past recollection recorded because she could not remember the incident or making the statement.

On appeal, the Crown conceded the statement did not meet the Wigmore criteria for past recollection recorded, but argued it was admissible under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the statement met the necessity and reliability criteria, supported by circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness including proximity in time and lack of motive to lie.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a real estate agent, pleaded guilty to uttering a forged document after forging an extension on a listing agreement to recover a sales commission.

He was fined $5,000 and sentenced to twelve months' probation.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to grant a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a conditional discharge would not be in the public interest given the serious, deliberate breach of trust committed by a professional dealing with the public.

The appellant appealed a decision finding that Ontario was forum non conveniens for an action on an insurance policy.

The appellant argued the motions judge failed to consider Articles 68 and 69 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Quebec Code was not relevant to the forum non conveniens analysis in Ontario, as Ontario's jurisdiction derives from its own law.

The Court found no basis to interfere with the motions judge's weighing of the factors, agreeing that the action's connection was almost totally with Quebec.

The appellant appealed his convictions on four counts of break and enter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions on counts one and four, finding it was open to the trial judge to apply the doctrine of recent possession given the unique combination of stolen items (a marked two-dollar bill and 88-cent stamps) found on the appellant.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on counts two and three, setting aside the convictions and entering acquittals, as there was no evidence linking the appellant to those specific break-ins other than proximity, and there was exculpatory evidence regarding the intruder's shoes.

The appellants appealed a decision staying their action on an insurance policy on the basis of forum non conveniens.

They argued the motions judge failed to consider Articles 68 and 69 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, which allow an action to be instituted in the domicile of the insured.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that Quebec procedural rules are irrelevant to an Ontario forum non conveniens analysis.

The court found no error in the motions judge's conclusion that the action's connection was almost entirely with Quebec.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding a real estate transaction involving misrepresentations.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding no evidentiary basis to hold Mona Dreiser liable for the misrepresentations and dismissing the action against her.

The Court also found the trial judge's damages award amounted to double recovery, as the respondent had already received clear title through the discharge of a vendor-take-back mortgage.

Damages were varied to $3,500, representing the difference between the amount paid and the actual market value.

The appellant appealed her conviction for mischief.

The trial judge had convicted her of both mischief and impaired driving.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Judge acquitted the appellant of impaired driving but sustained the mischief conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant, finding that the trial judge's finding of mischief was inextricably linked to the conclusion that she was impaired, and the evidence of requisite knowledge for mischief was very weak.

The respondent client sued his stockbroker and brokerage firm for failing to execute a stop-sell order on shares, resulting in significant financial loss.

The trial judge found the appellants liable and awarded damages based on the difference between the stop-sell price and the price when the respondent discovered the error, plus substantial indemnity costs.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the liability and damages findings, concluding the trial judge's assessment of credibility and mitigation was reasonable.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding costs, setting aside the substantial indemnity award and substituting a lower amount, as allegations of insider trading were not pursued at trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in finding the objective component of the reasonable and probable grounds standard for arrest was satisfied.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, which included dated information from police and the appellant's presence in a hotel room where drugs were likely being used or sold, as well as his assistance in placing drugs into his car.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial decision finding that the deceased lacked the capacity to enter into a marriage with her shortly before his death.

The deceased was suffering from terminal cancer, Parkinson's disease, and pneumonia, and was heavily medicated.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of incapacity based on medical and lay evidence regarding the deceased's physical and mental state.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant's claims for monetary relief under the Family Law Act and the Succession Law Reform Act were denied.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of a Crown witness who had given a prior inconsistent statement, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's review of the evidence or credibility assessment.

The court agreed with the summary conviction appeal judge that the verdict was not unreasonable, as it was open to the trial judge to accept the witness's evidence despite the prior inconsistency.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by a Justice of the Peace, which was previously dismissed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in law, necessitating a new trial.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial but expressed hope that the Crown would not proceed given the nature of the charge and the evidence.

The appellant, a black man, was convicted of robbing an East Indian pizza delivery man.

At trial, the judge permitted a challenge for cause based on the appellant's race but refused to allow a question addressing the interracial nature of the crime.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant was entitled to challenge the jury for cause based on the interracial nature of the crime, even though both the accused and the victim were members of visible minorities.

The denial of this right impaired the appearance of fairness and the integrity of the trial.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a sexual offence, arguing the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.D. principles and adequately explain the reasons for conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the law and had ample evidence to convict.

The Crown appealed the sentence, and while the Court agreed the sentence constituted an error in principle, it declined to set it aside as the sentence had already been fully served.

Both the appeal and cross-appeals were dismissed.

The parties separated after a ten-year traditional marriage.

The separation agreement provided for time-limited spousal support and child support.

The father's income subsequently increased substantially, and the parties' son moved in with the father while the daughter remained with the mother.

The father drafted an amending agreement reducing child support, which the mother signed without financial disclosure or independent legal advice.

The mother later applied to vary spousal and child support, seeking retroactive increases.

The trial judge increased support but declined to make it retroactive to the date the father's income increased.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, increasing the quantum of spousal support to reflect the mother's economic disadvantage and making the child support increase retroactive due to the father's financial non-disclosure and blameworthy conduct.

The appellant appealed his conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol level over 80 milligrams.

He argued he had already been acquitted of the offence and that the trial judge erred in finding he had care or control.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first ground but allowed the appeal on the second.

The Court held that the trial judge's conclusion that opening a passenger door to deposit a bag constituted a risk of danger was unreasonable, as there was no indication the appellant intended to resume driving.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.