Karen M. Weiler

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his action based on absolute privilege and declaring him a vexatious litigant.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the application judge that the alleged statements were protected by absolute privilege and that the appellant had persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious proceedings.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The respondent obtained summary judgment in an action on a mortgage.

The appellant conceded default but argued summary judgment was unjust due to an outstanding third party claim involving a disability insurance policy that would cover mortgage payments.

The Court of Appeal found that granting summary judgment would be unjust because there was an issue as to whether the mortgage and insurance policy were linked.

The appeal was allowed and the summary judgment was set aside.

The appellant appealed an order prohibiting him from acting as a lawyer.

He argued the application should have been converted into an action due to complex facts and credibility issues, and that the judge made factual errors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the judge applied the correct principles in refusing to order a trial and made no palpable and overriding errors in his factual findings.

The appellant appealed his sentence of one year imprisonment, two years probation, and a $199,083 restitution order for three counts of obtaining credit cards by fraud.

The Court of Appeal upheld the custodial sentence, finding it fit for a large-scale commercial fraud.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part regarding the restitution order, reducing it to $35,000 based on the appellant's ability to pay.

The Crown appealed a sentence of two years' imprisonment and three years' probation imposed on the respondent for multiple historical sexual offences against young children.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in principle by emphasizing rehabilitation over deterrence and denunciation, and by failing to appreciate the gravity of the offences and the risk of re-offending.

The appeal was allowed, and a global sentence of five years' imprisonment, less one year credit for pre-sentence custody, was substituted.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge misapprehended evidence regarding his continued abuse of a victim after being released from jail for a similar offence.

The appellant also argued the judge failed to give proper weight to an expert report.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that even if the sentencing judge erred as alleged, the overall sentence imposed was fit.

The appellant appealed from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board holding that he continued to pose a significant threat to the safety of the public and ordering his detention in a medium secure unit.

The appellant argued the Board erred by not ordering a further review within six months and by keeping him in a medium secure unit despite his progress.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the treating psychiatrist did not definitively recommend a six-month review and the Board's decision to maintain medium security was reasonable given ongoing concerns about elopement and potential reoffending.

The appellant was severely injured while exercising a horse at a racetrack.

His worker's compensation claim was denied because the trainer who hired him failed to maintain coverage as required by the Rules of Thoroughbred Racing.

The appellant sued the trainer, the Ontario Racing Commission, and the racetrack owner for negligence.

The trial judge found only the trainer liable.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed that neither the Commission nor the racetrack owner owed a private law duty of care to the appellant to ensure compliance with the rules, as their statutory mandates were to serve the public interest rather than private individuals.

The appellant sued her former employer for wrongful dismissal arising from a 2001 transfer of the business.

After the limitation period expired, she sought to amend her statement of claim to allege constructive dismissal based on a significant salary reduction in 1999.

The motion judge dismissed the motion to amend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under Rule 26.01, the expiry of a limitation period creates a presumption of prejudice to the responding party.

The moving party must rebut this presumption by demonstrating special circumstances.

Because the proposed amendment advanced a fundamentally different and unrelated claim, and no special circumstances were shown, the amendment was properly denied.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision granting partial summary judgment to the respondents on the issue of product ownership.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that there was no triable issue regarding the appellant's ownership of the product, noting the appellant's pleadings and a 1996 licensing agreement were inconsistent with ownership.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, striking the declaration that the respondent owned the product because the respondent had not filed a counter-claim.

The appellant appealed a judgment finding her liable for the outstanding balance of her former law firm's accounts for services rendered in matrimonial litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the accounts.

The trial judge properly considered relevant factors, including the nature of the services, time expended, and the appellant's ability to pay, and correctly noted that the appellant had acquiesced to the fees by making partial payments without complaint for many months.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding liability for a fire, arguing the trial judge erred in qualifying the respondent's causation expert, apportioning liability, and denying an adjournment request on the first day of trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the expert's practical experience sufficient for admissibility, upholding the contributory negligence apportionment, and finding no error in the discretionary refusal of the adjournment given the history of prior indulgences granted to the appellant.

The appellant life insurance company appealed a trial judgment awarding its former agent damages for breach of fiduciary duty, punitive damages, and vested renewal commissions following his termination.

The trial judge found the appellant breached its fiduciary duty by freezing the agent's vested commission account and acted in bad faith in its post-termination conduct.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on the vested commissions, the breach of fiduciary duty, the punitive damages award, and the dismissal of the appellant's counterclaim.

However, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal regarding the trial judge's award of a risk premium on costs, holding that the amended Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure does not permit a risk premium to be awarded against an unsuccessful party.

Following an appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement.

The court reviewed the submissions of counsel and awarded the respondent costs fixed in the amount of $20,000, all inclusive.

Following a successful appeal by the City of Toronto on a single issue, the Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement.

Because several issues from the original application remained undetermined and were remitted to the Superior Court, the Court of Appeal set aside the application judge's costs order and reserved the costs of both the original application and the appeal to the judge determining the remitted issues.

The Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) appealed a decision regarding a priority dispute over a $4.5 million tax refund to an insolvent company.

RBC had a perfected security interest when an interim receiver was appointed under s. 47 of the BIA.

However, RBC failed to file a financing change statement after the debtor's name changed, making its interest unperfected by the time the debtor was assigned into bankruptcy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that an interim receiver is not a 'person who represents the creditors of the debtor' under s. 20(1)(b) of the PPSA.

Therefore, the relevant date for determining priority was the date of bankruptcy, at which point RBC's unperfected security interest was ineffective against the trustee in bankruptcy.

The plaintiff, an OPP officer, sued the defendant newspaper and its reporters for defamation over articles criticizing his conduct during the 9/11 rescue efforts in New York.

At trial, the defendants relied on the traditional defence of qualified privilege, which the trial judge rejected for two of the articles.

The jury awarded the plaintiff $125,000 in damages.

On appeal, the defendants argued for the adoption of the public interest responsible journalism defence.

The Court of Appeal recognized the new defence as part of Ontario law, holding that it strikes an appropriate balance between freedom of expression and protection of reputation.

However, the court dismissed the appeal because the defendants had not pleaded or litigated the responsible journalism standard at trial.

The appellant husband appealed a Superior Court decision setting aside an arbitrator's award that had reduced his spousal and child support obligations.

The reviewing judge found that the arbitrator's refusal to grant the wife an adjournment after the husband produced a significantly altered financial statement on the morning of the hearing was unfair.

The Court of Appeal upheld the reviewing judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in her factual findings and agreeing that the denial of the adjournment prevented the wife from properly understanding and challenging the husband's financial evidence.

The appellant, who was found guilty of manslaughter by a jury, appealed his sentence of two years less a day incarceration and three years probation.

He was sentenced as an adult but ordered to serve his sentence in a youth facility.

The appellant argued the sentence was unfit, the trial judge failed to consider his immaturity under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, erred in treating psychiatric evidence, and failed to give enhanced credit for three years of pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding the adult sentence was fit and balanced.

The Crown appealed a 15-month conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for four counts of abduction in contravention of a custody order, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to include punitive conditions.

The Court of Appeal agreed that a conditional sentence must generally include punitive terms such as house arrest or a curfew.

However, because the respondent had served six weeks of pre-trial custody, faced punitive terms for related passport offences, and had already served a significant portion of the conditional sentence, the Court declined to interfere and dismissed the appeal.