Stephen T. Goudge

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding reasonable and probable grounds for his arrest and that his rights under ss. 10(a) and (b) of the Charter were violated.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the circumstances, including the fact that the appellant matched the description of a male who pointed a handgun, constituted reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

The Charter arguments were not pressed and were found to have no merit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for assault with a weapon.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence by characterizing the incident as an attack on a stranger, when it actually occurred during a drug transaction.

This misapprehension constituted an error in principle, requiring a fresh assessment of the sentence.

The Court varied the sentence to two years, in addition to four months of pre-trial custody, noting the seriousness of the assault and the appellant's lengthy criminal record.

The appellant appealed a dangerous offender designation, arguing that the Crown must show evidence of untreatability to sustain the order.

The Court of Appeal rejected this submission and dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge correctly focused on whether there was a reasonable possibility of eventual control of the appellant's risk in the community.

The appellant pleaded guilty to importing and trafficking large amounts of cocaine and was sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment.

He appealed his sentence, arguing that his potential deportation could affect his eligibility for day parole.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that speculation regarding the effect of immigration status on day parole eligibility is irrelevant to determining the appropriate sentence.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and robbery with a firearm.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting hearsay evidence of a witness's prior testimony identifying him from a photo array, and by misdirecting the jury on the use of evidence regarding a black man fleeing the scene.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the hearsay evidence lacked threshold reliability because the witness's professed memory loss prevented meaningful cross-examination.

The court also held the jury instruction on flight was misleading.

The curative proviso could not be applied, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant real estate company sued the respondents for oppression under the Business Corporations Act and for breach of contract after being locked out of a condominium project following a corporate restructuring.

The trial judge found oppression and awarded compensation but did not address the breach of contract claim.

The Divisional Court reversed the oppression finding and dismissed the entire action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the oppression claim, finding the restructuring was not unfairly prejudicial because the appellant was indemnified.

However, the Court found the Divisional Court erred in dismissing the unadjudicated breach of contract claim and remitted it for trial.

The appellant appealed a 12-month sentence imposed by the trial judge, which was twelve times the joint submission at trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge overemphasized the dangerousness of the drug and gave too little weight to the lack of severity of the crime, its low level of sophistication, and the offender's unfortunate circumstances.

On appeal, both the appellant and the Crown submitted that the appropriate sentence was six months plus probation.

The Court of Appeal agreed, granted leave, allowed the appeal, and varied the sentence to six months.

The applicants, appealing their convictions, sought disclosure or production of band lists used by the Court Services Division to prepare jury rolls in the Kenora District and Simcoe County.

They argued the lists were necessary to demonstrate systemic underrepresentation of First Nations persons on the jury rolls, which violated their Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal granted the application, finding that the requested records met the 'likely relevant' test for third-party production under O'Connor, as they could be used to test the statements of Crown deponents and understand the jury roll preparation process.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissing his appeal from a conviction for sexual assault.

The appellant argued that his guilty plea was equivocal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the lower court's decision, as the appellant had twice unequivocally acknowledged the accuracy of the facts supporting the constituent elements of the offence prior to his plea.

The appellants appealed an order granting them an adjournment on the condition of a limited draw against debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's order.

The court held that since the appellants sought the indulgence, the terms imposed were an entirely reasonable exercise of the motion judge's discretion.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board imposing a detention order that required him to live in 'supervised accommodation' if living in the community.

The Court of Appeal found the Board did not act unreasonably in imposing a detention order, but erred in unilaterally imposing the 'supervised accommodation' term without allowing submissions on its meaning, need, or availability.

The appeal was allowed to vary the order, removing the 'supervised accommodation' requirement but directing that the appellant not reside with his father.

The appellant applied for a registration certificate for his Armi Jager AP80 firearm, which was refused by the Registrar of Firearms on the basis that it is a prohibited firearm.

The Ontario Court of Justice reversed the Registrar's decision, finding that the AP80 was not a variant of the AK-47.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the Attorney General's appeal and restored the Registrar's refusal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal, holding that the Ontario Court of Justice failed to properly apply the reasonableness standard of review to the Registrar's decision.

The Court of Appeal further held that the AP80 is the same weapon as the AK-22, which is expressly declared by regulation to be a variant of the AK-47, and is therefore a prohibited firearm.

The appellant appealed an order granting summary judgment and sought leave to appeal costs.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the lower court's judgment, noting the appellant failed to bring forward evidence raising a genuine issue requiring trial.

The appeal and motion for leave to appeal costs were dismissed, with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellants failed to appear for the hearing of their appeal, despite prior endorsements of the court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned and awarded costs to the respondent in the amount of $5,000.

The appellant appealed a decision denying him interest on a shareholder's loan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis for interest as there was no agreement between the shareholders, no demand for repayment, no finding of oppression, and no judgment upon which to award prejudgment interest.

The appellant appealed a family law judgment, raising five issues including spousal support, a restraining order, the appointment of a trustee for a life insurance policy, trial costs, and alleged trial judge bias.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's determination of income or imputation of income to the appellant to encourage self-sufficiency under the Divorce Act.

The court declined to interfere with the discretionary orders regarding the restraining order, the trustee appointment, and costs.

While noting that the trial judge's language could have been more tempered, the court found no bias.

The appeal was dismissed without costs.

The young person appealed a finding of guilt, arguing the trial judge erred in his section 11(b) Charter analysis regarding unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged errors in the trial judge's application of Youth Criminal Justice Act guidelines.

However, the Court upheld the decision, finding that the lack of actual prejudice and the gravity of the offence outweighed the inferred prejudice from the delay.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sued the respondents for unlawful interference with economic relations, alleging that the respondents' bundling of accounting and TPA services contravened the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario.

The action was dismissed on summary judgment as statute-barred.

On appeal, the appellant argued the limitation period did not begin until the Professional Conduct Committee issued its disposition on the appellant's complaint.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant knew sufficient material facts to base its allegations well before the committee's disposition, and the discovery of the committee's opinion did not restart the limitation period.

The appellant appealed a $56,000 restitution order imposed following a joint submission for his minor role in a fraud.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge gave insufficient weight to the appellant's future ability to pay, noting he was an immigrant student with limited employment prospects who received little personal benefit from the fraud.

The appeal was allowed and the restitution order was set aside.

The appellant was convicted of tax evasion after failing to disclose income or pay taxes from 1993 to 1997, based on his belief that federal income tax was unconstitutional.

He appealed his conviction and his sentence of one year in jail.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding he had the requisite mens rea and the trial judge properly handled a juror issue.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred by treating the absence of a conditional sentence in tax evasion cases as an absolute rule and by mischaracterizing aggravating factors.

The jail sentence was varied to a one-year conditional sentence.