Stephen T. Goudge

The applicants sought directions on how to proceed with their applications for disclosure of certain First Nation Band lists in furtherance of a constitutional challenge to their criminal convictions.

The Crown argued that the issue of public interest privilege should be heard and decided before determining the disclosure process (Stinchcombe or O'Connor) and whether disclosure is required.

The Court of Appeal directed that all three issues be argued at a single hearing to proceed expeditiously.

The Court also ordered that notice encompassing all three issues be given to the affected Bands to ensure transparency and allow them to make submissions.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the summary conviction appeal court dismissing his appeal from conviction.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the proposed appeal raised an issue of mixed fact and law rather than a pure question of law, and did not engage the interest of the general administration of justice.

The court also found that the trial was not unfair, as the appellant had received adequate disclosure, and the trial judge's challenged remark was merely an attempt to assist a self-represented accused.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge's reasons were insufficient.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient for appellate review and that photographic evidence supported the victim's testimony.

The appellant appealed her conviction on the basis that the trial judge erred in assessing eyewitness identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to distinguish the relative probative value of multiple identifications by a police officer, failed to consider a relevant physical description discrepancy despite a Crown admission, and failed to caution himself on the generic weaknesses of eyewitness identification.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The respondent loaned a killer whale to the appellant under a Breeding Loan Agreement.

The respondent later gave notice to terminate the agreement, but the appellant refused to return the whale, arguing the termination right was qualified by a prior Interchange Agreement and extrinsic evidence.

The application judge found the Breeding Loan Agreement was a clear, unambiguous, stand-alone contract permitting termination without cause.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no ambiguity that would allow the admission of extrinsic evidence and concluding the termination provision was not commercially unreasonable.

The appellant franchisee operated a gas station under a one-year franchise agreement with the respondent franchisor.

The franchisee sought to rescind the agreement and claim a refund under the Arthur Wishart Act because the franchisor had not provided a disclosure document.

The franchisor successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that it was exempt under s. 5(7)(g)(ii) of the Act, which applies to agreements valid for no longer than one year that do not involve a non-refundable franchise fee.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the agreement's one-year term and requirement to pay royalties, rather than a franchise fee, satisfied the exemption criteria.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing that the Crown improperly cross-examined and argued about the complainant's motive to fabricate, and that the guilty verdicts were inconsistent with an acquittal on an incest charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge gave a proper curative instruction regarding the Crown's conduct and that the verdicts were not inconsistent, as it was open to the jury to accept some of the complainant's evidence while rejecting other parts.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the basis that the trial judge erred in finding his evidence not credible.

The trial judge's primary reason for rejecting the appellant's credibility was a finding that the appellant deliberately failed to disclose his complete criminal record.

The Court of Appeal found this was not a fair basis for rejecting the evidence, as the incomplete record was due to an inadvertent error by both Crown and defence counsel, and the appellant readily admitted the missing convictions during cross-examination.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction, arguing that the trial judge failed to consider evidence corroborating his claim that he could not communicate in English.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge expressly referred to the evidence but accepted the police officers' evidence as equally credible, concluding the appellant had not met his burden.

The appellant appealed an order dispensing with the requirement for his signature on a listing agreement for the sale of the matrimonial home, and the refusal of an adjournment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge did not exercise his discretion unreasonably in refusing the adjournment.

The appellant suffered no prejudice because the sale proceeds were ordered to be held in trust pending agreement or further court order.

The court stayed the order for 14 days to allow the appellant to remove his personal belongings.

The appellants appealed a decision striking out their Amended Notice of Application against a notary public for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The appellants alleged they unknowingly signed powers of attorney revoking their interest in foreign property, which were notarized by the respondent notary in their absence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding it was not plain and obvious that the notary owed no duty of care to the appellants when she affixed her signature, knowing the legal effect it would carry in the foreign jurisdiction.

The appellants, former executives of Livent, appealed their convictions and sentences for large-scale commercial frauds involving the falsification of financial statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding that the trial judge's reasons were adequate, the verdicts were reasonable, and the trial judge properly assessed the credibility of unsavoury accomplice witnesses.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeals, reducing the penitentiary terms because the Crown failed to prove the actual amount of financial loss or that the company's bankruptcy was caused solely by the fraud.

The appellants appealed a sealing order that redacted the amounts to be paid under two proposed settlement agreements in a CCAA proceeding.

The appellants argued the sealing order unjustifiably infringed the open court principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that litigation settlement privilege applied to the settlement agreements until approved by the court.

The court held that the sealing order was a minimal intrusion on the open court principle, the requirement to sign a confidentiality agreement did not impose an undue burden, and the respondents did not waive privilege by complying with the court order.

Following an appeal where the appellants achieved divided success, the Court of Appeal determined the appropriate costs awards for both the appeal and the trial.

The appellants were awarded reduced partial indemnity costs for the appeal to reflect their divided success.

For the trial costs, the respondents were awarded their agreed costs against the unsuccessful appellant, and a Sanderson order was made allowing the respondents to recover the trial costs they owed to the successful co-appellants from the unsuccessful appellant.

The appellants appealed a judgment regarding their late mother's estate, challenging the trial judge's finding that the respondent simply effected the mother's instructions.

The appellants argued that the mother's physical disability and the amounts of money involved required an inference to the contrary.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to sustain the trial judge's conclusion that the mother was of full mental capacity and the respondent merely implemented her instructions.

The appellant appealed an order striking out its Statement of Defence and Counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the draconian step of striking pleadings was not justified.

The appellant's former solicitors were removed from the record shortly before a scheduled trial, and the appellant had made efforts to retain new counsel.

The Court held that less severe measures, such as granting an extension of time, should have been considered.

The appellant appealed an order refusing to grant final orders for spousal support and equalization based solely on allegations after the respondent failed to defend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that allegations alone are inadequate and that evidence must be presented at trial to support the requested relief.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a stabbing during a fight.

He appealed his conviction on four grounds, including an improper closing address by the Crown, misleading jury instructions regarding expert pathology evidence, an unreasonable verdict, and systemic underrepresentation of aboriginal on-reserve residents in the jury roll.

The Court of Appeal split the appeal into two parts.

The Court dismissed the first three grounds, finding the trial was fair, the jury instructions were adequate, and the verdict was reasonable.

The Court adjourned the appeal to hear submissions on the discrete issue of the jury roll composition.

The tenant obtained creditor protection under the CCAA and sent a letter to the landlord repudiating its commercial lease.

The landlord did not acknowledge or accept the repudiation.

The tenant subsequently went bankrupt, and the trustee in bankruptcy disclaimed the lease, disallowing the landlord's claim for unrecoverable expenses for the remainder of the lease term.

The landlord's successor appealed the dismissal of its motion to set aside the disallowance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that an unaccepted repudiation does not terminate a lease, and therefore the lease remained in effect at the date of bankruptcy and was subject to the trustee's statutory disclaimer.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, attempted murder, and firearm offences arising from a shootout with police.

At trial, he advanced an alibi defence that was not disclosed prior to his testimony.

He argued on appeal that the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding the late disclosure of his alibi, the failure to call his mother as an alibi witness, and the lack of an unsavory witness caution for a key Crown witness.

He also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to serve a notice of alibi.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions and concluding that defence counsel's decision not to serve a notice of alibi was a competent tactical choice.