John I. Laskin

The appellant brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence and to amend his statement of claim on appeal.

The court granted both requests, finding that the interests of justice favoured admitting the evidence, which had been read to the motions judge but not marked as an exhibit.

The court also permitted the amendment to the statement of claim, which effectively withdrew an admission, and imposed terms to address any prejudice to the respondents.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by icy roads and sued the City of Scarborough.

OHIP sought to advance a subrogated claim against the City for the cost of the plaintiff's insured medical services.

The City argued the claim was barred by s. 30(5) of the Health Insurance Act and s. 267.8(18) of the Insurance Act because it was insured under a motor vehicle liability policy.

OHIP argued the bar only applied when the City was sued as an owner or operator of a vehicle, not as a road authority.

The Court of Appeal dismissed OHIP's appeal, holding that the plain wording of the statutes barred the subrogated claim regardless of the capacity in which the City was sued.

The plaintiff employer settled a claim arising from its employee's fraudulent issuance of a performance bond, providing a release to the third-party contractor.

The release promised not to sue anyone who might claim contribution or indemnity from the contractor.

The plaintiff subsequently sued the employee, who then third-partied the contractor.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to stay the plaintiff's action and the third-party claim as an abuse of process, finding that the plaintiff's undertaking not to seek amounts recoverable from the contractor was an impermissible unilateral amendment to the clear terms of the release.

The appellant was rendered a paraplegic after being shot by an unknown assailant while driving his wife's car.

He applied for statutory accident benefits, which his insurer denied on the basis that the incident was not an 'accident' under section 2(1) of the 1996 Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's decision, finding that the gunshots, not the use or operation of the automobile, were the direct cause of the appellant's injuries.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent's auto repair shop was destroyed by fire.

Despite investigations by the fire department and police concluding the fire was accidental, the appellant insurer denied the claim, alleging arson based on the flawed investigations of its independent adjuster and expert.

At trial, the jury awarded the respondent $157,000 for fire damage and $200,000 in punitive damages for the insurer's bad faith.

The insurer appealed the punitive damages award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the insurer breached its duty of good faith by doggedly pursuing an unfounded arson defence and ignoring evidence to the contrary.

The court held that the $200,000 award was proportionate and justified to deter such reprehensible conduct.

The appellant was convicted of fraud for failing to report employment income while receiving social assistance.

She appealed, arguing that the welfare agency's sharing of her T4 slips with the police violated her rights under ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the compelled production of pre-existing documents like T4 slips does not violate the principle against self-incrimination under s. 7.

Furthermore, the appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy under s. 8 that the agency would not share evidence of fraud with the police.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part to delete a probation term requiring $100 monthly restitution payments due to the appellant's limited means, though the intermittent jail sentence and free-standing restitution order were upheld.

The appellants, federal public service employees, brought a civil action against the government and senior managers alleging workplace harassment and abuse of authority.

The motions judge dismissed the action, finding that the court lacked jurisdiction because the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the grievance process under the Public Service Staff Relations Act (PSSRA) and the collective agreement, applying the Supreme Court's decision in Weber.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the PSSRA grievance process was not intended to be an exclusive dispute resolution mechanism for complaints that are not referable to third-party adjudication.

Since the appellants' claims could not be adjudicated under the PSSRA, the court retained concurrent jurisdiction and declined to defer to the statutory regime.

The respondent physician pleaded guilty to defrauding OHIP of nearly $1 million over seven years through false billings.

The trial judge imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day and a restitution order.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that a conditional sentence was demonstrably unfit given the egregious breach of trust and the paramount need for general deterrence in large-scale frauds against the public health care system.

Taking into account the respondent's unusual mitigating circumstances and the time already served under the conditional sentence, the Court imposed a sentence of 18 months' incarceration.

A memorandum from the Senior Legal Officer of the Court of Appeal for Ontario forwarding costs submissions and correspondence to the panel of judges following the release of reserved reasons.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

At trial, the Crown relied heavily on the testimony of a jailhouse informant.

The trial judge gave a Vetrovec warning but erred by providing the jury with examples of potentially confirmatory evidence that were not capable of confirming the informant's testimony.

The trial judge also erred by allowing the Crown to introduce highly prejudicial investigative hearsay evidence regarding the appellant's antecedents, including alleged ties to terrorism and the drug trade, to rebut a defence claim of an inadequate police investigation.

The Court of Appeal found that both errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant landlord originally applied to the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal under the Tenant Protection Act, claiming the respondent tenant breached the Act.

The Tribunal dismissed the application.

The appellant did not appeal but instead applied to the Superior Court for a declaration that the unit was a commercial tenancy.

The motions judge dismissed the application based on issue estoppel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal implicitly decided the unit was residential and the appellant could not resile from its initial position relying on the Tribunal's jurisdiction.

The appellants were convicted of possessing 1,200 kilograms of contraband tobacco and sentenced to the minimum fine under s. 240 of the Excise Act.

They appealed, arguing that the minimum fine provisions constitute cruel and unusual punishment contrary to s. 12 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the minimum fine is not grossly disproportionate given the gravity of the offence and the direct connection between the quantity of illegal substance possessed and the size of the fine.

The court did, however, reduce the fine to $132,000 to correct a calculation error by the trial judge.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime following a jury trial.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge provided inadequate instructions to the triers during the challenge for cause process and erred in dismissing his Corbett application to exclude a prior narcotics conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the triers on the nature of their task and the procedure to follow.

The Court also held the trial judge erred in dismissing the Corbett application, as the prior conviction was highly prejudicial and not a crime of dishonesty.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and touching for a sexual purpose against the nine-year-old son of his former girlfriend.

The appellant argued that the trial judge applied an unfairly rigorous standard of scrutiny to his evidence compared to the Crown witnesses.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the record and found ample reason to disbelieve the appellant, noting multiple inconsistencies, exaggerations, and fabrications in his testimony.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The parties were not married or living together when their child was born.

The mother registered the child's birth using her surname and did not acknowledge the father on the Statement of Live Birth, pursuant to s. 10(3)4 of the Vital Statistics Act.

The father applied for an order requiring the mother to execute a joint election form to change the child's name to a hyphenated surname.

The application was dismissed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the Act allows a mother to know the identity of the father but choose not to acknowledge him for the purpose of birth registration, thereby giving the child her surname.

The appellant, acting as receiver and manager for a general partner, appealed a judgment determining that the assets of a dissolved limited partnership must be distributed according to the priority scheme in s. 24 of the Limited Partnerships Act.

The appellant argued that the partnership agreement ousted the statutory priority and that assets should be distributed based on percentage interests.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that unequivocal language is required to oust the legislative priority provisions.

Because the partnership agreement did not explicitly address priority, the statutory scheme applied.

The appellants, various book publishers, appealed a decision determining that they did not have priority over the Bank of Nova Scotia regarding accounts receivable collected by the distributor, General Distribution Services Inc. (GDS).

The publishers argued that because they retained title to the books, they had priority.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the arrangement between the publishers and GDS did not require the segregation of funds, allowing GDS to mingle the proceeds with its own money.

Consequently, the relationship was one of debtor and creditor, not trustee and beneficiary, and the publishers did not hold a priority interest.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on charges of dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm.

The respondent, a young offender, drove through a stop sign at an allegedly excessive speed and collided with another vehicle, killing three people.

The trial judge found the stop sign was difficult to see and could not determine the exact speed, concluding the driving was a departure but not a marked departure from the standard of care.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the facts were disputed and the trial judge's conclusion did not amount to an error of law.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and possession of a restricted handgun, receiving a six-year sentence.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to exclude evidence obtained through a breach of his s. 8 Charter rights when police unlawfully knocked on his motel room door.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in his Charter analysis, the curative proviso applied because the trial judge explicitly accepted the appellant's wife's testimony as sufficient, standing alone, to justify the convictions.

The appeal against conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action arising from a perforated bowel suffered during a colonoscopy and polypectomy.

They argued the trial judge erred by failing to determine the exact cause of the injury before concluding the standard of care was met.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly rejected the appellants' theory that the electrocautery machine was set too high, and reasonably concluded the injury resulted from an inherent risk of the procedure.