Andrew J. Raven

The federal government approved a Work Force Adjustment Policy, incorporated into the master collective agreement with the respondent union.

The Policy required departments to review and terminate contracted services to facilitate redeployment of surplus employees.

To reduce person-years, the Department of National Revenue contracted out the work of 270 data processors.

The union filed a reference under s. 99 of the Public Service Staff Relations Act, alleging the contracting out violated the Policy.

The Public Service Staff Relations Board found it had jurisdiction and ruled in the union's favour.

The Federal Court of Appeal upheld the decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board correctly assumed jurisdiction under s. 99 because the obligation was owed to the bargaining unit as a whole, and its interpretation of the Policy was not patently unreasonable.

The appellant Institute was the bargaining agent for nurses employed by the federal government in the Northwest Territories.

When the nurses became employees of the territorial government, they became eligible for membership in the respondent Association, which had a statutory monopoly to bargain collectively.

The Institute sought incorporation under the Public Service Act to represent its former members, but the territorial government declined to enact the required legislation.

The Institute applied for a declaration that the incorporation requirement violated freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory monopoly and the requirement of incorporation did not infringe s. 2(d), as the activity of collective bargaining is not constitutionally protected.

The appellant, a federal public servant, was discharged after engaging in a sustained and highly visible public campaign criticizing major government policies, including metric conversion and the Charter of Rights.

He grieved his discharge, but an adjudicator upheld it, finding his conduct impaired his ability to perform his duties and violated his duty of loyalty.

The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed his application for judicial review.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while public servants have some freedom of speech, it is not absolute and must be balanced against the need for an impartial and effective public service.

The Court found the adjudicator did not err in inferring impairment of effectiveness from the extreme nature of the appellant's public criticisms.

The appellant, a correctional officer, was denied eligibility for promotion because a Parliamentary Subcommittee report named him as the instigator of a prison riot, resulting in notoriety.

The Selection Board excluded him based on a restriction imposed by the Commissioner of Penitentiaries.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that 'merit' under s. 10 of the Public Service Employment Act refers only to intrinsic characteristics, and the Selection Board should not have considered the unproven allegations.

The Court ruled that the Appeal Board, under s. 21, had a statutory duty to inquire into the truth of the Subcommittee's findings.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Appeal Board.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal that dismissed an application to review and set aside a decision of the Public Service Appeal Board.

The Board had allowed an appeal against the proposed appointment of the appellant to a position in the Public Service without affording him the opportunity to be heard.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, set aside the decisions below, and referred the matter back to the Board for a new hearing, directing that the appellant be given notice and an opportunity to be heard.