Eric T. Sigurdson

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of decisions by a FSCO arbitrator and Director's delegate finding that the respondent insured suffered a catastrophic impairment under s. 2(1.1)(e)(i) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The insurer argued the arbitrator unreasonably interpreted 'reasonable period of time' for a Glasgow Coma Scale score.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the standard of review is patent unreasonableness and the tribunal's decisions were supported by evidence and within its specialized jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict finding her 90 per cent liable for a motor vehicle accident.

The jury concluded that the appellant was not paying attention and collided with the rear of the respondent's vehicle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that there was an evidentiary basis for the jury's findings and the verdict was not so plainly unreasonable and unjust that no reasonable jury could have reached it.

Liberty Mutual appealed an arbitration order requiring it to pay a special award under s. 282(10) of the Insurance Act for unreasonably withholding or delaying the payment of statutory accident benefits.

The Arbitrator had ordered a special award expressed as a percentage of the benefits owing.

On appeal, the Director of Arbitrations held that the percentage approach was inappropriate and that special awards must be expressed as a specific lump sum amount.

The Director also found the order was too vague to be enforceable.

Liberty Mutual's argument that the use of full-time government employees as arbitrators raised a reasonable apprehension of institutional bias was dismissed.

The appeal was allowed in part, the special award paragraph was rescinded, and the Director remained seized to determine the appropriate lump sum amount.

The appellant was rendered a paraplegic after being shot by an unknown assailant while driving his wife's car.

He applied for statutory accident benefits, which his insurer denied on the basis that the incident was not an 'accident' under section 2(1) of the 1996 Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's decision, finding that the gunshots, not the use or operation of the automobile, were the direct cause of the appellant's injuries.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Ministry of Finance, acting as an intervenor, brought a motion to introduce new evidence in the form of an affidavit from a former Director of Arbitrations.

The underlying appeal involved a challenge by the insurer to the dispute resolution system based on alleged institutional bias.

The insurer and another intervenor objected to portions of the affidavit referring to historical reports and special award statistics.

The Director of Arbitrations allowed the motion, finding the historical context relevant to the institutional bias issue and noting that the insurer had the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant.

The affidavit was admitted in its entirety.

An individual applied for intervenor status in an appeal concerning statutory accident benefits and allegations of institutional bias.

The Director of Arbitrations denied the application, finding that the applicant did not represent the interests of any recognized group and his participation would likely complicate the proceedings by raising substantially different issues and arguments.

The existing parties and intervenors were deemed sufficient to address the issues.

The insurer appealed an arbitration order that included a special award for unreasonably withholding benefits.

On appeal, the insurer brought a motion to admit new and extrinsic evidence.

The insurer sought to introduce evidence of institutional bias within the dispute resolution system, arguing that the use of full-time arbitrators created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Director of Arbitrations allowed this evidence to be admitted as extrinsic evidence, finding that the insurer had not waived its right to raise the issue.

However, the Director refused to admit new evidence regarding the insurer's belief about the insured's knowledge of available benefits, as this evidence could have been adduced at the original hearing.