Michael J. Gillen

The appellant was convicted of fatally injuring his roommate's dog and sentenced to nine months' custody.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by shifting the burden of proof regarding his level of intoxication, effectively requiring him to prove he was too intoxicated to form the requisite specific intent.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered the intoxication evidence and did not reverse the burden of proof.

Furthermore, the court held that injuring an animal under section 445(1)(a) of the Criminal Code is a general intent offence, meaning intoxication short of automatism is not a valid defence.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of decisions by a FSCO arbitrator and Director's delegate finding that the respondent insured suffered a catastrophic impairment under s. 2(1.1)(e)(i) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The insurer argued the arbitrator unreasonably interpreted 'reasonable period of time' for a Glasgow Coma Scale score.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the standard of review is patent unreasonableness and the tribunal's decisions were supported by evidence and within its specialized jurisdiction.