John I. Laskin

The parties divorced in 1990 and the appellant was ordered to pay spousal support.

The appellant later purchased two joint-survivor annuity contracts designating the respondent as the beneficiary, moved to Mexico, and stopped paying support.

The respondent applied to enforce the support order against the annuity payments.

The appellant argued that sections 196(1) and 196(2) of the Insurance Act barred the claims.

The Court of Appeal held that section 196(1) exempts all annuity payments from creditors' claims where a beneficiary is designated, allowing the appeal in part.

However, the Court upheld the finding that a former spouse is not a 'spouse' under section 196(2), meaning that section did not protect the appellant's interest in the contracts.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on charges of failing to comply with a probation order and breaching a prohibition order relating to children.

The accused, who was subject to an order prohibiting him from attending public swimming areas where children might be present, went swimming in his condominium complex's pool.

The trial judge acquitted him, finding the pool was not a 'public swimming area'.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the pool, which was accessible to 8,000 residents and outside members, fell within the definition of a public place.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge misapprehended an important piece of evidence given by the appellant, which may have affected her assessment of his credibility, entitling the appellant to a new trial.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable based on self-defence, but the Court of Appeal held it was open to a trier of fact to accept the complainant's evidence regarding the sequence of events.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered, with a recommendation that the Crown consider the frailties in the complainant's evidence and that the appellant had already served his sentence.

The tenant held a commercial lease containing an option to purchase the shopping centre.

The tenant subsequently subleased the premises for the entirety of the term.

The landlord sought a declaration that the option to purchase was no longer exercisable by the tenant, arguing the sublease constituted an assignment in law that carried the option with it.

The application judge granted the declaration.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that while a sublease for the entire term may be an assignment in law, an option to purchase is severable and does not automatically pass with the assignment if the parties intended otherwise.

The court found the parties clearly intended to preserve the option with the tenant.

The successful respondents sought to have the costs of the motion and the appeal fixed by the Court of Appeal.

The Court held that the costs of the motion were a matter for the motions judge.

The Court fixed the costs of the appeal payable to the respondents on a partial-indemnity basis at $7,500 plus assessable disbursements and G.S.T.

The applicant, convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, brought a motion in advance of his appeal seeking an order for the Crown to disclose certain information.

He argued the trial judge erred in failing to order this disclosure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the applicant failed to meet the first part of the Dixon test, as his request was rooted in speculation and improbability.

The Court also noted procedural concerns with bringing such a motion before a different panel than the one hearing the appeal, suggesting that non-disclosure issues should generally be dealt with by the panel hearing the appeal.

The appellant, Meditrust Healthcare Inc., operated a national mail-order pharmacy business through subsidiaries to comply with provincial regulations.

Meditrust sued the respondents for various economic torts, alleging a conspiracy to destroy its business.

The motions judge granted partial summary judgment dismissing most claims, holding that under the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, Meditrust could not sue for damages that were derivative of those suffered by its subsidiaries.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's decision on all grounds except for Meditrust's claim for loss of goodwill, finding that damage to reputation could constitute a direct, personal loss to the shareholder.

The appellant bank financed the respondents' shopping centres with security instruments including a debenture and an assignment of leases and rents.

After the loan defaulted, but before the bank enforced its security, the respondents diverted $394,100 in rental receipts to a new corporate account.

The application judge held the respondents were free to use the rents until the bank enforced its security.

The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that under the assignment of rents, the borrower's freedom from accountability ended upon default.

The court ordered judgment in favour of the bank for the diverted funds.

The appellants, having successfully appealed a trial decision regarding the enforcement of a Florida judgment, moved for the payment out of court of moneys they had posted as security for costs.

The respondents, who had been granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, moved for a stay of execution of the Court of Appeal's judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants' motion, finding it just to maintain the status quo and keep the security in court pending the Supreme Court appeal due to the appellants' non-resident status and potential hardship.

The Court granted the respondents' motion for a stay of execution, accepting an irrevocable $1 million guarantee from the Lawyers Professional Indemnity Company as satisfactory security.

The appellant was convicted of arson and mischief causing danger to life.

The trial judge delivered brief reasons for judgment, stating that he found the Crown witnesses truthful and rejected the appellant's evidence, but provided no insight into why he reached these conclusions beyond a blanket adverse credibility finding.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge's reasons were conclusory and generic, failing to facilitate meaningful appellate review and constituting an error of law.

The appellant appealed a motions judge's decision refusing to grant an adjournment, appoint an inspector, or invoke compliance and oppression remedies under the Condominium Act, 1998.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's exercise of discretion, noting that while the direct election of the president and prohibition of proxies were non-compliant, they were approved by the Board to address long-standing complaints.

The court also confirmed that an increase in common expenses in the annual budget does not require a by-law or compliance with s. 97(4) of the Act.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay 12 years of child support arrears under a separation agreement.

He argued the trial judge erred in enforcing the agreement, calculating his rental income, and failing to apply the Child Support Guidelines.

The Court of Appeal upheld the arrears, finding the separation agreement remained enforceable and the claim was not barred by the Limitations Act.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, reducing the attribution of gross rental income from 70 percent to 40 percent, and ordering that post-secondary education expenses be allocated in accordance with s. 7 of the Guidelines.

The appellant was retained by the respondents to negotiate scientific research tax credits on a commission basis.

The respondents breached the contract by terminating the appellant without notice.

The trial judge awarded $45,000 in damages based on the lost chance of success, which the appellant appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on damages, finding the trial judge's quantification reasonable.

However, the Court granted the respondents' cross-appeal on costs, holding that the trial judge erred by leaving the determination of a Rule 49 offer to the assessment officer, and awarded costs to the respondents from the date of the offer.

The appellant father appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay child support based on an imputed annual income of $30,000.

The father had quit his job as a tool and die maker and enrolled as a full-time university student.

The Court of Appeal held that 'intentionally' under section 19(1)(a) of the Child Support Guidelines does not require bad faith or a specific intent to evade support obligations.

The court upheld the finding that the father was intentionally under-employed but reduced the imputed income to $16,500, reflecting his capacity to work part-time while studying.

The court also varied the retroactive support period to account for times the father provided childcare and was on academic probation.

The appellant appealed an order finding him in contempt for failing to comply with interim child support, spousal support, and financial disclosure orders in a divorce proceeding.

The motions judge had ordered a warrant of committal for seven days and struck his pleadings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while payment orders cannot be enforced by contempt proceedings under the Family Law Rules, the committal was properly based on the appellant's flagrant failure to comply with production orders.

The Court also found no error in the motions judge's exercise of discretion to strike the pleadings given the history of non-compliance.

The appellant, a bouncer, appealed his manslaughter conviction after punching an intoxicated patron in the head, causing a fatal fall.

He argued the trial judge erred in refusing to consider self-defence, finding causation, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the self-defence claim given the appellant was a trained, sober bouncer facing an intoxicated victim with his hands down.

The court also upheld the trial judge's findings on causation, noting medical evidence supported that the punch caused the fatal fall.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an endorsement on costs following two appeals.

The court agreed with the submissions of the interveners and ordered that the respondent municipality is entitled to total costs of $10,000.

Of this amount, $7,000 is to be paid by the individual appellant and $3,000 by the interveners.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and trafficking after shooting a police officer during a drug takedown.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and the jury instructions on cross-racial eyewitness identification were inadequate.

The Crown appealed the 8-year sentence, arguing it failed to reflect the principle of parity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence overwhelming and the jury charge adequate.

The Court allowed the Crown's sentence appeal, increasing the sentence to 10 years (6 years net of pre-trial custody) to better reflect the gravity of the offence.

The tenant leased a rental unit but later moved to a new home, allowing two friends to move into the unit without the landlord's consent.

The tenant also constructed a basement bedroom without a building permit to use during occasional overnight stays.

The landlord applied to evict the unauthorized occupants and terminate the tenancy.

The Court of Appeal held that the tenant had transferred occupancy to his friends and that the illegal construction of the bedroom was a serious illegal act justifying termination of the tenancy.

The plaintiff brought a proposed class action against the manufacturers and the independent tester (ULC) of an allegedly defective smoke alarm, seeking damages for pure economic loss.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff could not maintain an action against the manufacturers whose products he did not purchase.

However, the court allowed the negligence claim against the manufacturer of his specific smoke alarm to proceed, finding it was not plain and obvious that a claim for pure economic loss based on a defective safety device would fail.

The negligence claim against the independent tester was struck out as it owed no prima facie duty of care to the purchaser.