John I. Laskin

The Crown appealed a youth sentence but conceded the appeal was moot as it was no longer seeking a custodial disposition.

The Court of Appeal declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal, finding it was largely fact-driven and not an exceptional case.

The appeal was dismissed for mootness.

The applicant sought to reopen his sentence appeal after being declared a dangerous offender and receiving an indeterminate sentence.

He argued that based on a subsequent Supreme Court of Canada decision, the sentencing judge erred by not considering the long-term offender provisions.

The Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction to reopen the appeal because the merits were not previously decided.

The court found it was in the interests of justice to reopen the appeal due to the serious error of law and the possibility of a different result at a new sentencing hearing.

The appellant, a former teacher, appealed his convictions for sexual offences involving five former students.

He argued that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof, applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, and provided inadequate reasons for rejecting his testimony.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the burden of proof and properly relied on the totality of the evidence, including compelling similar fact evidence from the complainants.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty on the fifth day of trial to possession of cocaine and ecstasy for the purpose of trafficking.

He was sentenced to 41 months' imprisonment, plus 7 months' credit for restrictive pre-sentence bail.

The appellant appealed the sentence, arguing it was unduly harsh and overlooked his rehabilitation and positive antecedents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the large quantity of drugs involved, which included over 769 grams of cocaine and 2000 ecstasy pills.

The appellant appealed an order declaring him a vexatious litigant and requiring him to post security for costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge failed to address the threshold requirement under Rule 14(21) of the Family Law Rules that the appellant made 'numerous motions without merit'.

The court also set aside the security for costs order because it was unclear whether the motion judge relied on a stayed costs order, but left in effect the order requiring the appellant to pay all outstanding costs orders.

The appellant appealed his sentence of three years' imprisonment and a lifetime driving prohibition for driving-related offences.

He argued the trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to his guilty plea and failed to give 3:1 credit for pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal held that even if there were errors in principle, the three-year sentence was fit given the appellant's horrendous record for driving-related offences.

However, the Court varied the lifetime driving prohibition to a 10-year prohibition.

The sentence appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for choking and assault in a domestic violence context.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, failed to properly apply the W.(D.) principles regarding credibility, and provided deficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed credibility, did not treat the case as a mere credibility contest, and provided adequate reasons for the convictions.

The appellant appealed his 15-year sentence for robbery, aggravated assault, and firearms offences, arguing unjustifiable disparity with his co-accused's 11-year sentence and that his firearms sentences should have been concurrent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the disparity fully justified by the appellant's extensive criminal record, age, and parole status at the time of the offences.

The court also held that the sentencing judge was entitled to impose consecutive sentences for the firearms offences to reflect the invasion of different legally protected interests.

The appellant appealed her conviction for driving 'over 80'.

At trial, the defence failed to object to the admissibility of the Intoxilizer test results until closing submissions, arguing the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds because she referred to the screening device as an 'Alcotest' rather than an approved screening device.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in entertaining the late Charter challenge.

Furthermore, the Court clarified that absent credible evidence to the contrary, an officer's testimony that they used an approved screening device is sufficient to establish reasonable and probable grounds for a breath demand.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his drug-related conviction on the sole ground that the trial judge failed to warn the jury not to engage in propensity reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that since identity was the sole issue and all evidence was admissible on all counts, the requested warning would have confused the jury and would not have benefited the appellant.

The young person appealed a conviction entered by the youth court.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing identification evidence, applying the W.D. framework, and misapprehending evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment or application of the law.

The young person appealed the trial judge's decision to sentence him as an adult for second-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by directly deducting two and a half years of pre-trial custody rather than treating it as a discretionary consideration.

The appeal was allowed, the adult sentence was set aside, and the maximum youth sentence was imposed to better facilitate the young person's rehabilitation.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's assessment of damages for breach of contract regarding the improper backgrounding of cattle.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law, and reduced the respondents' damages based on a seven cents per pound sale price differential between 'green' and 'burnt' cattle.

The respondents' cross-appeal regarding the trial judge's 30% discount on the appellant's claim for unpaid invoices was dismissed.

The appellant insurer appealed a trial judgment granting the respondent relief from forfeiture after the insured breached statutory condition 4(1) of the Insurance Act by driving with a suspended licence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 129 of the Insurance Act applies only to matters concerning proof of loss, not coverage.

Furthermore, the court found that even if section 98 of the Courts of Justice Act applied, the insured's conduct in ignoring registered letters from the Ministry of Transportation demonstrated wilful blindness and was incompatible with relief from forfeiture.

The judgment was varied to reduce the payable amount.

The appellant and respondent entered into a ten-year contract for the supply of ethanol.

The contract contained price-protection provisions, including a requirement for the appellant to match the price of an alternate supplier if certain conditions were met.

When the respondent received a lower offer from an alternate supplier, the appellant refused to match it, arguing that the obligation was contingent on the development of an active market for ethanol in Ontario under another section of the contract.

The trial judge found that the price-match provision operated independently.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the plain wording of the contract and the factual matrix supported the conclusion that the provision was a stand-alone obligation.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision refusing proposed amendments to their claim.

The proposed amendments sought to add allegations of conspiracy and negligence, and to add a numbered company as a plaintiff.

The Court of Appeal found no reviewable error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellant solicitors appealed an order upholding an assessment officer's decision regarding their accounts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower court judge that the assessment officer did not err in principle, despite the unusual result of the assessment.

Costs of $300 were awarded to the respondent client.

The appellant roofing company appealed a declaration that its insurer had no duty to defend an action brought by a motorcyclist who was injured when a ladder flew off the appellant's truck.

The insurer denied coverage based on an automobile exclusion in a rider to the commercial general liability policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the insurer was entitled to rely on the rider, which excluded coverage for bodily injury with respect to which a motor vehicle liability policy is required by law to be in effect.

The court held that loading and storing the ladder constituted the use or operation of an automobile, and the underlying claim did not allege concurrent non-automobile-related negligence.

The applicants (accused) brought a motion for directions seeking a disclosure order regarding an in-chambers pre-sentence meeting before the trial judge, relevant to the Crown's sentence appeal.

The Crown confirmed it possessed no written records of the meeting and conceded it could not contradict the applicants' version of the essential facts.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal found no purpose would be served by a disclosure order and directed the applicants to prepare a draft statement of agreed facts based on their version of events.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding adverse possession of a disputed strip of land between two properties.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the respondent regularly used the disputed strip at the front of the houses, defeating the claim for adverse possession there.

However, the Court found that the application judge failed to address the back of the house, where a fence excluded the respondent and established exclusive possession for the appellant.

The judgments were amended accordingly, with costs awarded to the respondent who was substantially successful.