John I. Laskin

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexually assaulting his young son, arguing his guilty pleas should be set aside because a major depressive disorder undermined their voluntariness.

The Court of Appeal held that the 'limited cognitive capacity' standard applies to determine whether a mental disorder affects the voluntariness of a guilty plea.

Applying this standard, the court preferred the Crown's expert evidence and found the appellant understood the process and made a conscious, volitional decision.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment with 13 years of parole ineligibility.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting the deceased's ante-mortem statements and evidence of his prior discreditable conduct, and in failing to properly instruct the jury on the use of this evidence.

He also appealed the period of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, and concluding that the sentence was fit given the history of domestic abuse.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing the issue of bolus drinking.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the summary conviction appeal judge on the issue and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that dismissed his appeal from conviction.

The appellant argued that the summary conviction appeal judge misstated the fourth branch of the Palmer test for admitting fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that even if the judge misstated the test by using 'would' instead of 'could', the fresh evidence was ultimately inadmissible.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence imposed on the respondent by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the sentence, noting the trial judge gave exemplary reasons.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the lower court judge and dismissed the appeal.

Costs were awarded to the respondents in the fixed amount of $5,000.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that overturned the accused's conviction for failing to provide a suitable breath sample.

The appeal court judge had found that the trial judge failed to appreciate evidence regarding lack of motive and consciousness of innocence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the appeal court judge misapplied the legal test for appellate review and effectively retried the case.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge gave thorough reasons for finding the requisite mens rea and was not required to refer to every piece of evidence, particularly where the evidence in question had marginal relevance to the issue of intent.

The appellant, Bell Globemedia Publishing Inc., was successful on appeal and sought partial indemnity costs for both the initial motion and the appeal from the respondents, Conrad M. Black and Barbara Amiel-Black.

The respondents argued that intervenors generally do not receive costs and that the amounts claimed were excessive.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellant $18,000 in partial indemnity costs for the appeal, finding the claimed amount excessive given the appellant's familiarity with the issues.

The court declined to award costs for the initial motion, as the motion judge made no costs order and the appellant had not sought such costs in its notice of appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault involving a teenage boy whom he lured to his hotel room and drugged before assaulting.

The appellant argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, made inappropriate comments to the complainant, and improperly restricted cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework and that the trial judge's compassionate comments did not demonstrate bias.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed given the serious aggravating factors of luring and drugging a young victim.

The Canada Revenue Agency investigated the appellants for tax fraud involving approximately 5,000 tax returns and $15 million.

The CRA sought a further extension to retain seized materials under s. 490(2) of the Criminal Code, which a Justice of the Peace denied, citing the pace of the investigation.

The Superior Court quashed the denial on certiorari, finding the Justice of the Peace failed to apply the correct test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the focus under s. 490(2) must be on the needs of the ongoing investigation rather than usurping investigatorial discretion.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that excluded expert evidence from a practitioner of traditional Chinese medicine.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the evidence had been admitted on consent at trial and the expert was properly qualified.

The conviction was restored.

Following an appeal that increased the appellant's damages award from $236,494.91 to $251,449.46, the award exceeded the respondents' $250,000 offer to settle.

The Court of Appeal held that the ordinary rule for costs should apply.

The court awarded costs to the appellant on a partial indemnity basis, referred those costs for assessment, and awarded $900 for costs submissions at trial.

The appellant sued her former father-in-law's estate for unjust enrichment, seeking compensation for services she provided to her in-laws during her marriage.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding her contributions were not substantial enough and there was no shared expectation of compensation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, noting that the appellant's services were no more than what might reasonably be expected from a loving daughter-in-law, and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding the conversion of its customer relationships and equipment by the respondents.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in determining the extent of the respondents' entitlement to compete based on a rescinded franchise agreement, and in finding that the appellant failed to mitigate its damages.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the trial judgment, and awarded the appellant $40,000 in damages for the conversion of its business relationships, plus costs.

The accused appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that had overturned her acquittal.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, set aside the summary conviction appeal court judge's order, and restored the acquittal.

The trial judge had found that the arresting officer breached the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights and implicitly found the officer stopped the accused selectively for an improper purpose.

The Court of Appeal held that the cumulative effect of these Charter breaches warranted the exclusion of the breath results.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claim to an interest in a company.

The appellant, an undischarged bankrupt, argued that his interest should be returned to him under s. 40(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act as property incapable of realization, and that the trustee had told him not to disclose the interest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trustee had not determined the property was incapable of realization, and the appellant's bare assertions about the trustee's advice lacked sufficient detail to raise a genuine issue for trial.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $9,000.

The appellant, an Aboriginal offender and residential school survivor, appealed his sentence for sexually abusing his step-daughter.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to consider the appellant's Aboriginal background and upbringing under s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code.

Balancing the severe aggravating factors of the offence against the appellant's tragic upbringing and physical ailments, the Court granted leave to appeal and reduced the sentence to four years.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with 20 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification evidence and the availability of a manslaughter verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's comments on the evidence were acceptable and did not usurp the jury's function, and that there was no air of reality to manslaughter.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 20-year parole ineligibility period was justified by the extraordinary violence of the murder and the appellant's high moral culpability.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with 12 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued the trial judge erred in leaving section 21(2) of the Criminal Code with the jury, in instructing on the doctrine of recent possession, and in defining abetting to include purposeful presence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding sufficient evidence of a predicate offence (robbery) and no reversible errors in the jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 12-year parole ineligibility period was within the appropriate range given the brutal nature of the murder.

The appellant appealed a jury trial judgment where the jury awarded zero for general damages.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge's instructions on causation did not prejudice the appellant, the jury's answers to specific questions were inconsistent, rendering the zero damages award perverse.

Exercising its power under section 119 of the Courts of Justice Act, the Court fixed general damages at $35,000, less a $15,000 deductible, and awarded the appellant $25,000 in appeal costs.