John I. Laskin

The appellants achieved modest success on their appeal, successfully striking down a ban on signs under s. 2(b) of the Charter and certain prohibitions in a municipal by-law.

However, the respondent municipality was substantially successful overall.

The Court of Appeal awarded the respondent reduced costs of the appeal fixed at $25,000.

The court declined to interfere with the lower court's costs award of $350,000 for the injunction motion and by-law application, finding it fair and reasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting the complainant's spontaneous complaint and in assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the complaint was properly admitted as part of the narrative to provide context for assessing credibility, and that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence or unfairly scrutinize the defence evidence.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court (SCAC) decision that overturned the accused's 'over 80' conviction and ordered a new trial.

The SCAC judge had ruled the trial judge's reasons inadequate because the trial judge failed to determine which of two police officers made the breath demand, as both officers testified the other had done so.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the SCAC judge erred by adding an unnecessary element of proof.

The trial judge's finding that a valid demand was made was sufficient under the Criminal Code, and the accused's compliance with the demand provided a complete answer absent a Charter challenge.

The appellant appealed a judgment dismissing his application for certiorari to set aside a committal order following a preliminary inquiry.

The appellant argued there was insufficient evidence of identification and the type of plant.

The Court of Appeal held that the preliminary inquiry judge did not commit a jurisdictional error, as there was some evidence connecting the appellant to the property and the 9,000 marijuana plants, including his admitted ownership and the testimony of a police officer.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order striking his pleadings for failure to comply with previous financial disclosure orders in a high-conflict matrimonial dispute.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reinstated the pleadings, finding that striking pleadings is a remedy of last resort and was not warranted given the substantial disclosure already made, the lack of itemized missing disclosure, the absence of wilful disobedience, and the principle of proportionality.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing her action for delay under Rule 24.

The action, commenced in 2002, was dismissed in 2013 for failure to restore it to the trial list.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the appellant failed to adequately explain the lengthy delay or rebut the presumption of prejudice.

The appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal costs was refused.

The appellants appealed an order granting summary judgment dismissing their action against a lawyer who received their cheque in trust for his client.

They argued the lawyer knew or ought to have known they relied on him to ensure the funds were disbursed in a particular manner.

The court held there was no basis to interfere with the motion judge’s factual findings that no such reliance was known or reasonably knowable to the lawyer, and that there was no evidence the monies were paid out for any unauthorized purpose.

The appeal was dismissed with fixed costs to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding damages for destroying trees and altering a watercourse on the respondents' adjacent property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed arguments regarding the sufficiency of the trial judge's reasons and the effect of a release signed by the respondents.

However, the Court agreed that the trial judge erred in calculating the damages.

The appeal was allowed in part to reduce the total damages awarded to $59,930 plus applicable taxes.

The proposed intervenor appealed the dismissal of her motion for leave to intervene in an Ontario action seeking recognition of a United States judgment against a foreign state and its security ministry under the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act.

The Court of Appeal held that she met the intervention criteria under rule 13.01(1) because she had a contingent interest in the proceeding and might be adversely affected if the foreign judgment were recognized and enforced against limited Canadian assets.

The court further held that the motion judge erred by treating the matter as a private commercial dispute and by failing to recognize the public importance of the new statutory regime.

The proposed intervenor had a useful contribution to make, particularly on a limitations argument not raised by other parties.

The appeal was allowed and leave to intervene was effectively granted through directions permitting the filing of a factum.

The appellant sought appellate relief after a lower court refused to grant a declaration that the Crown has a general post-trial and post-appeal duty to preserve evidence for the lifetime of an offender convicted of a life-imprisonment indictable offence.

The application below had been grounded in the loss of autopsy photographs said to be potentially relevant to a miscarriage of justice review under s. 696.1 of the Criminal Code, but the appellant accepted on appeal that no Charter breach had been established from their loss.

The Court of Appeal held there was no basis to entertain the appeal because the appellant advanced a new declaratory theory not supported by the record and not adjudicated below.

The appeal was dismissed, with no costs.

The appellant was convicted of armed robbery and related offences and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by permitting the Crown to cross-examine its own witnesses on prior inconsistent statements, failing to give a W. (D.) instruction, and holding a mid-trial chambers discussion in his absence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the cross-examination permissible, the jury instruction adequate, and applying the curative proviso to the accused's absence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was fit.

The appellants abandoned their appeal.

The Court of Appeal ordered costs to the respondent in the agreed upon amount of $6,000 all inclusive.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding an agreement reached by the parties, reflected in a special case, concerning the review of a decision by the majority executors of an estate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, declining to interfere with the agreement.

The court noted that the agreement entitled the appellant to a review of the majority executors' decision, meaning the court's jurisdiction was not ousted, and left the determination of the appropriate standard of review to the judge hearing the review application.

The appellant sought to appeal an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal determined that the order in question was interlocutory.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction, with no order as to costs.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault, forcible confinement, and breaking and entering, relying on fresh evidence and asserting ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal found that while fresh expert evidence showed the blood pattern on the screen door was not caused by a baseball bat, the presence of the appellant's blood and fingerprints inside the house and on the door provided ample evidence of his participation.

The court also rejected the ineffective assistance claim regarding a height disparity, noting it was a deliberate tactical decision by trial counsel.

The application to adduce fresh evidence and the appeal were dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference arising from allegations by a child complainant.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by treating the appellant's failure to give an immediate unequivocal denial to a vague police allegation as a basis to reject his testimony, and by applying different standards of scrutiny to the complainant's evidence and the defence evidence.

While the court rejected the argument that the verdict was unreasonable, it found the credibility analysis legally flawed and capable of producing a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed an order striking out claims for breach of contract based on representations in an information folder regarding the Can-Am Fund.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that it was plain and obvious no cause of action existed for breach of contract, given the governing statutory scheme and warnings in the materials.

The application for leave to appeal the costs order was also dismissed.

The respondent was charged with driving while holding a hand-held wireless communication device after a police officer observed her holding a cellphone while stopped at a red light.

The respondent claimed she had only momentarily picked it up after it fell to the floor.

The trial court convicted her, but the appeal judge allowed her appeal, finding that 'holding' required sustained physical contact.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the ordinary meaning of 'holding' and the road safety objectives of the Highway Traffic Act dictate a complete prohibition on having a cellphone in one's hand while driving, regardless of the duration.

The respondent was convicted of driving while holding a hand-held wireless communication device contrary to s. 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appeal judge allowed the appeal, holding that the Crown must prove the cellphone was capable of receiving or transmitting.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the requirement for a device to be capable of receiving or transmitting applies only to prescribed devices, not to cellphones.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault after engaging in sexual activity with the complainant, who mistakenly believed he was her boyfriend.

The trial judge rejected the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, finding the appellant failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended material evidence regarding the appellant's knowledge of the complainant's intoxication, the visibility in the tent, the timeline of events, and physical differences between the appellant and the boyfriend.

These errors undermined the trial judge's credibility assessment and reasonable steps analysis, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.