John I. Laskin

The respondent sought to enforce a settlement agreement against the appellants, Glen Grove and Spendthrift, who were not signatories to the agreement but were related to the signatory corporation, 129.

The trial judge found the appellants liable based on a 'privity principle' and common control.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld Glen Grove's liability, finding that 129 acted as its agent in negotiating the settlement and offering security.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding Spendthrift, finding insufficient evidence to bind it to the settlement.

The appellants, former lawyers at a firm where the principal misappropriated trust funds, appealed a motion judge's refusal to set aside or vary a garnishment order against the firm's professional liability insurer.

The respondents, who were owed $3.6 million, sought to exhaust the $1 million policy limits.

The appellants argued they needed the policy for defence costs against threatened claims by the respondents.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, varying the order to require the respondents to release any claims against the appellants relating to the trust funds as a condition of receiving the garnished insurance proceeds, noting the respondents could not articulate any substantive claim against the appellants.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action against the respondents for damages related to his HIV infection, which he alleged was linked to a sponsorship undertaking given to the federal government.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court declined to entertain new arguments regarding exceptions to the limitation period raised for the first time on appeal.

Furthermore, the Court found no evidence establishing a causal link between the government's actions and the appellant's infection.

The respondents, Canadian citizens living in the United States for more than five years, challenged the constitutionality of provisions in the Canada Elections Act that prohibited them from voting in federal elections.

The application judge found the provisions violated section 3 of the Charter and were not saved under section 1.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the provisions infringed section 3, they were demonstrably justified under section 1.

The majority found the pressing and substantial objective was to preserve the social contract between citizens' obligation to obey the law and their right to elect lawmakers, and that the five-year limit was a minimally impairing and proportionate means of achieving this objective.

The appellant condominium corporation terminated its management agreement with the respondent for cause.

The respondent sued in Small Claims Court for breach of contract, but the trial judge dismissed the claim, finding the respondent's conduct cumulatively amounted to gross negligence or recklessness.

The Divisional Court set aside the trial judgment, holding the reasons were insufficient for appellate review.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reinstated the trial judgment, finding the Divisional Court erred by failing to read the reasons in the context of the trial record and the informal nature of the Small Claims Court.

The appellant, a 21-year-old first-time offender, was convicted of two counts of criminal negligence causing death and one count of criminal negligence causing bodily harm following a motor vehicle accident.

He appealed his convictions and his four-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or her conclusion that the appellant's driving constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonable person.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge overemphasized general deterrence for a youthful first offender, and reduced the sentence to two years less a day.

The appellant mother appealed an order reducing child and spousal support and dismissing her constructive trust claim.

The motion judge had refused the mother's request for an adjournment to complete previously ordered questioning, concluding the issues could be bifurcated and decided without it.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge denied the mother a fair hearing by jumping to the erroneous conclusion that questioning was unnecessary and by failing to allow full submissions on the issue.

A new hearing was ordered.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order enforcing the respondent's termination of a Fixed Price Services Agreement and its right to purchase shares in a solar power project due to the appellant's payment default.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence and raised new arguments on appeal regarding the respondent's alleged defaults and the mechanics of the share transfer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for fresh evidence, finding the Palmer criteria were not met.

The Court also dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding the appellant breached the agreement and that the respondent was entitled to purchase the shares.

A request to stay the judgment pending a counterclaim was also denied.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application to quash a municipal resolution and for an injunction restraining the municipality from erecting a barrier restricting access to the rear of their property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that the doctrine of issue estoppel applied because the appellants had previously sought and been denied an injunction to remove the barrier in 2009.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, a high school teacher, was convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault against a 14-year-old student.

He appealed his convictions, arguing primarily that the trial judge erred by permitting the Crown to call a vice-principal as a reply witness to rebut the appellant's testimony regarding a conversation between them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the reply evidence did not breach the rule against case-splitting because the Crown could not have reasonably anticipated the appellant's testimony.

The court also dismissed arguments regarding inadmissible hearsay and inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and the trial judge's reasons were insufficient because she acquitted on two other incidents based on unreliability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly explained why the evidence for the third incident was reliable despite concerns about the first two.

The Crown appealed the refusal of a trial judge to make a DNA data bank order pursuant to s. 487.05(1) of the Criminal Code against a young person.

On consent, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and issued the order sought by the Crown.

The appellant appealed a conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting and using similar fact evidence by relying too heavily on generic similarities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly relied on specific similarities and correctly applied the law regarding the admissibility and use of discreditable conduct evidence.

The trial judge's discretionary determination was entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his conviction for theft.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's receipt being found in the complainant's stolen purse and the complainant's wallet being found near the appellant's residence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the only rational inference was the appellant's guilt.

The respondent pleaded guilty to breaking and entering a dwelling-house and committing sexual assault under s. 348(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The sentencing judge initially imposed a SOIRA order but later rescinded it, concluding that s. 348(1)(b) was not a designated offence.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that while s. 348(1)(b) is not listed as a designated offence, the respondent was sentenced under s. 348(1)(d), which is a designated offence.

Therefore, the SOIRA order was mandatory.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and indecent assault against the complainant, which occurred between 1979 and 1985, as well as his ten-month custodial sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of an uncharged incident, failing to give limiting instructions on prior consistent statements, and failing to instruct the jury on an alleged admission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the ten-month custodial sentence was fit and properly reflected the principles of denunciation and deterrence for historical sexual offences involving a breach of trust.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following the appeals in Westerhof v. Gee Estate and McCallum v. Baker.

The court ordered that the costs of the appeal in McCallum v. Baker be awarded to the respondent, fixed in the amount of $60,000 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The Crown appealed a global sentence of six years imposed on the respondent for three robberies of taxi drivers and an obstruct justice conviction.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in calculating pre-sentence custody, that the six-year sentence was demonstrably unfit, and that the obstruct justice sentence should have been consecutive.

The respondent conceded the pre-sentence custody error, and the Court of Appeal reduced the credit from 33 months to 11 months.

However, the Court dismissed the remainder of the appeal, finding the six-year sentence was fit given the respondent's youth and rehabilitative prospects, and that the concurrent sentence for obstruct justice was within the trial judge's discretion.

The respondent, having been successful on the appeal, sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant argued that no costs should be awarded because the appeal involved an issue of public importance, or alternatively, that costs should be reduced to reflect divided success on the issues.

The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments, finding the issue was not truly novel and declining to make a distributive costs award.

The respondent was awarded costs of $83,875.85.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon arising from an incident outside a bar.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing his police statements under the W.D. principles and in assessing witness testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the reasonable doubt standard, correctly rejected the appellant's inconsistent statements, and was entitled to accept the consistent evidence of the key witnesses identifying the appellant as the assailant.