John I. Laskin

The respondent pleaded guilty to encouraging animal fighting.

The sentencing judge rejected a joint submission and imposed a harsher sentence.

The respondent appealed the sentence to the summary conviction appeal court.

The SCAC judge, finding the sentencing judge erred in calling a witness, invited the respondent to amend the notice of appeal to appeal the conviction and ordered a new trial.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under s. 687(1) of the Criminal Code, a court hearing an appeal from sentence alone has no jurisdiction to order a new trial.

The conviction was restored and the matter remitted to the SCAC for review of the sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder, aggravated assault, and discharging a firearm with intent to wound, as well as his sentence of eight years and six months.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on identification evidence and in reviewing the theory of the defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury was properly instructed and the review of the defence theory was adequate.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the offence was a premeditated, unprovoked act of violence with a firearm causing life-threatening injuries, and the sentence was within the appropriate range.

The appellant appealed his conviction for manslaughter and the sentences imposed for manslaughter and possession of a restricted weapon.

He argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on common intention under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the jury charge, noting the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and the common intention to rob did not terminate before the appellant and his confederate left the scene.

The appeals against conviction and sentences were dismissed.

The youthful appellants pleaded guilty to numerous offences, including robbery and break-ins, committed over a six-month period spanning their eighteenth birthdays.

The sentencing judge rejected a joint submission for a reformatory sentence and instead imposed penitentiary sentences.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the joint submission was within an acceptable range and that it was contrary to the public interest to send these first-time adult offenders to the penitentiary.

The appeals were allowed and the joint submission was substituted.

The appellant pleaded guilty to defrauding OHIP of $155,675 and made full restitution prior to sentencing.

The trial judge imposed an eighteen-month conditional sentence, two years' probation, community service, and a $100,000 fine.

On appeal, the Crown conceded that attaching both a probation order and a fine to a sentence of imprisonment rendered the sentence illegal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal to the extent of deleting the fine, finding it unnecessary given the full restitution and the fact that the conditional sentence and probation order adequately addressed all sentencing principles.

The appellant pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing bodily harm after a collision that severely injured his passenger.

He appealed his sentence of nine months' imprisonment and a twenty-one month driving prohibition, arguing for a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the sentencing judge's conclusion that the appellant's longstanding alcohol abuse and lack of a supervised counselling plan made a conditional sentence inappropriate.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after returning from Jamaica with drugs hidden in her purse.

Her sole defence was that she was an 'unknowing mule'.

The trial judge instructed the jury that a reasonable doubt could not arise from an absence of evidence, and repeated this error when answering a jury question.

The Court of Appeal held that this misdirection was a reversible error, as the jury likely misapprehended the correct standard of proof regarding the lack of direct evidence of the appellant's knowledge.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown applied to revoke the respondent's bail pending his appeal of a fraud conviction, alleging he breached a condition prohibiting him from engaging in non-personal financial transactions.

The respondent argued the application was procedurally flawed because no arrest warrant was issued under s. 679(6) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that an arrest warrant is unnecessary when the appellant is already in custody.

Finding reasonable grounds to believe the respondent breached his bail conditions by soliciting investments for a business, the court revoked his bail.

The Crown's application for a certificate of default was dismissed as premature pending the trial on the breach of recognizance charges.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault.

At trial, the judge refused to edit the appellant's criminal record, which included a prior sexual assault conviction, but failed to properly instruct the jury in her final charge on the limited use of that record.

The trial judge also erred by admitting a hearsay statement made by the complainant to a friend for the truth of its contents, and by failing to adequately remedy an incorrect mid-trial ruling regarding the materiality of the date of the offence.

The Court of Appeal held that the cumulative effect of these errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The parties separated in 1992 and the limitation period for an equalization claim expired in December 1998.

The appellant retained counsel in September 1998, and negotiations regarding the respondent's pension continued past the limitation period.

When negotiations failed, the appellant commenced an action and sought an extension of time under s. 2(8) of the Family Law Act.

The motions judge dismissed the motion, finding bad faith and prejudice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motions judge erred by focusing only on the pre-1998 delay and by finding prejudice where the respondent had notice of the claim before the limitation period expired.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion seeking various forms of relief against the Crown, including an injunction to prevent entry onto disputed lands, damages for the destruction of a gate, an order to search Ministry records, and leave to amend his statement of claim to plead conspiracy and punitive damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's decision in its entirety, finding no errors in the refusal of the injunction, the determination that damages could not be granted on such a motion, the finding on disclosure, and the exercise of discretion to refuse the amendments.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant school bus operator appealed the dismissal of its motion for a declaration that its insurer had a duty to defend it in the main action.

The underlying action alleged the operator failed to ensure a student was safely on board, resulting in severe weather exposure and amputation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding a possible duty to indemnify under the policy, which triggered the duty to defend.

The court dismissed the request for separate representation, finding no sufficient conflict on the pleadings, but awarded the appellant solicitor-and-client costs until the insurer takes over the defence.

The plaintiff's husband died after receiving emergency medical care from provincial attendants.

The plaintiff sent a letter to the Ministry of Health expressing concerns about the care, which prompted an investigation.

The Province later moved to dismiss the plaintiff's subsequent wrongful death action, arguing the letter did not constitute formal notice of a claim under s. 7(1) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the letter provided sufficient particulars to identify the occasion and allow the Crown to investigate, thereby satisfying the statutory notice requirement.

The appellant appealed a conviction for importing heroin and argued that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence seized from a hotel room following a warrantless arrest that violated ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge committed no error of law in applying the s. 24(2) analysis and was entitled to conclude that, although the breaches were serious, their seriousness was somewhat blunted by the officer’s honest belief and the surrounding circumstances.

The court rejected arguments concerning search incident to arrest, the effect of discoverability, and the alleged failure to consider a pattern of Charter breaches.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The appellant challenged her conviction on the basis that the trial judge shifted the burden of proof, unfairly assessed credibility, and erred in finding a document was concocted without independent evidence.

The court held that the impugned passage had to be read in context, that the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework, and that the credibility analysis was reasonable.

It further held that the finding of concoction flowed directly from the rejection of the appellant’s evidence regarding the exhibit and was distinguishable from prior authorities requiring independent evidence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was manifestly reasonable and, if anything, lenient.

The appellant appealed a second degree murder conviction arising from a jury trial following a shooting death.

She argued that the jury charge was deficient on intent because it did not refer to her use of prescribed anti-depressants, that the reasonable doubt instruction was inadequate, and that Crown counsel’s cross-examination created trial unfairness.

The court held that the charge on intent was adequate, the pre-Lifchus reasonable doubt instruction did not create a reasonable likelihood of jury misunderstanding when the charge was read as a whole, and the complained-of Crown conduct did not deprive the appellant of a fair trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought to vary child support after early retirement and a resulting reduction in income.

The appeal concerned whether support should revert to the pre-retirement guideline amount or remain at the lower amount based on pension income.

With both parties effectively supporting continuation of the lower guideline figure, the court held it did not make sense to assume income above pension benefits after retirement.

The appeal was allowed and child support was fixed at $266 per month, with no order as to costs at any level.

This was an appeal, with leave, from a costs order arising out of summary judgment and related motions in ongoing litigation involving a counterclaim.

The court declined to interfere with the motions judge’s award of solicitor-and-client costs and with the allocation of costs, finding those determinations were within the judge’s discretion and supported by the record.

However, the court varied the order respecting the costs of the action by holding that two respondents whose litigation with the appellant remained ongoing should not receive those costs immediately, while another respondent was entitled to its costs of the action subject to careful assessment to avoid double-counting.

The court also held that costs payable to the appellant should be payable now on a party-and-party basis rather than in the cause.

The appellant appealed a criminal conviction and appeared in person.

The court adjourned disposition initially to obtain an expedited transcript of a witness's evidence, then reviewed the full transcripts.

The appeal turned on credibility findings made by the trial judge, who accepted the Crown witness's evidence and rejected the appellant's version of events.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the appeal and dismissed it.

In an insolvency appeal arising from a consumer proposal, the appellant bank challenged an order holding that an approved proposal compromised the unsecured portion of its secured claim and that a side agreement with the debtors was unenforceable.

The court held that, because the bank did not seek revision of the proposed assessment of its security, the approved proposal was binding on all unsecured claims under s.62(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court further held that equality among creditors is a basic insolvency principle and that a secret side agreement violating that equality amounts to a fraud on other creditors and is unenforceable.

The appeal was dismissed, Mr. Farmer was to be removed as an inspector, and the order was amended by consent to remove any reference to misconduct by the trustee.