John I. Laskin

The parties brought a joint motion to implement a settlement of an appeal.

They sought to amend the lower court's judgment, which had declared a mortgage fraudulent and void, so that the mortgage would only be void as between the appellant and respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed amendment could compromise the rights of other secured creditors, such as Legal Aid, who were not parties to the settlement.

The appellant appealed a custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by mechanically applying a two-stage process, which led to a failure to consider the appellant's extraordinary cooperation with police and significant rehabilitation.

The appeal was allowed, and the custodial sentence was varied to a 20-month conditional sentence, with the three-year probation term remaining.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder after a second trial, the first having resulted in a hung jury on that count but a finding of guilt on the included offence of aggravated assault.

The appellant appealed the conviction, arguing autrefois convict and errors in the jury charge.

The Crown appealed the trial judge's dismissal of a dangerous offender application and the sentence imposed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeals, holding that autrefois convict requires a final adjudication including a sentence.

The Court allowed the Crown's dangerous offender appeal, ordering a new hearing because the trial judge failed to properly assess the brutality threshold and the psychiatric evidence regarding the appellant's sexual sadism.

The Crown's sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an assessment of a party-and-party bill of costs for a motion for leave to appeal and a one-day appeal.

The Assessment Officer had assessed the successful respondent's counsel fee at $35,000.

The Court of Appeal found the assessed counsel fee to be unreasonably high, noting that the appeal involved a single question of law on uncontested facts that had already been argued in the Divisional Court.

The appeal was allowed and the counsel fee was reduced to $17,500.

The Director of the Family Responsibility Office appealed a motions judge's order lifting the suspension of a defaulting payor's driver's licence, issuing a refraining order, and directing the withdrawal of any federal licence denial application.

The Court of Appeal held that the motions judge lacked jurisdiction to make a refraining order outside the 30-day statutory period.

However, because the Director failed to prove service of the First Notice regarding the driver's licence suspension, the suspension could not stand.

The Court further held that the motions judge erred in ordering the withdrawal of the federal licence denial application, as the payor had been properly served with notice and failed to take the required statutory steps to prevent it.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The respondent was in default of a child support order and his driver's licence was suspended after the Director sent a First Notice to his address on record.

The respondent brought a motion to reinstate his licence, claiming he did not receive the notice.

The motions judge ordered the reinstatement of the licence for 90 days to allow the respondent to bring a motion to vary support.

The Director appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Director proved proper service of the First Notice in accordance with the legislation.

The motions judge had no jurisdiction to order reinstatement or to make a refraining order outside the statutory 30-day period.

The appellant, a bank employee in a position of trust, appealed a summary judgment dismissing her wrongful dismissal action.

The motions judge found the bank had just cause to dismiss her after she engaged in kiting or similar conduct, having been warned twice previously.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no trial was required as the appellant had no innocent explanation and admitted to the conduct.

The appellants challenged 1994 changes to the Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP) that restricted eligibility based on immigration status, imposed a three-month waiting period, and required individual rather than family-based eligibility assessments.

The appellants argued these changes violated their equality rights under section 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that the distinction between permanent and non-permanent residents is not an enumerated or analogous ground under section 15.

The Court further found that the three-month waiting period and the shift to individual eligibility did not constitute discrimination.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant bank appealed a decision ordering a court-appointed receiver to pay municipal realty taxes to the respondent municipality in priority to the bank's secured claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under section 382 of the Municipal Act, municipal realty taxes have priority over all other claims except the Crown.

The Court also held that a court-appointed receiver is a 'trustee' within the meaning of section 400(11) of the Act, giving the municipality priority over the proceeds of personal property realized by the receiver.

The mother appealed a trial judge's order transferring sole custody of her 6-year-old son to the father.

She brought a motion to stay the custody transfer pending her appeal.

The trial judge had ordered the transfer based on a social worker's caveat that the mother's inability to promote the child's relationship with the father might necessitate a change in custody.

The Court of Appeal granted the stay, finding that the mother had a strong arguable appeal, had been the child's primary caregiver his entire life, and that maintaining the status quo was in the child's best interests pending the appeal.

The appellant was catastrophically injured in a motor vehicle accident while a passenger in an uninsured vehicle.

He sought indemnity from the respondent insurer under a policy issued to a man with whom he lived in a de facto parent-child relationship.

The motions judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding the appellant was neither a 'person insured under the contract' under s. 265 of the Insurance Act nor a 'relative' under the OPCF 44 endorsement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the definition of 'insured' in s. 224(1) applies to s. 265, and that 'relative' in the endorsement should be interpreted liberally to include a de facto parent-child relationship, provided dependency is proven at trial.

The moving parties sought to stay discoveries pending their motion for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

They argued it would be unfair to allow the third party to conduct discoveries while a conflict of interest issue remained unresolved, and relied on a clause in a mediation agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that the balance of convenience favoured allowing discoveries to proceed.

The court noted the slim chances of leave being granted, the lack of prejudice to the moving parties, and that the mediation agreement did not justify an open-ended stay.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence for pointing a firearm at her two children during an incident that occurred 19 years prior.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on the testimony of the complainants, despite the appellant's denial and inconsistencies in the complainants' evidence.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed credibility and applied the burden of proof.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and a one-year conditional sentence was imposed.

The parties separated after a 17-year marriage during which they operated a tobacco farming business.

The husband appealed the trial judge's order requiring him to pay spousal support out of his capital while the wife retrained, and challenged several aspects of the post-separation accounting.

The Court of Appeal upheld the spousal support order, finding no error in principle in requiring both parties to encroach on capital to share the burden of the wife's retraining.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding the post-separation accounting, varying orders related to the sale of soya beans, tobacco quota rental proceeds, and NISA accounts.

The appellant unions appealed an order dismissing their motion to vary an earlier order that appointed an interim receiver for Royal Oak Mines Inc. The original order explicitly directed the interim receiver not to make contributions to any employee pension plan without court authority.

The unions argued this was illegal as it undermined the collective agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the interim receiver was not the employer and had no funds to pay the benefits, and that the court had jurisdiction under s. 47(2) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to make the order.

The court also rejected the unions' claim that the interim receiver was liable for termination pay under the Employment Standards Act.

The appellant slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk and broke her leg.

She faxed a handwritten notice of her claim to the municipality within the seven-day statutory period, but the notice did not specify the exact date or location of the fall.

The municipality successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the notice was defective under s. 284(5) of the Municipal Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a notice does not strictly need to state the time and place if it provides enough information for the municipality to investigate.

Whether the appellant's notice was sufficient raised a genuine issue for trial.

The appellant pleaded guilty to extortion, theft, and failure to comply.

The trial judge rejected a joint submission for a one-year sentence and two years' probation, instead imposing a three-year sentence, citing the 'atrocious' nature of the facts involving chat lines.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by summarily rejecting the joint submission without explaining how it was contrary to the public interest or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The sentence was varied to reflect the joint submission.

The appellant and respondent insurers disputed priority for statutory accident benefits following a fatal accident.

The deceased had exited his tractor trailer and was standing 30 feet away when he was struck by debris from another vehicle.

The arbitrator found the deceased was the 'driver' and thus an 'occupant' of the tractor trailer under the Insurance Act, making the respondent liable.

The appeal judge reversed this finding.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the statutory definition of 'driver' does not require the person to be engaged in the act of driving or inside the vehicle at the exact moment of the incident, provided they maintain a physical connection and control over the vehicle.

The appellant sign companies challenged a municipal by-law that imposed an annual fee on third-party billboards and capped the total number of such signs.

The appellants argued the fee was an ultra vires indirect tax and the cap violated their freedom of expression under the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the by-law, finding that the annual fee was a valid regulatory fee authorized by the Municipal Act, as it defrayed the costs of the municipality's sign section.

The Court also held that while the cap on billboards infringed freedom of expression, it was saved under section 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit to protect the city's urban plan and streetscape.

The appellant landlord sued the respondent, a competing landlord, for inducing breach of contract after a tenant abandoned the appellant's building and signed a new lease with the respondent.

The tenant had previously threatened to terminate its lease due to the appellant renting space to an abortion clinic.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissing the action, finding no genuine issue for trial because the evidence showed the tenant had already decided to terminate its lease before any contact with the respondent.