Kevin McElcheran

The receiver of the appellant appealed a motion judge's interpretation of an accounts receivable insurance policy with the respondent insurer.

The motion judge found that buyers' claims for set-off against amounts owing to the appellant constituted a 'dispute' under clause 7 of the policy, which deferred the insurer's liability to pay claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no ambiguity in the clause and confirming that a dispute is not restricted to claims arising out of the unpaid shipment of goods.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicants sought leave to appeal a discretionary order denying them leave to file a representative claim on behalf of uncertified classes in ongoing CCAA proceedings.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion, noting she properly considered the forum of future class certification, the absence of individual claims, and the prejudice of altering the claims process after the claims bar date.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision finding them bound by a December 17, 1999 agreement.

The appellants argued the agreement was based on a misrepresentation regarding the accounting approach used for a pay-out calculation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that differing views on accounting approaches did not constitute a misrepresentation, especially since the view of the appellant's Chief Financial Officer was known to the appellant.

The appellant law partnership, a creditor of a bankrupt management company, brought an action under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act to set aside a transfer of assets to a related company.

The motions judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding it was barred by the six-year limitation period in the Limitations Act or by the equitable doctrine of laches.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance is neither an action on a simple contract nor an action upon the case, and thus is not caught by the six-year limitation period.

The Court also found a triable issue regarding whether the respondents suffered prejudice sufficient to establish the defence of laches.

The appellant unions appealed an order dismissing their motion to vary an earlier order that appointed an interim receiver for Royal Oak Mines Inc. The original order explicitly directed the interim receiver not to make contributions to any employee pension plan without court authority.

The unions argued this was illegal as it undermined the collective agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the interim receiver was not the employer and had no funds to pay the benefits, and that the court had jurisdiction under s. 47(2) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to make the order.

The court also rejected the unions' claim that the interim receiver was liable for termination pay under the Employment Standards Act.