Jennifer K. Penman

The offender was convicted of second degree murder after brutally stabbing the victim following a day of drinking.

The Crown sought 15 years of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought the mandatory minimum of 10 years.

The court weighed the offender's difficult background as a refugee and his efforts at self-improvement against the brutal nature of the prolonged attack and his failure to seek medical help for the victim.

The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 13 years, along with DNA and firearms prohibition orders.

The accused, Abdirisaq Yabarow, facing a charge of second-degree murder, brought a motion seeking to admit an exculpatory statement he made to an acquaintance, Mohamed Khalinle, or to compel the Crown to lead this statement as part of its case.

The statement included a claim of self-defence.

The court considered the established exceptions to the rule against self-serving statements, including mixed statements and spontaneous statements.

The court found that the Khalinle statement did not qualify as a mixed statement because it was separate from other inculpatory statements adduced by the Crown, lacking a sufficient nexus.

It also did not meet the criteria for a spontaneous statement, as it was made after ample time for consideration and not upon confrontation with an accusation.

Consequently, the court ruled the exculpatory statement inadmissible at the instance of the accused and refused to compel the Crown to lead it, affirming the Crown's discretion in calling witnesses and the principle against self-serving evidence.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application to quash a search warrant and production order related to his electronic devices (cell phone and tablet) and to exclude evidence under s. 24(1) and (2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The application challenged the facial and subfacial validity of the orders, alleging a lack of reasonable grounds, overbreadth, material non-disclosure in the supporting information, and improper execution of the warrant outside the authorized time period.

The court dismissed the application, finding that reasonable grounds for the orders existed, there was no material non-disclosure that vitiated the authorizations, and the forensic examination of the devices was not required to be completed within the search and seizure period stipulated in the warrant, but rather was governed by the Criminal Code's detention regime.

The accused, Abdirizaq Yabarow, was charged with second-degree murder.

The Crown brought an application to determine the voluntariness and admissibility of two statements made by the accused.

The first statement was made to paramedics and police on October 4, 2017, when the accused was perceived as a victim seeking help for injuries.

The second statement was made to homicide detectives on October 6, 2017, following his arrest for murder.

The court found that the paramedics were not persons in authority and that the first statement was voluntary and admissible.

Regarding the second statement, the court determined it was voluntary and admissible up to the point where the accused expressed confusion and requested a rest, but any statements made thereafter were inadmissible as police questioning should have ceased at that juncture.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to exclude the voluntary portions of either statement.

In a second-degree murder trial, the Crown applied to admit three graphic autopsy photographs of the deceased.

The defence opposed, citing prejudicial effect and proposing alternatives such as limiting the number of photographs or presenting them in black and white.

The court applied the balancing test of probative value versus prejudicial effect, finding the photographs highly relevant to central issues including intent, self-defence, and a potential third-party suspect theory.

The court emphasized that modern juries are capable of dispassionate evaluation and concluded that the significant probative value of the photographs strongly outweighed any potential prejudicial effect.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to limit the photographs, as doing so would undermine their evidentiary purpose.

The Crown's application was granted, allowing the introduction of all three full-colour autopsy photographs.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application to adduce evidence of a third-party suspect.

The defence sought to call witnesses and introduce video surveillance to establish that another resident of the victim's building had animus, motive, and opportunity to commit the murder.

The court applied the McMillan test and found that the proposed evidence established a sufficient connection between the third party and the crime.

The application was granted, as the probative value of the evidence outweighed its slight prejudicial effect.

The Crown sought to admit utterances made by the accused, Najib Amin, during an undercover police operation in his first-degree murder trial.

The defence opposed admission, citing principles from R. v. Hart.

The court, applying the Hart factors as a framework, found the utterances admissible, concluding that their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect and that police conduct did not constitute an abuse of process.

The ruling specifically addressed four categories of utterances, finding them all admissible with one requiring a specific instruction to mitigate prejudice.

The defendant, Courtney Salmon, was found guilty by a jury of human trafficking, receiving material benefit from human trafficking, procuring/exercising control, and receiving material benefit from sexual services for consideration.

The Crown sought a global sentence of ten years of incarceration, while the defence proposed five years.

The court applied sentencing principles, considered aggravating and mitigating factors, and utilized the "whole panoply of factors" from R. v. Tang and R. v. Miller to assess the seriousness of the human trafficking offences.

The court conditionally stayed counts for procuring/exercising control and receiving material benefit from sexual services under the Kienapple rule, finding a sufficient factual and legal nexus with the human trafficking charges.

A global sentence of six years of incarceration was imposed for the remaining counts, to be served concurrently.

The court also applied pre-trial custody credits, including additional credits for harsh conditions (Duncan) and strict bail (Downes).

Ancillary orders included a non-communication order, DNA sample, lifetime weapons prohibition, forfeiture of electronic devices, and 20 years registration under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial for first degree murder following a preliminary inquiry.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on motive, opportunity, and after-the-fact conduct.

The reviewing court applied the test for committal, assessing whether there was any evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict.

The court found that the combined evidence of the accused's motive, presence in the building, and attempts to conceal his identity was reasonably capable of supporting an inference of guilt.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.

Appeal from conviction on five counts of sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code and one count of sexual exploitation under s. 153.

The appellant, a modeling agent, was convicted of sexual offences against three male models.

The jury was unable to reach a verdict on one count.

The appellant raised multiple grounds of appeal including failure to grant severance, failure to declare a mistrial, directed verdict applications, prior consistent statements, and Crown closing address issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The accused, a transgender woman charged with murder, sought to introduce expert sociological evidence regarding the prevalence of violence against transgender people to support her claim of self-defence.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed evidence lacked logical relevance to the specific facts of the case, was unnecessary as the expected reactions to violence were not outside the normal experience of a jury, and carried a potential for prejudice that significantly outweighed its minimal probative value.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder, sought to exclude a videotaped statement made to police, alleging a breach of her s. 10(b) Charter right to consult counsel without delay.

The court found a minor s. 10(b) breach due to a police officer's general practice of not facilitating counsel contact at the hospital.

However, the court determined that the subsequent statement was not obtained as a consequence of the breach, as there was a "fresh start" after the applicant consulted duty counsel, and the applicant would have spoken to the police regardless.

Applying the Grant factors, the court concluded that the breach was minor, had no impact on the applicant's Charter-protected interests, and society's interest in a trial on the merits favored inclusion.

The statement was ruled admissible.

The accused pleaded guilty to four serious offences: making child pornography, possessing child pornography, sexual assault, and counselling a person under 16 to touch her with an object.

The offences involved her very young son and were discovered through international cooperation between American and Canadian authorities.

The Crown sought a long-term offender designation and a sentence of six to eight years.

The defence sought a five-year sentence with no long-term offender order.

The court imposed a six-year sentence (apportioned as 3.5 years for sexual assault concurrent with 3.5 years for invitation to sexual touching, 2.5 years consecutive for making child pornography, and 2 years concurrent for possession of child pornography) and declined to impose a long-term offender designation, finding the accused posed a low risk of reoffending based on psychiatric evidence.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to introduce a video statement from witness Jason Cotterell, who did not testify, as an exception to the hearsay rule.

The Crown argued the statement met the criteria of necessity and threshold reliability.

The court found that while portions of the statement describing events after the robbery were sufficiently corroborated by video evidence and a recovered projectile to meet the threshold reliability test, the Crown failed to establish necessity.

The police did not make reasonable efforts to secure the witness's attendance, waiting two months before attempting service and failing to pursue available contact methods such as Instagram or the witness's known contacts.

The statement was ruled inadmissible.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, as well as his sentence.

The offences occurred at a detention centre where the appellant and three co-accused attacked a fellow inmate in his cell.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by drawing inferences to fill evidentiary gaps regarding what occurred inside the cell where there was no video surveillance.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction for aggravated assault but set aside the convictions for assault with a weapon and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace on the basis of the Kienapple principle.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in law by bifurcating the sentence, ordering part of it to be served concurrently and part consecutively.

The sentence was varied to two and one-half years to be served consecutively to the appellant's existing sentences.

The appellant was convicted on 16 of 17 charges including exercising control, procuring, receiving material benefit from procuring, sexual assault, robbery, theft under $5,000, fraud under $5,000, uttering threats, and assault.

He was sentenced to 8.5 years imprisonment less 3 years pre-trial custody.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his conviction and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's credibility findings were open on the record, that the similar fact evidence was properly admitted, and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed and leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of five firearms offences arising from allegations that he transferred a firearm while on bail for unrelated robbery charges.

He was sentenced to 4 years and 6 months' custody, less 3.92 years' credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the ground that the verdict was unreasonable and sought leave to appeal his sentence, challenging the denial of enhanced pre-sentence custody credit under section 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code on Charter grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal but granted leave to appeal sentence and adjusted the credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused was charged with manslaughter following a fatal shooting in a barbershop.

The Crown alleged the accused aided or abetted the deceased in confronting the shooter, relying entirely on circumstantial evidence of their interactions before the incident.

At the close of the Crown's case, the accused applied for a directed verdict of acquittal.

The court granted the application, finding no evidence beyond speculation that the accused knew the deceased had a loaded handgun or that he possessed the requisite knowledge and intent for the unlawful act.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial on charges including robbery and firearms offences.

The sole issue was the sufficiency of the eyewitness identification evidence.

The principal witness had only a brief, dark observation of the assailants while intoxicated, and her subsequent in-dock identification was tainted by prior conversations and a flawed photo line-up.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded her jurisdiction by committing the applicant to trial where the identification evidence was so frail and uncertain that it amounted to no evidence at all.

The application was granted and the committal was quashed.

This appeal addressed whether informer privilege can protect an anonymous Crime Stoppers tip made to obstruct a police investigation.

The Court held privilege does not apply where, on a balance of probabilities, the caller intended to further criminal activity or interfere with the administration of justice.

It confirmed judges should presume privilege exists and determine applicability through in camera proceedings, often ex parte, with fairness safeguards for the defence.

The Court also confirmed judges may review the tip record and may require a preliminary exclusion or probity showing before full litigation.

The appeal was dismissed.